It is our pleasure to present this unique publication composed of papers written by talented young American students who participated in Terrorism Research Center internship within the framework of the Program “Security and Society in the Information Age” in 2019 at Collegium Civitas University in Warsaw, Poland.

Andrew Holub (Oakland University) worked on “An introduction to human evolved psychology and political violence: Implications for future directions in research and practice”; Meghan Lovett (University of Texas, Austin) analyzed the “Growing Threat of the Alt-Right”; Gar Lovejoy (University of Pittsburgh) looked “Inside the Dark Web”; Alex Thompson (Miami University) focused on the “Increasing Use of Post-Truth and Fake News in Political Discourse”; Kayla Ritchie (The University of Tennessee) posed the question “How Social Constructions are utilized in the Securitization of Migration”; Mara Royse (University of Texas, Austin) analyzed a case study on “Cultivating Children for War”; Brendon Fujisawa (California State University, Fresno) examined whether there is an “Effect of Rodrigo Duterte’s Policies on the Rise of Terror”; Albert James Contreras (University of Texas, El Paso) investigated the issue of the “Return of European Foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria”; Mason Connor Shuya (University of Texas, El Paso) analyzed the topic of “Mobilizing the Population in Reaction to Russian Aggression”; Seth Kraman (Miami University) examined the “Guidance Required for Protections of Cyber Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law”; and Eric Nesbitt (Michigan State University) looked at “The Scope of Cryptocurrency in the Information Age”.

We hope you will find the book interesting and valuable and we cordially invite you to learn more about “Security and Society in the Information Age” programming at: www.securityandsociety.org.
SECURITY AND SOCIETY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Volume 2

Katarzyna MANISZEWSKA, Paulina PIASECKA Editors

SRAS
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Dear Reader,

It is our pleasure to present this unique publication composed of papers written by talented young American students who participated in the Program “Security and Society in the Information Age” in 2019 at Collegium Civitas University in Warsaw, Poland.

The Program “Security and Society in the Information Age” is organized in Warsaw jointly by Collegium Civitas and SRAS (USA). Composed of summer school courses and semester or academic year study abroad opportunities, it aims at presenting global topics from the unique perspective of Central and Eastern Europe. Courses devoted to a wide range of history and security issues are designed with the region serving as a case study. They are taught in English and are aimed at ambitious students who are eager to really engage in and out of the classroom.

The participants are also given the opportunity to embark on a research internship in Warsaw at the Terrorism Research Center. Founded in 2006, the Terrorism Research Center (TRC) is a research unit within Collegium Civitas. The Center is one of the leading think-tanks in Poland with renowned experts participating in projects conducted by the Center. The main fields of activity include scientific research, analytical undertakings as well as education and raising awareness about security issues in the society. TRC focuses on a wide range of issues surrounding international terrorism and how to combat it, as well as on the impact of those phenomena on the functioning of the state and its citizens, both in the public and private sectors.

During the internship, the students are invited to work on their own research project, supervised by academic mentors. The interns conduct research, interviews, analysis, attend events and meet with experts and professionals.

This book is the result of the 2019 internship program at the Terrorism Research Center. The interns explored a variety of important security issues facing modern societies:
Meghan Lovett (University of Texas, Austin) analyzed the “Growing Threat of the Alt-Right”; Gar Lovejoy (University of Pittsburgh) looked “Inside the Dark Web”; Alex Thompson (Miami University) focused on the “Increasing Use of Post-Truth and Fake News in Political Discourse”; Kayla Ritchie (The University of Tennessee) posed the question “How Social Constructions are utilized in the Securitization of Migration”; Mara Royse (University of Texas, Austin) analyzed a case study on “Cultivating Children for War”; Brendon Fujisawa (California State University, Fresno) examined whether there is an “Effect of Rodrigo Duterte’s Policies on the Rise of Terror”; Albert James Contreras (University of Texas, El Paso) investigated the issue of the “Return of European Foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria”; Mason Connor Shuya (University of Texas, El Paso) analyzed the topic of “Mobilizing the Population in Reaction to Russian Aggression”; Seth Kraman (Miami University) examined the “Guidance Required for Protections of Cyber Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law”; Eric Nesbitt (Michigan State University) looked at “The Scope of Cryptocurrency in the Information Age” and Andrew Holub (Oakland University) worked on “An Introduction to Human Evolved Psychology and Political Violence: Implications for Future Directions in Research and Practice”.

The contributors paint in this book a complex picture of security challenges in today’s interconnected world. It is not merely an analysis of the issues; the authors look for solutions and the papers are accompanied by recommendations for administration, policy makers and for each of us living in modern societies and confronted with various security threats.

We hope you will find the book interesting and valuable and we cordially invite you to learn more about “Security and Society in the Information Age” programming at: www.securityandsociety.org.

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An Introduction to Human Evolved Psychology and Political Violence: Implications for Future Directions in Research and Practice

Andrew HOLUB

Abstract: Although media headlines may create the appearance that political violence is a new and burgeoning phenomenon in societies, its antecedents are entirely and undeniably at least as old as the human species. The study of human evolution can offer important insights into describing, explaining, predicting, and controlling political violence. Applying evolutionary theory has become, and will remain, an important cornerstone of the study of violence, including political violence. Doing so mandates a thorough understanding of the mechanisms of natural and sexual selection, and how these forces have designed minds with adaptations to solve problems presented by group living. The following is intended to be a brief introduction for students and scientists unfamiliar with the study of the evolved human mind, using human social violence as the model of illustration. In conclusion, recommendations for further developing scientific research into a metatheory to explain human (violent) behaviour is presented as a lofty, but increasingly tangible (through technological advances) endeavour for future researchers that will enable more effective social policies.

Key Words: Evolutionary psychology, Human group dynamics, Political violence, Future of scientific theory
Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology

Evolution by natural (and sexual) selection is the most credible, and comprehensive current scientific theory for the study of biological organisms. It undeniably offers useful explanations and workable hypotheses for disciplines from anthropology to zoology. From its formal postulation, evolutionary theory was applied to understand not only the origins of physical adaptations\(^1\), but also behaviours\(^2\). Within the past 40 years, evolutionary theory has been increasingly used in the study of human mind\(^3\) and behaviours\(^4\). Accordingly, the mind has been conceptualized as being composed of many evolved mechanisms evolved to solve specific problems related to survival and reproduction. These mechanisms are considered psychological adaptations that have evolved because they contributed to individual fitness and the successful replication of the corresponding genes. To understand how these adaptations work, it is important to grasp the sometimes deceptively simple process of evolution. Space limitations constrain a detailed explanation here, and so the reader is encouraged to peruse some of the comprehensive and accessible reviews of evolution\(^5, 6, 7, 8\) and evolutionary psychology\(^9, 10, 11\) that have been written

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\(^10\) Cosmides and Tooby, “From Evolution to Adaptations to Behavior: Toward an Integrated Evolutionary Psychology.

to date, for additional information. There are three necessary conditions for complex adaptations, such as sociality, to evolve in a population: 1) variability in traits, 2) heritability of these variations, and 3) a non-neutral impact of these variations on survival and reproduction. Simply, this means that organisms in a population must not all be exactly the same – there must be differences. The differences in the traits must be able to be passed from generation to generation – specifically meaning they have a genetic component. Finally, these differences cannot be neutral with regard to selection – meaning that possessing certain variants of a trait will make some organisms more successful in survival and reproduction over other variants. Over time, the variants of that trait will become more abundant in the population. This is the process of evolution by natural selection. Some variants of a trait may not aid survival, but rather reproduction – making an individual able to have more offspring who will themselves reproduce. This is sexual selection. Natural selection is the process by which traits impact survival, whereas sexual selection is the process by which traits impact reproduction. Both surviving to reproductive age and reproduction are necessary for the succession of traits via the replication of genes across generations. Often the term “evolution by natural selection” is used with the implication of sexual selection being included. The present paper takes care to use the two as separate, but related, processes of evolution.

There are three results of evolution: adaptations, by-products, and noise. Most relevant for the present work are adaptations. Adaptations are solutions to adaptive problems. Adaptive problems are anything that hinder the ability of genes to successfully replicate themselves and increase their abundance in a population. They are countless and specific and can relate to either survival – such as acquiring food (energy); or reproduction–such as attracting (or selecting) a mate. It is worth noting that natural selection operates on the level of the genes. Ultimately, it is copies of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that are passed from one generation to the next, not traits themselves. The genes of DNA provide the building blocks for the

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13 Darwin, *The Descent of Man*.
macroscopic traits that are labeled adaptations. An adaptation is only recognizable in terms of the adaptive problem it has evolved to solve. Further, it need not be a physical characteristic. Buss (2019) provides a summary of the evolved psychological mechanisms (EPM) of the human mind:

1. An EPM exists in the form that it does because it solved a specific problem of survival or reproduction recurrently over evolutionary history
2. An EPM is designed to take in only a narrow slice of information
3. The input of an EPM tells an organism the particular adaptive problem it is facing
4. The input of an EPM is transformed through decision rules into output
5. The output of an EPM can be physiological activity, information to other psychological mechanisms, or manifest behaviors
6. The output of an EPM is directed toward the solution to a specific adaptive problem.

Therefore, the human mind is conceptualized as being comprised of numerous, domain-specific, modules, each designed to process information related to a particular adaptive problem and produce an output that will mitigate it. Such a conceptualization is useful for understanding why, when it comes to social dynamics, human behaviours are so often irrational, counterintuitive, hypocritical, and even dangerous. Social behaviour, including political violence, provides the perfect example of the mind as a disjointed system of many relatively independently functioning information processors.

Evolution of Human Group Dynamics

Humans have been shaped through selection pressures to be extremely social, a characteristic shared by the closest phylogenomic relatives to humans. Indeed, group living is common in all species of the Hominidae

family, bonobos (*Pan paniscus*), chimpanzees (*Pan troglodytes*), and gorillas (*Gorilla gorilla*) with the genus *Pongo* being the notable exception. Living in groups must have produced many benefits in order for it to become common among primates and ubiquitous for humans (see Lidfors, 2018 for a review). For instance, living in a group of allies provides an individual protection from rivals (as well as potential predators). Parenting responsibilities could also be shared amongst kin living in close proximity. Learning can also take place between individuals. Coalitions working together could produce a food surplus, first through hunting larger game, and then from the advent of agriculture. Access to high-quality, calorie-rich, nutrient-dense food sources has been hypothesized to be the turning point for human evolution, as it produced circumstances that favored the evolution of the relatively large, and complex cerebral cortex and intelligence of humans. Perhaps not antagonistic to this idea, it has been proposed that the increase in size of a species’ typical social group is directly related to the evolution of larger, more complex neocortices in primates. Undoubtedly, ingenuity and creativity have allowed humans to solve adaptive problems in novel ways. For instance, other animal species are able to live in cold climates as a result of the long process of evolving physical adaptations such as blubber and thick fur. Humans lack such physical adaptations but have been able to survive and thrive in cold climates largely due to creating other solutions, such as fire or wearing the pelts.

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(adaptations) of hunted animals. Such creative solutions to adaptive problems are exclusive to humans, despite similar tendencies to live in groups existing across the animal kingdom. Therefore, it’s possible that human intellect co-evolved with the complexity of social groups.

In addition to sociality, many behaviours common to humans, such as non-reproductive copulations\(^25\), have been documented in other species of the *Hominidae* family. However, none of the Great Apes matches humans in the level of complexity in their social relations. Given the long evolutionary history of selecting sociality, human psychology is finely attuned to the behaviours of conspecifics. It is common wisdom that humans are very quick to form groups. Colloquially, anyone who has been to high school can attest to the intensity of human group dynamics. Sherif and colleagues (1961)\(^26\) demonstrated the extremity of groups processes in their famous Robber’s Cave experiment. Adolescent boys taking part in a summer camp were arbitrarily separated into two groups, and then pitted against each other in a week of sporting competitions. The conflict between the groups escalated so much that the experimenters had to intervene to prevent violence. The main focus of the experiment was about how group tensions could be diffused in the process of forming a larger group with superordinate goals. In this case, two groups in competition with each other were combined to form a new group that was in competition against a shared, external problem, to great success.

Henri Tajfel\(^27\) conducted classic social psychology research on the ease of group formation. Expounding upon Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm, Rebecca Bigler and colleagues\(^28\) have demonstrated that children can form


Evolution of Human Group Dynamics

intense, and long-lasting group affiliation based upon the arbitrary assignment of t-shirt color. Even brief, random group assignment under laboratory conditions is enough to illicit negative attitudes towards adults who are (experimentally) swapped between groups, from the members of the original group who are not swapped – a migrant bias effect\(^{29}\). The latter study demonstrates in-group favoritism characteristic of human social dynamics. Besides the ease of group formation, humans demonstrate an (often) extreme preference for in-group members, and corollary aversion to out-group members. These preferences manifest both psychologically and behaviourally. For instance, individuals have a tendency to exaggerate the similarity of members of an out-group, as well as a tendency to underestimate the similarities of members of an in-group (out-group homogeneity effect\(^{30}\)). Ambiguous behaviour is also more likely to be perceived as hostile when coming from strangers (i.e., out-group members\(^{31}\)). Humans have likely evolved such biases as a means of managing the threats posed by other humans. Conspecifics would have represented a major danger, either through aggression or disease\(^{32}\). Therefore, aversion or apprehension about strangers would likely have benefited ancestral humans and acted as a solution to adaptive problems. The tendency for in-group – out-group prejudices, hostility, and even violence, is a lasting result of selection favoring the avoidance of the dangers posed by other groups.

Although living in groups dispenses ample benefits to have been selected across evolutionary history, it also posed unique adaptive problems between the constituents\(^{33}\). Generally, living in close proximity means that


\(^{33}\) Lidfors, “Living in Groups”. 
individuals find themselves in competition for limited resources. The more of any shared resource (such as the food) than one individual takes for himself, the less of this resource available for the others in the group. Each individual’s personal interests drive him to take as much of the resource as he can, a mindset that will eventually exhaust the resource. This situation has been described as the “tragedy of the commons”\(^\text{34}\). The tragedy of the commons represents one of the major adaptive problems that must be overcome for larger, more complex groups to evolve. One of the solutions is status hierarchies, whereby individuals are allowed priority access to a resource at the deference of others in the group (see Cummins, 2016)\(^\text{35}\). Status hierarchies are particularly common amongst pack hunting species, in which a kill must be immediately divided between the members of the group. Among species in which hierarchical structure is not fixed and inherited, there are two means of attaining status: dominance and prestige\(^\text{36}\). Dominance is status achieved through size and physicality. Prestige is status achieved through knowledge and skills. Thus, there are multiple means ancestral humans could have ascended status hierarchies. At the top of a hierarchical structure may be found another solution to the adaptive problems of group living: leaders. Delegating decision-making authority to select individuals is extremely useful in arbitrating the allocation of acquired and common resources, which would reduce conflicts over consumption. Leaders would also facilitate organization and coordination of joint efforts to accomplish a larger task through a division of labour. For example, a large animal would have been difficult and dangerous for one ancestral man to hunt on his own, but his success would be greatly increased (as would his companions’) if he formed a coalition with other men to hunt. Such a coordinated effort would have been aided by the appointment of a leader. In exchange for such efforts the leader would usually


receive larger, or more desirable, shares of resources. However, he would also face greater risks, such as during hunting, or from discontent within his group. Leadership entails the gamble of accepting risk in exchange for the possibility of greater rewards through cooperation. Coalitional action would not only be limited to hunting prey animals but could also be targeted towards other humans as well. This is the basis of modern political violence.

Only humans and chimpanzees have been observed forming coalitions that attack and kill conspecifics\(^{37}\). This phenomenon seems particular to males of both species. It has been hypothesized that men have evolved adaptations specifically designed to facilitate hunting and coalitional warfare (i.e. the male warrior hypothesis\(^ {38} \). This is not to suggest that aggression is not common across all *Hominidae* species – it is, having evolved as strategy that confers advantages on the perpetrators. Buss and Shackelford (1997)\(^ {39} \) outlined seven adaptive problems for which aggression would be a solution: co-opting the resources of others, defending against attack, inflicting costs on same-sex rivals, negotiating status and power hierarchies, deterring rivals from future aggression, deterring mates from sexual infidelity, and reducing resource expenditure on genetically unrelated children (through infanticide). These adaptive problems are just as salient within the nebulous, modern geo-political structure as they would have been in ancestral human tribes. There is a debate about whether the culmination of aggression – homicide – is itself and adaptation\(^ {40} \), or merely a non-selected by product of violence surpassing its designed purpose\(^ {41} \). Nevertheless, aggression remains in human societies as a result of


intense selection pressures that have selected it over evolutionary time. The modern political landscape presents some slightly new manifestations of group dynamics that produce novel settings for the ancient adaptation of aggression.

Political Violence

It is tempting to think of contemporary political violence as the product of political parties, nation states, mass media, or any number of recent innovations of group dynamics, but the antecedents of this violence are integral, evolved features of human behaviour. How then can political violence be defined in modern contexts? By its nature, violence should include aggression, which can be defined as any behaviour that is intended to harm another living organism\(^42\). Violence usually carries a connotation of severity of consequences. The World Health Organization\(^43\) defines violence as: “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.” Therefore, violence connotes physical force, either real or threatened, with the intent of causing harm. Likewise, “political” indicates a relation to a system of human governance – deriving from Aristotle’s treatise *Politics*, “concerning the polis” (city state)\(^44\). Political violence can be considered the use of force among people for aims related to governance or leadership.

Politics is inherently social. Obtuse as this conclusion may be, it is important to clearly recognize that societies and governments only function as a product of, and through the maintenance, of human social interactions. It is easy to discuss politics as something “other”, existing and acting as


an independent agent. Government and society are not purely external forces operating on individuals, like gravity or radiation. Rather, they are forces in which individuals take active participation. Yet, it is absolutely the case that the degree of involvement may vary between political systems, and between individuals within a given system. These discrepancies in involvement can be a source of conflict between groups. Modern instances of political violence, such as the protests in Hong Kong\textsuperscript{45} (ongoing as of writing), can be thought of in the same light as a group of ancestral men revolting against a leader. Although this may seem reductionist, the core of the issue remains the same: the perception of inequity in resource distribution. Political rights and freedoms are perceived to be a resource, just as food, land, or mates would be. If one group monopolizes a resource at the expense of another, conflict will emerge.

Within a society, political violence may take many forms. At the pinnacle of intensity, political violence results in armed conflict between two or more groups – a civil war\textsuperscript{46}. Likewise, the severest of intergroup conflict is easily discernable in the form of outright physical violence. Both within a society and between societies, the victors of a conflict stand to reap substantial rewards. Throughout human evolutionary history, coalitional warfare would have been a route for victors to gain resources, including and especially mates (see Savage and Palmer, 2016\textsuperscript{47}). Although most of the Hong Kong protestors would not mention “finding a mate”, or “inequal resource allocation” as a cause for the violence directed towards the government, issues of wealth, freedom, and social status are unmistakably linked to the protests. These issues are by no means neutral to survival and reproduction, and thus human minds have evolved to attend to them. Therefore, at one level of analysis, political violence concerns local issues,


such as universal suffrage, but at another level of analysis, most of these local issues are related back to adaptive problems related to survival and reproduction. This difference in levels of analysis distinguishes the proximate and ultimate causes of behaviour, derived from Tinbergen’s (1963) famous four questions. Proximate levels of explanation consider the mechanisms of how a behavior is produced, while ultimate explanation account for why, from an evolutionary perspective, the behaviour exists. Often, proximate causes are rooted in ultimate causes. Therefore, political violence may occur because a populace dislikes a certain law enacted by the government, or because one group has developed antipathy towards a rival group, but the reason these conflicts exist is because of the activation of psychological adaptations responding to perceptions of adaptive problems, such as conditional acquiesce to leadership, out-group threats, and resource allocation.

As a final example, evolutionary theory provides useful explanations for phenomena that are intuitively difficult to understand, such as suicide terrorism. The topic of evolutionary psychology and terrorism is expansive, worthy of book length coverage, but it can be briefly introduced presently. Suicide terrorism seems contrary to adaptations that have been built to aid an organism’s survival and reproduction. It is difficult for most people to comprehend how a person could decide to sacrifice his/her own life for the purpose of ending the lives of strangers. Religiosity has been stressed as both a proximate and ultimate cause for suicide terrorism (religion itself being evolved) but does not itself constitute a sufficient cause since many religious people do not engage in suicide terrorism. Kin selection may provide the route through which suicide terrorism is maintained. In his

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Conclusion and Future Directions

The extraordinary benefits of living in groups have driven human evolution to an extreme sociality that has, at least in part, contributed to the extraordinary success (in terms of population growth, and expansiveness

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53 Liddle et al., “An Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology and Its Application to Suicide Terrorism,” 188.
of inhabited environments) of the species. Living in groups carries specific adaptive challenges which have subsequently driven adaptations. The complexities of modern political systems are inherently rooted in evolved, coalitional psychologies. The affiliative nature of humans disposes a quickness for group formation, and strong demarcation of in-group and out-group members. As such, human group dynamics across history, and today, are marked by aversion to out-group members, and tendency for violent confrontation when individuals of one group feel threatened by another group. It is worth noting that acknowledging that aggression is a human adaptation is an acceptance of neither inevitability nor acceptability, much in the same way that the ability to convert excess calories into fat stores in adipose tissue for future use is not accepted as inevitability condemning humans to morbid obesity and the associated shortened lifespan\textsuperscript{54}. The success of policies designed to reduce (political) violence will be determined by the strength of the research on which they are based. Therefore, future research will need to improve in order for major behaviour consequences to be implemented.

One of the directions for future research is further identifying and disentangling individual characteristics that dispose specific acts of political violence. Just as not every religious person engages in acts of terrorism, neither do all individuals perpetrate violence during times of inter-group conflict. There have been countless studies attempting to identify variables associated with the perpetration of violence, including individual features such as personality, neurology, and endocrinology; as well as external features such as childhood experience, and socioeconomic status. However, a further refinement of these numerous independent and dependent variables is needed. Political violence is not homogenous, therefore, there are probably meaningful differences in, for instance, willingness to perpetrate physical violence against fellow citizens within a given nation-state who differ in political ideology, and willingness to perpetrate violence against individuals outside of one’s country. Given the strong in-group, out-group distinctions that humans naturally draw, this research would investigate

differences in exactly where and why individuals differ in where they draw the line of “one of us” and “one of them.” Individuals draw dozens, maybe hundreds of such lines in their lives, but are not necessarily equally prone to violence against all out-groups. For some, racial differences are more salient than national differences, while for others, religion is primary variable for group affiliation. Of course, these grouping variables may not always be independent of each other. The complex interactions between individual differences in in-group categorization and out-group violence will require many additional studies, data, and sophisticated statistical modeling in order to represent these relationships.

The extant literature on human violence is already truly massive and in desperate need of replication, revision, refinement, and coalescence. Such an undertaking would be herculean, and possibly even outside of human capacity. However, one of the “dirty secrets” about the study of human behaviour, is the incompleteness of the disciplines. As yet, no metatheory has been established to comprehensively unite the breadth of research on the human mind and behaviours. Attempts to do so recall the South Asian parable of the blind men attempting to describe an elephant, with each touching a different part (trunk, tusk, tail, etc.) and subsequently summarizing the nature of the elephant in a partially correct, but incomplete manner (cited in Larsen and Buss55). Until all of the research collected thus far has been catalogued and analyzed in relation to each other, researchers and policy makers will continue to misunderstand human behaviour and implement ineffective and costly practices in the attempt to mitigate violence. Perhaps the greatest potential for future research lies in artificial intelligence, super computers, and machine learning. Any potential scientific theory about human violent behaviour would have to synthesize the glut of existing data. Simply compiling all of the relevant studies could take an entire lifetime for human, perhaps even longer. Artificial intelligence could much more quickly scan, identify, and catalogue the numerous relevant studies. Extremely fast information processors would also be

needed to analyze the sheer volume of data and model the variables. Hypothetically, the output would be a theory represented mathematically in an algorithm that organized all of the relevant variables needed to predict human violence. Such an algorithm would likely be colossal and compose hundreds, maybe thousands, maybe millions, maybe billions of variables. Thus, the ultimate goal for research on human violence, and behaviour more generally, needs to be finding a way to leverage emerging information processing technologies to synthesize existing research into a workable theory that can limit the scope and precisely direct future research. The process of scientific research is much less efficient than it could be, and metascience and the philosophy of science need to consider these questions about how the process of gathering information about the natural world can be improved as new technologies emerge in the 21st century. Such recommendations may seem lofty and tangential to an introduction to evolutionary psychological perspectives on political violence, but such considerations need to be made in order to move the discipline forward and come closer to actually answering the questions being asked. Most importantly, such improvements will help to mitigate and prevent the effects of human violence.

In closing, it is worth noting, that at present, the goal of living in a frictionless, peaceful society is beyond the capacity of the human species. Thomas More was truly correct when labeled such a paradise as *Utopia* — “nowhere”\(^{56}\). As outlined, living in groups presented adaptive problems for which aggression has been a useful solution. Assuming that humans can transcend their deeply evolved minds simply through collective desire and demands is naïve. Yet, it is equally untrue that evolution conveys genetically determined\(^{57}\), or unchangeable adaptations\(^{58}\). Evolutionary psychologists are quick to point out that evolutionary history is not a necessary

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58 Cosmides and Tooby. “From Evolution to Behavior: Evolutionary Psychology as the Missing Link.”
future. Advancing scientific theories that accurately summarize human behaviour as emerging from an evolved psychology, is the best hope for successful policies that will reduce (political) violence. It is a towering goal, but if scientific progress is made in the giant leaps described above, there is every reason to believe that more effective policies can be implemented. However, the potentially dramatic efficiency of a metatheory of human (violent) behaviour, would raise additional questions about the ethics of application. These considerations are grave and will need serious deliberation in due course. Drawing conclusions now would be premature, however, it is better to have these primary discussions before such applications are made. Studying evolution by natural and sexual selection can help explain the present, but science and technology are advancing at a pace that leaves it difficult to predict the future of human political violence.

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59 Al-Sharaf et al., “Thirteen Misunderstandings about Natural Selection.”


A Case Study of the Effect of Duterte’s Policies on the Rise of Terror

Brendon FUJISAWA

Abstract: President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines has enacted numerous extreme policies targeting drug dealers and users in the Philippines. Since his election there has also been an increase in Islamic terror activity. This paper seeks to explore whether these policies had an impact on the rise in terrorism in the country.

Keywords: Philippines, Drug war, Duterte, Abu Sayyaf

Introduction

Terrorism has been on the rise in the Philippines. The Global Terrorism Index\(^{60}\) ranked the Philippines in 2016 at 12\(^{th}\)^{61}, with a 7.089, and in 2018\(^{62}\) at 10\(^{th}\), with a score of 7.18. This increase is directly related to the increase in operations of Abu Sayyaf and Islamic State affiliated militant

\(^{60}\) The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a yearly report that assesses the terror levels of 163 countries, covering 97.7% of the world’s population. Each country is scored on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 representing the highest level of impact from terrorism. For more information, visit the Institute for Economics & Peace at http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/.


groups. In 2016 President Duterte was elected to the Philippine’s Presidential Office by popular vote. This began an officially sanctioned literal war on drugs that would erode the social infrastructure and normalize violence, used as a pretense to remove political opponents and drive the price of drugs high enough to incentivize drug groups to fund terrorist groups. This paper seeks to examine whether the current regime’s drastic social policies has influenced the increase in terrorist activity.

Conflict Background

The Philippines is home to a vast array of ethnic groups and political ideologies. The country is predominantly Catholic, with approximately 5% of the population identified as Muslim. The Muslim population is mostly concentrated in the southern region in Mindanao island and has spawned multiple different movements demanding independence for the Moor region. In 1971 the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded with the purpose of establishing an independent Moor region. Then in 1977 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was founded as a separate group from the MNLF. The MILF was extremely popular in the region, and in the 1980s gained a considerable amount of territory through popular support. Following the 1980s, both the MLNF and MILF transitioned into moderate political factions and began to negotiate with the government. Former members from both factions became the primary insurgents in the area after being ostracized from the MLNF and MILF, when both parties became more moderate.

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63 Ibid., p. 28.


Abu Sayyaf Background

The Abu Sayyaf (ASG) militant group has existed in the Philippines for approximately three decades\textsuperscript{66}. The primary motivations for this group are a) the independence in the predominantly Muslim regions of the South Philippines and b) to establish an Islamic Caliphate\textsuperscript{67}. After being ostracized from the MNLF for their radical views, ASG was formed. In the 1990s they shared close ties to Al Qaeda, but have since then separated from them\textsuperscript{68}. The organization has carried out various operations, from small scale kidnapping and extortion operations to larger coordinated attacks such as the Valentine’s Day Bombings in 2005 and the Siege of Marawi\textsuperscript{69}. For most of its existence, the group focused heavily on kidnapping operations. In the 1990s alone, they abducted American missionaries, tourists, and school children\textsuperscript{70}. More recently, they have aligned themselves with the Islamic State (IS), although there are conflicting reports about the nature of the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and IS. Some reports consider them a local affiliate, while others state that it is purely a symbolic relationship without any exchange of materials and funding\textsuperscript{71}. Abu Sayyaf is not the only group in the region, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Ansar al-Khalifa, and the Maute Group also operate in Mindanao. Each of them was formed after splitting from either the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or Abu Sayyaf\textsuperscript{72}. On March 25th, 2017 Abu Sayyaf Group, along with other Islamic State affiliated Muslim militant groups, seized the city of Marawi.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
Rodrigo Duterte

Duterte has enacted numerous radical policies which have had sweeping effects across the nation. Duterte’s 2016 campaign platform was based on nationalism, and a staunch zero tolerance policy to crime and corruption. Prior to becoming President, Duterte was the Mayor of the city of Davao, where he enacted many of the same tactics of extrajudicial killings and harsh punishments. One of the most noteworthy actions he has taken since becoming president, is the call for lethal direct action against drug dealers and users. Shortly after the election, he called for the extrajudicial killing of any drug users in one of his inaugural speeches, stating, “If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself as getting their parents to do it would be too painful.” Following this extreme political rhetoric, there have been a large amount of extrajudicial killings. As of the 30th September 2018, the Philippines Drug Enforcement Agency reported approximately 5,000 extrajudicial killings while in police custody, while the Philippine National police listed 15,000 deaths as “homicides under investigation” relating to the war on drugs. Additionally, Duterte has ordered that the military show no mercy for any opposition militants. In a brazen and profanity laced speech, Duterte, addressing the terrorists, said that “I will eat your liver if you want me to. Give me salt and vinegar and I will

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Besides targeting drug dealers, drug users and terrorists, Duterte has also targeted his political opposition. There are multiple instances where politicians critical of him and his policies have been arrested on charges which they claim are fabricated. Multiple Senators, and most recently the Vice President, who have vocalized their criticism of Duterte, have been arrested. After a Senator sought to open an inquiry about the extrajudicial killings, for example, Duterte’s response was, “I will have to destroy her in public.” The international community has also taken notice of these arrests, with the European Parliament and United Nations both officially adopting resolutions stating that the arrests are politically motivated.

**Changes in Society**

The extreme number of killings has led to pervasive changes in society. The director for Amnesty International’s South Asia Branch, Nicholas Bequelin said, “Fear has now spread deep into the social fabric of society.” This quote is representative of the general atmosphere where extrajudicial killings are normalized, even to the extent that there is now recognized slang amongst the population for various techniques. A New York Times photojournalist, Daniel Berehulka, who was in the Philippines in 2016, documented the murders taking place under the war on drugs. He reported:

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80 Ibid.


Not far from where Tigas was killed, I found Michael Araja, shown in the first photo below, dead in front of a “sari sari,” what locals call the kiosks that sell basics in the slums. Neighbors told me that Mr. Araja, 29, had gone out to buy cigarettes and a drink for his wife, only to be shot dead by two men on a motorcycle, a tactic common enough to have earned its own nickname: riding in tandem83.

The Question of a Failed State

Although the Philippines is not considered a failed state, by some classifications, its normalization of violence suggests that it is. The classifications of a failed state vary among scholars84. While the specific definitions are contested, there are two common overall concepts across multiple definitions; the idea that the state no longer has a monopoly on violence or its escalation85. Both criteria for a failed state have been present in the Philippines after Duterte’s call for civilian violence against drug dealers and users. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described weak and failing states as global pathways that facilitate the movement of criminals and terrorists86. While the situation is not as dire as other failed states (e.g. Somalia) since the government still exists, the encouragement of civilian led violence has allowed an insurgency to foster and grow in the same way as a failed state does.

Narco-terrorism

While drug use goes against Islam, multiple hardline Islamic terror groups have forgone the strict interpretation of this rule in order to further their

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85 Ibid.

own interests\textsuperscript{87}, both financially and to supplement their fighters\textsuperscript{88}. In an interview with the World Bulletin, Colonel Rodrigo Gregorio of Joint Task Sulu stated that the military had been in contact with Abu Sayyaf members who have been killed while possessing drug paraphernalia and behaving in a manner consistent with drug users\textsuperscript{89}. Drug dealing groups in the area have supported Islamic militant groups to destabilize the region in order to facilitate the drug trade\textsuperscript{90}. The harsh prohibition has also created unique economic situations for drug traffickers, allowing them to raise prices and increase their profits\textsuperscript{91}. According to the Philippines Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the street price of cocaine has gone from P3,600 (USD 72) in 2015, to over P5,000 (USD 100) in 2017\textsuperscript{92}. This price increase has further incentivized the drug groups to fund Islamic terror in order to destabilize the region further.

\textbf{Polarization}

Another contributing factor in the rise of extreme militants is the lack of protection for political moderates. In the Philippines, the protection for moderate political parties has not only been removed but replaced with active persecution. As previously mentioned, many of Duterte’s political opponents have been targeted with trumped up charges against them.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
which they claim are planted or fabricated in order to silence them\(^93\). The removal of moderates and opposition forces in a country leads to an unstable political situation which further fosters terrorists ability to operate due to the internal strife that is created\(^94\). A 2005 report examining the factors in the rise of terrorism in a country stated, “Perhaps the surest link between state failure and terrorism, however, is to be found where governments cannot or will not protect political moderates”\(^95\). By removing any moderate factions, a positive feedback loop is established where extremism only spawns more extremism.

**Extraneous Factors**

While the current regime’s social policies have exacerbated Abu Sayyaf and the Islamic State’s control on the region, there have been other extraneous factors not caused by the current administration that has facilitated their rise. The Philippines archipelago creates an extreme porous border that is expensive and complex to patrol. The region already was unable to adequately patrol the area before Abu Sayyaf and the Islamic State became significant players in the region, as evidenced in the rise of piracy and human trafficking that was endemic in the region far before Duterte took power\(^96\). This problem is further complicated by the Philippine’s neighbors to the south. Indonesia and Malaysia have long had problems with Islamic terror, and due to the porous borders, these problems led to an influx of foreign fighters to the Philippines. While foreign fighters were denied entry into the Philippines at airports, others were able to use

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\(^95\) Ibid., 393.

smuggling routes to enter the region and take up arms\textsuperscript{97}. Shortly after the battle, it was reported that at least 32 of the militant casualties were foreign fighters, with the number expected to rise as identities were further established. There are approximately 100 foreign fighters believed to be in the Mindanao region. Foreign fighters, unlike the marginalized local populations recruited, were encouraged to travel to the Philippines and join the militant groups there following the fall of the Islamic State in the Middle East\textsuperscript{98}. Duterte also cannot be blamed for the existing culture of explosives used for dynamite fishing in the Philippines that allowed militant groups to have plentiful access to bombmaking materials which further facilitate their operations\textsuperscript{99}.

\section*{Alternative Actions}

The lingering issue of Islamic terror in the Philippines could have been somewhat alleviated had these violent policies not been enacted. As previously stated, the choices to declare an all-out war on drug dealers was part of Duterte’s 2016 campaign. Had these drastic measures not been taken, possibly the Islamic violence could have been reduced. Of course, independently the war on drugs has been a humanitarian nightmare, but the terror that arose from this is a compounding problem that further complicates the issue. In the future, groups could take less drastic action, avoiding thousands of deaths in the streets and ensuring that punishment is carried out through official channels.

While keeping violence and other extreme actions limited to state actors does provide a certain degree of stability, it is insufficient. It has been


shown that in regimes with higher amounts state sanctioned violence, there is a higher incidence of anti-state violence during an insurgency. This suggests that any type of violent solution will only make an insurgency worse.

**Strategic Importance of the Philippines**

Any death from terrorism is unacceptable, but the regional stability of the Philippines is important for numerous reasons. China’s expansion into the South China Sea challenges the other claimants to the area. The Philippines claim 9 of the islands, as well as allowing United States military assets to establish a base in the Northern Philippines. This strategic positioning, as well as cooperation between the United States’ and the Philippines’ militaries, is a critical relationship in matching Chinese expansion in the area. Should extremist action continue and escalate, this would threaten the stability of the area by drawing important resources towards stabilizing internal threats.

**Conclusion**

The degradation of social order and the rule of law, removal of moderates, and changes in the drug economies have all accumulated to exacerbate the Islamic terror issue in the Philippines. Islamic terror likely would have been an inevitable issue, but the drastic attempts at quelling the drug issue have considerably exacerbated the problem. With the human

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cost of the conflict already numbering in the thousands, it is difficult to justify this brazen assault on human rights when it is also exacerbating terrorism in the area.

Bibliography


Cultivating Children for War: A Case Study Comparing US Military Recruitment Strategies and Islamic State Radicalization Tactics

Mara ROYSE

Abstract: This paper analyses the nuances of opposing systems of government and how they build societies around a militarized culture to attract children to their ranks. This will include a case study of the strategies implemented by the United States’ Military to maintain an all-volunteer force by encouraging enlistment and targeting youth with heavy advertisement and enticing benefits; and an additional case study comparing the U.S. Military strategies to the sophisticated and forceful tactics of the Islamic State caliphate to conscript all members of society into their ideology and world of perpetual violence. Extreme differences are noted that come naturally when comparing a democratic republic to a violent authoritarian extremist organization, but there are also significant similarities, as the United States acts as a sovereign state and the Islamic State seeks to become its own sovereign entity. This paper focuses on the recruitment of children as child soldiers, terrorists, and martyrs, who continue to be used in conflicts around the world, even where international humanitarian law is widely recognized and made legitimate on a global scale. Consequences of recruiting children will be recorded, and broader suggestions pulled from various think takes and international organizations will be woven into the conclusive remarks.

Keywords: Children, Radicalization, Recruitment, United States Military, Islamic State, Militarization, Targeting Youth, Socialization of Violence, Martyrdom, Glorification of War
Introduction

Around the world, state and non-state actors target children to join their ranks. Whether it be for the purpose of protecting and maintaining state interests at home and abroad, or to impose radical ideologies and terror on an unfair, unjust world, people fight for their cultural identity and beliefs. Those fighting, seek to protect themselves and others from opposing values and beliefs that threaten their way of life and ability to be successful. These ‘threats’ have historically demanded collective action and the mobilization of all members of society, especially those that represent the future fighting force: children. In 2001, Dr. Peter Singer, author of Caution: Children at War, documented that thirty-seven of fifty-five ongoing or recently ended conflicts (including both state and non-state actors) had children below the age of eighteen serving as combatants; eighty percent of those conflicts involving children included fighters below the age of fifteen103.

As we move into the modern era, responsible state actors are seeking more ethical ways to perpetuate war, including working to eliminate the use of children in military operations and limiting child exposure to hostilities. Still, children in countries that use volunteer forces remain targets of rigorous, persuasive advertisement and subversive recruitment strategies. Meanwhile, state and non-state actors that refuse to comply with international codes of ethics persist in their use of children as cheap weapons of war. Violent extremist groups manipulate children to create cultures of violence; to forcibly sculpt societies where extreme ideologies idolizing death and encouraging hatred is the norm.

This paper reviews how and why children are cultivated for war, comparing the strategies of U.S. Military recruiting in the era of the United States’ “War on Terror” to the caliphate’s tactics of radicalization in the Islamic State war of jihad.

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Defining the Child

According to Article 1 of the United Nations (UN) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a “child” is defined as any individual below the age of eighteen\textsuperscript{104}. Under this Convention, UN international law states parties must take “all feasible measures” to ensure that members of armed forces under the age of eighteen do not take a “direct part in hostilities”\textsuperscript{105}. However, Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child was essential in allowing state actors to recruit below the age of eighteen, given written parental permission and proper documentation verifying a child’s age\textsuperscript{106}. When the Convention took place in 2000, the United States military was recruiting approximately fifty thousand qualified volunteers at age seventeen each year, so this Article was especially crucial; the U.S. Military continues to maintain the minimum recruitable age of seventeen (with parental consent) to this day\textsuperscript{107}. In the United States, 99.75 percent of the total enlisted force are ages eighteen and older by the time they complete training; being able to recruit seventeen-year-olds thus presents little to no setbacks in operations of the U.S. Military, even with the limitations around exposure to hostilities\textsuperscript{108}.

On the other hand, and in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, non-state actors are not allowed to involve children in any form of participation of military operations, especially if these operations expose them to hostilities\textsuperscript{109}. This is to say that only sovereign states recognized by the international community are allowed to recruit and train children from the age of sixteen, as they are able to control paperwork and validate state-issued identification cards. Of course, the Islamic State, although not recognized as a sovereign state, act as their own sophisticated,


\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 791.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 792.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
state-like entity – controlling media, education, religion, and military operations. The IS sees children as weapons, more valuable than adults, and the right of the child is abandoned for the sake of accomplishing IS missions and socializing IS ideologies.

The following sections of the paper will explore the reasons why children are recruited, how they are recruited, the consequences of targeting children, and suggestions for the future in relation to both the U.S. Military and the Islamic State.

Why Children are Recruited: U.S. Military

Since the draft calls came to an end in 1973, the United States has not required compulsory military service, requiring the U.S. Military to spend more time and money to recruit an all-volunteer force. Targeting children with effective advertisement is necessary to persuade the next generation of fighters to join the cause, and the Pentagon effectively uses approximately $15,000 per each new recruit in order to achieve its annual recruitment goal. During Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17) alone, approximately 165,000 people were successfully recruited into the active duty enlisted force; 8,500 into the active duty officer corps. These recruits were necessary to maintain and/or increase upon the current numbers of 1.3 million active duty personnel in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force (as those who have completed their tour of duty retire, exit, depart, or resign).


111 Ibid.


115 Ibid.
Because the number of necessary recruits for the U.S. Military are high, implementing rigorous recruiting strategies and spending millions on advertisements each year is crucial.

Enlisted recruits make up ninety-five percent of total recruits yearly; between thirty and thirty-five percent of FY17 enlisted recruits in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and nearly fifty percent of FY17 enlisted recruits in the Marines were ages seventeen or eighteen\(^{116}\). Approximately eighty-five percent of all enlisted Marine recruits are between the ages of seventeen and twenty; seventy percent all other branches’ recruits are between the ages of seventeen and twenty\(^{117}\). Considering the largest pool of recruits each year consists of those who recently graduated high school, the U.S. military is smart to target those below the age of recruitment. Additionally, the Fair Labor Standards Act in the United States permits minors to legally begin working as early as fourteen years of age (with limitations on hours) and fully enter the work force at age sixteen (the same minimum age a minor is legally allowed to drop out of high school)\(^{118}\). The U.S. Military must compete with the current economy to attract well-qualified candidates, and thus, if they are to continue to maintain an all-volunteer force, must heavily target children, even if they are below the legal minimum age of recruitment (seventeen).

Currently, the job market is hot in the private sector, and President Trump and his administration are working to increase the overall numbers of the military after years of downsizing, making recruiter’s jobs even more difficult\(^{119}\). Other limitations preventing recruit eligibility include educational achievement (must have a high school diploma or GED at a minimum), possessing a criminal record, a history of drug use, physical fitness ability, and tough medical requirements that restrict people with color-blindness,

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 22–23.
\(^{117}\) Ibid.
allergies, eczema and much more\textsuperscript{120}. In a 2018 \textit{New York Times} article, the Army reported that nearly two-thirds of young adults are not eligible to be recruited due to poor physical fitness or “other issues such as drug use”\textsuperscript{121}. Age is also a limiting factor, as the maximum age you may enlist ranges from twenty-eight to thirty-nine depending on the branch; this serves a dual purpose, ensuring that those in military service are healthy and physically fit for duty, and because full retirement benefits may only be received after twenty full years of service\textsuperscript{122}.

All of these factors considered, the U.S. Military pouring in massive amounts of money to engage with children comes as no surprise. It is necessary to ensure force sustainability and growth. Additionally, the U.S. government does not wish for war to become a family business and aims for the military to resemble the demographics and diverse socio-political perspectives of the United States. In order to preserve the integrity and proper representation of American values, military recruiting is targeted at the entire American population of children, hoping to encourage continued national support and military volunteerism. Reading onward, it becomes clear that this is a stark contrast to the Islamic State objectives of transforming all of society into fighters for their cause; however, the idea that creating a society supportive of your values and interests remains the same, and is necessary for maintaining an effective fighting force.

\section*{Why Children are Recruited: Islamic State}

Violent non-state actors have many reasons for recruiting and using children in combat. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), children are recruited by terrorist and violent extremist groups for the following reasons: visibility and propaganda, demography, 


\textsuperscript{121} Philipps, “As Economy Roars, Army Falls Thousands Short of Recruiting Goals.”

community expectations, economic considerations and effectiveness, control, and tactical advantages\textsuperscript{123}.

In 2017, UNODC wrote that within a six-month data set of Islamic State propaganda, there were 254 recorded events that included images of children; thirty-eight percent of those images were “children engaged in acts of violence or being exposed and normalized to violence”\textsuperscript{124}. The images are used to shock, recruit internationally, and ultimately to show the power and merciless resolve that the Islamic State is capable of\textsuperscript{125}.

In poorer areas where there are more fatal cases of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), children often outnumber adults, thus making them the most available to recruit (and abduct)\textsuperscript{126}. In areas where violent non-state actors are seen as a defensive force against other violent actors (state and non-state), families and communities expect and encourage children to join the fight; in areas where the violent extremist and terrorist organizations are not widely supported, children are easier to manipulate, recruit, and abduct than adults are, and thus become the most viable option to maintain/expand support and power\textsuperscript{127}.

As members of the force, children require less food to survive and can be paid little or nothing at all, making them more economically viable than adult fighters\textsuperscript{128}. Thanks to the evolution of warfare and an increase in lightweight, easy to use small arms (which are more poorly regulated than larger weapons with greater firepower), children are also capable of being just as effective as adults in combat\textsuperscript{129}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
Because children appear less suspicious, they are able to get closer to targets and spy, deliver messages, and undertake suicide attacks much easier\textsuperscript{130}. They are also less capable of understanding or analyzing risk, and therefore display less anxiety; compared to adults, they also have a higher propensity for following orders without asking questions\textsuperscript{131}.

By forcing the indoctrination of children into the Islamic State, the IS is also able to fan the flame of extremism from the beginning of one’s life, ensuring Islamic State ideology of hate and violence will be passed on for generations\textsuperscript{132}. As noted by Quilliam, a think-tank based in London and focused on counter-extremism:

\begin{quote}
Islamic State … is not just a rebel group, but an aspiring state, and it needs societies, not just soldiers. As such, its recruitment tactics feed into its long-term strategy by enrolling the whole family, not just youth … Children watching from the outside come to believe that the practices they witness are the norm, and a positive course of action for them”\textsuperscript{133}.
\end{quote}

The Islamic State needs its methods and ideologies to become normalized; they create a society of families and communities where the children are brought up to believe and trust in IS systems and values, so that generations to come will remain homogenous and supportive.

It is important to note that girls are also sought out for specific and malicious purposes. Young girls are used frequently in propaganda as they attract more media attention than young boys\textsuperscript{134}. The recruitment of girls also contributes to establishing a normalized culture, creating functional households where terrorists are taken care of by wives who birth and raise the next generation of IS fighters\textsuperscript{135}. This attracts future recruits and

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik, “The Children of Islamic State.” \textit{The Quilliam Foundation} (2016), 30–33.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 35.
successfully demonstrates the Islamic State’s ability to build a sustainable society\textsuperscript{136}. Girls are also subject to systematic sexual violence and are often used and sold as sex slaves; the use of sexual, gender-based violence bolsters the Islamic State’s power through increased financing, the recruitment of male fighters, and the destruction of existing communities of the non-compliant, resistive ‘other’\textsuperscript{137}.

In summary, the Islamic State exploits and manipulates children as they search to manifest their desires of statehood and expand the reaches of their violent ideology, successfully depriving children of their basic needs and internationally recognized fundamental human rights.

“Socialisation involves initially interacting with children, usually in public spaces... and encouraging engagement... by offering free toys and candy, or the opportunity to hold [a] ... flag, and in some cases, weapons. At this stage, children are exposed to... ideology and are drawn in through the narrative of the so-called... military successes, its utopian society, and the alleged benefits for those who have already joined”\textsuperscript{138}.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Benotman and Malik, “The Children of the Islamic State,” 35.
How Children are Recruited: U.S. Military

After the Twin Towers fell on 11 September 2001, the shock of terror drove the United States to quickly become a militarized state, where security, vigilance, and punishment resulting from stricter law enforcement sharply increased. Eighteen years later, the generation of those born into the War on Terror are coming of age, eligible to take up arms and continue the fight that once belonged to the prior generation. One of the longest military campaigns in United States history, the Global War on Terrorism has permitted the creation of a culture around military structure and discipline. Radio, television, film, and gaming platforms distribute media glorifying war heroes and the power of U.S. military forces and technology, all the while demonizing existing threats to the U.S. and its allies. Military-preparatory institutions have been created and spread throughout the nation, including the four-year Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) program in high schools, from which approximately forty percent of all participants enter the U.S. Military. Recruiters’ assigned ‘zones’ are determined geographically by the location of existing school districts, and there are monetary incentives for efficient and fast recruitment.

The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001/2002 includes a section that explains how the act gives U.S. Military recruiters access to high school students’ personal information, equivalent to that given to private sector employers and college recruiters, without requiring the obtainment of prior parental consent. With this information, recruiters are able to send letters to students and call both them and their households. Recruiters


141 Ibid., 224.

142 Ibid., 226.

143 Ibid.
also conduct in-person visits to schools, which includes anything from setting up booths in the cafeteria and handing out pamphlets, rolling in an eighteen-wheel cinema van with virtual tank simulators and rock walls, to landing Blackhawk helicopters on the baseball field\textsuperscript{144}. Online, recruiters comb through social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Reddit; as technology advances and kids interact with less traditional forms of media, social media becomes the new best way to reach out to potential recruits\textsuperscript{145}.

Media advertisement targeted at youth also include PG13-rated (Parents’ Guidance for those age thirteen or younger) big-budget Hollywood films glorifying the military and presenting military duties and way of life in a positive light\textsuperscript{146}. All branches of the military and the Department of Defense (DoD) have liaison offices on the same floor of a building in Los Angeles, California, so that they can work closely with Hollywood producers and directors\textsuperscript{147}. Any movie that displays U.S. Military bases, weapons, aircraft, ships, and personnel wearing official uniforms, in order to receive military support must first be approved by military officials\textsuperscript{148}. This includes movies like \textit{Top Gun}, \textit{American Sniper}, \textit{13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Ben Ghazi}, \textit{Lone Survivor}, \textit{Twelve Strong}, the \textit{Transformers} series, and most recently, \textit{Captain Marvel}, which contributed to an Air Force constructed female-targeted ad campaign in a time when the Air Force was met with a pilot shortage of 2,000 people\textsuperscript{149}. The short-video-style ad campaign, released on International Women’s Day 2019, is titled, “Every Hero has an Origin Story,” and consists of different real-life female pilots telling their stories.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 73.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 73–74.
\end{footnotesize}
How Children are Recruited: U.S. Military

of how they became ‘superheroes’ through joining the United States Air Force, accompanied by heroic background music directly pulled from *Captain Marvel*[^150]. One of the women featured in the advertisement was Brigadier General Jeannie Leavitt, the first female fighter pilot of the Air Force, and the airman that helped prepare Brie Larson for the role of “Captain Marvel,” the main character of *Captain Marvel*: a strong-willed, brave ex-fighter-pilot-turned-superhero that saves the universe[^151]. Campaigns like these work to harness youth imagination and spark hope for future generations, drawing in children and young adults alike with fantasies of heroism, fame, and empowerment. Corporate media companies are fine with campaigns like this, where they may lose a little autonomy over their editorial work in exchange for extremely expensive and difficult to access equipment, as well as free use of real military personnel as extras and the opportunity to work with real military consultants[^152].

Former Spokesman of the Department of Defense Kenneth Bacon once said, “If we can have television shows and movies that show the excitement and importance of military life, they can help generate a favorable atmosphere for recruiting”[^153]. But while the U.S. Military is presented in a favorable way, the enemy of the United States is not so lucky. The U.S. Army launched its extremely successful, cutting-edge, free first-person-shooter computer game, *America’s Army*, in 2002, which accumulated six million registered users at the end of 2005, and, as of 2014, has had forty-one new releases/updates across different gaming consoles (including Xbox and PlayStation models[^154]). After 9/11 and the release of *America’s Army*, game companies began pushing out more war-theme games, and attempted to keep up with relevant conflicts, creating games like *Prisoner of War, Medal of Honor: Frontline, Desert Storm, Delta Force: Black Hawk Down*, and the *Call of Duty* series; games where players hunt insurgents,

[^150]: Ibid.
[^151]: Ibid.
[^153]: Ibid., 74.
[^154]: Stahl, “Have you played the war on terror?,” 122.
like the *Tom Clancy* series, *SOCOM: Navy Seals, Conflict Desert Storm II: Back to Baghdad*, and *Desert Combat* have also been manufactured\(^{155}\). Many of these games put a target on the people of the Middle East, with combat centered around the desert lands of the Middle East; these games and other media like it draw feelings of violence towards the Arab community, and the format of video games allow players to become desensitized to killing this ‘other.’ Additionally, commercial war games have created patriotic slogans like, “All Americans Pledge Allegiance. A Select Few Show It.” and “You don’t play. You volunteer”\(^{156}\). This type of branding, whilst helping gaming companies create loyal customers willing to ‘take up arms’ and ‘answer the call’ as each game sequel releases, also adds to the real number of recruits each year\(^{157}\). *America’s Army* sparked a surge of competitive games of the same genre, and thus popularized the military across the United States. One colonel once bragged that *America’s Army* has “achieved the objective of putting the Army in pop culture”\(^{158}\). Another sergeant noted, “Every seventeen-year-old that comes into my recruiting office has aspirations of being a Marine sniper because they grew up playing *Call of Duty* video games”\(^{159}\). Video games successfully ‘game-verte’ and normalize the use of violence for teens, especially against Middle Eastern terrorist threats and insurgents, while spotlighting patriotism and idealizing military duty.

Media, as well as the heavy presence of retired military JRTOC instructors and active recruiters, effectively socialize military values into American society starting from a young age. National holidays like Memorial Day and Veteran’s Day pay homage and respect to those who ‘fought for freedom and justice,’ formally acknowledging that service to the country is of the highest honor, and that your life in service is for the greater good of society. Civilians are constantly heard repeating, “thank you for your service,”

\(^{155}\) Ibid., 118–125.
\(^{156}\) Ibid., 125.
\(^{157}\) Ibid.
\(^{158}\) Ibid.
\(^{159}\) Rosendale and Leidman, “Locked-in on Our Youth,” 23.
and military members are proud to serve. This support and recognition is necessary for the maintenance of an all-volunteer force, and as described later, the socialization and establishment of American military culture is necessary – just like the systematic socialization of ideologic violence, terror, and death propagated by the Islamic State is necessary for them to create the illusion of legitimacy and functionality.

Besides extensive forms of advertisement, the U.S. Military also uses a combination of short-term contracts and high-value social and economic incentives, consequently targeting low-to-mid-income households with benefits like large signing bonuses, housing, grocery allowance, extended paid leave (thirty days per year); life insurance and TRICARE services for all members, spouses, and dependents (covers medical/dental insurance); Veteran’s Affairs (VA) educational benefits like the Post-9/11 GI-Bill, which offers four years of paid tuition and a monthly stipend for housing and books (may be transferred to your spouse or dependent); and of course, incredible retirement benefits (members who retire with twenty years of service get a monthly annuity for life)\textsuperscript{160}. Nearly sixty percent of all who enlisted in FY17 came from neighborhoods with average annual household incomes of less than $63,000, and approximately forty percent were from households with annual incomes of less than $40,000\textsuperscript{161}. According to the U.S. Census of 2017, the median household income across the nation was $60,000\textsuperscript{162}. Giving financial incentive and tools that could help one afford an education and escape poverty encourages young adults to join the military, despite the risks. In fact, adolescents differ from adults in that, in their stage of development, they are more likely to take risk with regards to health and safety; U.S. and international law is purposefully in place to ensure that children are given special protections because of their


immaturity and deficiency to make choices with lifelong ramifications\textsuperscript{163}. As one study puts it into words, “it would be difficult for anyone, especially a seventeen-year-old child, to realistically calculate the benefits of an enlistment bonus, worth thousands of dollars, to the reality of war and the genuine potential of mortality”\textsuperscript{164}.

In any such case, the Islamic State does not ever permit the pining over such a choice. Under Islamic State caliphate, there is no freedom to choose.

How Children are Recruited: Islamic State

The Islamic State is capable of creating child terrorists and child martyrs through creating a society accustomed to death, exploiting feelings of humiliation and sentiments of frustration, and strategically targeting poor, broken communities in search of a better life. According to Dr. John Horgan in an issue of the journal \textit{Studies in Conflict and Terrorism}, there are six steps of socialization children outside of the Islamic State go through to become integrated into the IS forces: seduction, schooling, selection, subjugation, specialization, and stationing\textsuperscript{165}. In societies fully controlled by the Islamic State, the stage of seduction (propaganda, the reaching out of individual members, etc.) becomes less necessary, as the society and communities within the IS have been corrupted to the point that becoming a fighter is only natural, and ultimately the only acceptable way of life\textsuperscript{166}.

The Islamic State passes down its radical ideology, indoctrinating children from a young age and intensifying training from ages ten to fifteen, as they are sent to training camps where death and violence are desensitized (children as young as twelve have been noted to participate in executions of

\textsuperscript{163} Hollman, “Children’s Rights and Military Recruitment,” 229.

\textsuperscript{164} Rosendale and Leidman, “Locked-in on Our Youth,” 24.


\textsuperscript{166} Benotman and Malik, “The Children of the Islamic State,” 8–9.
the opposition) under shari’a law and the name of *jihad*\(^{167}\). The Islamic State uses a sophisticated method of mandatory education (homeschooling is *haram*/forbidden) and strict curriculum to ensure that freedom of thought is eliminated, so that all education gained may be used for the sake of the State and not the individual\(^{168}\). Subjects like social studies, philosophy, music, and drawing have been eliminated, and others are limited, like history textbooks that only teach the history of Islam, and geography textbooks that only name continents (delegitimizing existing sovereign states and presenting the world in a way that makes it appear ready to conquer)\(^{169}\). The majority of time in school is spent intensely studying the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad, and ‘*Jihadi Training*’ replaces normal physical education (P.E.), and the P.E. book teaches workout routines including swimming and wrestling, as well as instructions on how to assemble, fire, clean and store small arms\(^{170}\). Girls are veiled at the start of primary education and taught to be good wives, learning to stay and maintain a household for male fighters so they may be preserved to birth the next generation of fighters\(^{171}\). Teachers are forced to undergo shari’a training and repent for teaching ‘false, disbelieving’ curriculum; they are closely monitored to ensure they successfully pass on IS ideology, and teachers who refuse to conform are executed\(^{172}\). Teachers trusted by children are made vulnerable by lifelong exposure to violence, and readily accept the views taught to them without much, if any critical analysis; the Islamic State takes advantage of this vulnerability to “light the flames of extremism at a young age”\(^{173}\).

Those ages ten to fifteen, who show great promise, are systematically selected and taken to IS training camps, disciplined, specialized in a certain role (messenger, fighter, suicide bomber, etc.), and then given a specific

\(^{167}\) Ibid.
\(^{168}\) Ibid., 30–33.
\(^{169}\) Ibid.
\(^{170}\) Ibid.
\(^{171}\) Ibid., 8–9.
\(^{172}\) Ibid., 30–33.
\(^{173}\) Ibid.
mission/duty station. This is somewhat similar to the U.S. military, who provide a test – Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), to determine a person’s qualifications for certain vocations. The U.S. military then sends them to a basic training camp to prepare them for the profession of arms and specialization in a certain field (infantry, communications, intelligence, etc.), and then assign them to a specific mission/duty station based on their specialty. In terms of sophistication, the Islamic State has acquired the infrastructure and resources to act as efficiently as the Nazi party did when instrumentalizing German youth, and they function with all the power of a legitimate authoritarian state.

In addition to controlling formal education to guide the hearts and minds of children, mothers are given books and instructions outlining how to raise jihadi children; the socialization of Islamic State ideology requires the enrollment of the entire family. By creating a heritage of hatred, the IS successfully creates a society of terrorists to do their bidding. Socialization also includes engaging positively with children in public arenas, where IS members may distribute toys or candy, let kids wave an IS flag, and hold IS fighter’s weapons. Children give speeches encouraging others to join the fight, attracting new recruits, both child and adult alike, and IS fighters are made to look like war heroes, who lead utopian lives and receive benefits under the Islamic State. Children become lured by the ideology that their lives could become meaningful, fulfilled, and appreciated by the masses through life and death for the Islamic State; coming from a war-torn society with economic struggles, children are compelled to join and achieve higher economic status and gain enough power to overcome their feelings of disenfranchisement, humiliation, and powerlessness.

As discussed previously, the U.S. Military uses similar tactics to paint the portrait of American soldiers as heroes and protectors of American values.

176 Ibid., 34–35.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
If the military is not respected and supported by society, then that military and its government becomes susceptible to self-destruction. However, there exists a large difference in how these societies are structured, as one encourages participation through the promise, maintenance, and evolution of individual freedom, while the other strips away individual civil and human rights in the name of the state — forcing conformity, only granting protection, food, shelter, sex, and fame in exchange for giving up control of one’s own life. If one refuses to conform to the Islamic State way of life, they are made an example of and executed; even if one does not agree, fear drives them to submit to the ruthless regime\(^{180}\).

Besides crafting child soldiers for the purpose lifelong servitude to the caliphate, children are often the most willing age group to sacrifice their lives, and thus are often used as suicide bombers and in messages of martyrdom. Growing up in a world of violence contributes to the development of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in children, which results in the re-experience of violent events through play and in their dreams, or through images and sounds associated with that violence\(^{181}\). Children with PTSD fear the recurrence of violence, absorb a warped understanding of right and wrong, and begin to have a pessimistic outlook of the future, feeling that they will never reach adulthood\(^{182}\). These same children that grow up with “extreme poverty, violence, and institutionalized harassment during prolonged periods of conflict” are surrounded by violent political movements and “repeatedly exposed to a culture of martyrdom” under the Islamic State\(^{183}\). This ‘culture of martyrdom,’ where one’s death is made meaningful and beneficial to the community and the ‘greater good,’ becomes appealing to children who grow up with violence and hopelessness; they become overly-willing to give up their lives, rather than live them\(^{184}\).

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\(^{182}\) Ibid.

\(^{183}\) Ibid., 107.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., 108.
A culture built around martyrdom like this is key in establishing the loyalty and coming-together of many, as ethnic groups in conflict tend to empathize with those who practice self-sacrifice, and the experiences of the few are felt by the masses. Ongoing suffering, violence, and humiliation of a people permits the language, narrative, and cultural practices of that people to revolve around pain and death; this opens the door for martyrs to stand center stage, giving the audience the ability to view martyrdom as a means to work together to overcome conflicts around identity.

For the Islamic State, it was necessary to spread and normalize the concept of martyrdom in order to create a culture around it. They use children’s education, media, and programming directed at children to spread the message that martyrdom is equivalent to fame; and through martyrdom, one makes the ultimate sacrifice of their earthly desires with the promise of continuing life in paradise. This is necessary to make clear, as the Qur’an states, “Do not kill yourselves, for God is merciful to you. If any of you does these things out of hostility and injustice, we shall make him suffer Fire: that is easy for God” (4:29). The Islamic State works to distinguish martyrdom from suicide, making it seem as if the ultimate paradise is waiting for those who work as Allah’s soldiers and do His bidding against those deemed hostile and unjust. However, there is no need to brainwash children to believe that death is greater than life after generations of martyrs have existed, as most children are made to go their whole lives with an extreme appreciation for death and the afterlife.

This is what the Islamic State has accomplished. They use and have used martyred children in a calculated strategy to mobilize more adults and children, and celebrate martyrs in the media to the point where a mother’s greatest pride, and a child’s greatest accomplishment, comes out of being
a martyr\textsuperscript{190}. Propaganda revolving around martyrdom is pushed out: last-will-and-testament photos and videos of adult and child martyrs, images of civilians killed by enemies of the Islamic State, and a series known as “the smiling martyr”\textsuperscript{191}. The IS praises martyrs who chose to die for the cause, idolizing them. And those who die as innocent victims are mourned over, spotlighting the injustice perpetrated by the ‘other’\textsuperscript{192}. Child martyrs are almost always shown as alive and well in propaganda, showing how they will be joyously remembered by IS society, rather than showing images of dead ‘cubs’ that could potentially cause families to shield their children from joining ranks\textsuperscript{193}.

This culture of martyrdom created by the Islamic State contributes greatly to convincing communities and parents of the value of death for the cause and displays how children can contribute alongside adults\textsuperscript{194}. This ecosystem breeds justification for making a family business out of dedication of life and death to the IS. The more that die for the cause, and the more that are killed by the enemy, the more people are willing to take up arms and give up their lives for the cause. Destruction of a culture like this, or any widely accepted, homogenous belief, would prove extremely difficult, as it is so deeply engrained into each individual’s identity.

**Consequences of Targeting Children**

According to a pediatric journal on the effects of war, terrorism, and armed conflict on young children, kids aged zero to six in particular are in a developmental period distinguished by rapid and multiple physiological, cognitive, and emotional changes that build the foundations for perspective and positive and negative values; therefore, this is a time when exposure to traumatic events and violence would be most detrimental to long-term

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 119.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 120.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 123.
Children exposed to violence often show signs of PTSD, as well as warped emotional development and perceptions of right and wrong, making them difficult to integrate into non-violent society if they ever leave their roles as non-combatants. Dr. Mia Bloom and John Horgan explain that “violence is self-perpetuating; like a drug. It sparks excitement, and an adrenaline rush, and so demands a repeat performance, in the same way that a drug becomes addictive.” It becomes difficult to exist as a functional member of peaceful society when you experience withdrawal symptoms to a drug you have been exposed to all your life. This is the life of the former children of the Islamic State.

Another consequence of the indoctrination of children into the IS, is that it becomes increasingly difficult to change the culture of violence and combat ideological hatred as generations come to pass. The more control the authoritarian regime has, the more integral extremist values become to the society. It then becomes less likely that members of that society can develop the freedom of thought that would allow them to break away. The Islamic State has effectively brainwashed millions of people.

In the United States, the military-centric society established after 9/11 and the start of the War on Terror, has created a renewed sentiment of patriotism. Under the current administration, it has encouraged feelings of nationalism and isolationism. Unfortunately, the War on Terror has created a large anti-Muslim sentiment, as media platforms have demonized Arab society, which makes it difficult for many U.S. citizens to empathize with and be willing to take on refugees from Middle Eastern countries, as they have learned to fear the ‘other.’ Since the NCLB Act gave access to the personal information of children enrolled in public primary institutions, many parents feel as though their children are at risk of being convinced to take up a career path with a high mortality rate, and fight to ‘counterrecruit’.

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196 Bloom, “Pathways to Involvement: Consensus and Cultures of Martyrdom,” 108.

197 Ibid., 111.

198 Friesen, “Framing symbols and space: Counterrecruitment.”
The military also faces the consequences of high PTSD rates in conjunction to adults’ exposure to violence, and fights to lower the abnormally high suicide rates within the military community. Behind accidents, suicides are the second leading cause of death in the U.S. Military. As war has evolved, combat-related deaths have become much less frequent. It is interesting to note that, between 2008 and 2010, soldiers ages seventeen to twenty-four made up sixty-one percent of total suicide attempts and forty-seven percent of total suicides. One might speculate that adolescents who were not prepared for the risk, or who did not calculate the level of stress they may encounter, were not able to come to terms with their profession of arms and, sadly, took their own lives. It is also possible that the lack of an in-depth mental health screening prior to the start of service contributes to a higher suicide rate directly after the start of enlistment. As the military focuses much time and many resources into preventing and treating mental illnesses, it is hard to establish a conclusive understanding of the soldier suicide dilemma, and thus would require further research.

Despite these negative consequences, millions of Americans find opportunity through the military to make a better life and increase one’s socio-economic status. The U.S. Military gives members, their spouses, and their dependents the ability to achieve a free or more affordable higher education with VA Educational benefits; according to The U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, in Fiscal Year 2018 (FY18) alone, there were 893,725 beneficiaries of VA Educational benefits, with six different benefit programs giving out a total of eleven billion dollars. Nearly 9.5 million people are granted healthcare insurance through the TRICARE

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200 Ibid., 263.

201 Ibid., 264.


program\textsuperscript{204}, and those who complete twenty years of service enjoy rich benefits for volunteering a significant portion of their life to their country. In FY18 alone, the DoD reported that the total cost of retired pay recipients came to fifty-nine billion dollars, paid to 2.3 million military retirees and survivors\textsuperscript{205}. These are certainly benefits combatants for the Islamic State will never see, with the expectation of a lifetime of servitude to the caliphate.

Both the U.S. and the IS have the similar end goal of mobilizing the people to fight for and truly believe in a cause. The difference is, one entity pours millions of dollars and resources into persuading citizens to volunteer, and the other brainwashes those it conquers and demands conformity. Therefore, the most significant differing consequence and end result is that there exists a country of free people with a choice, and there exists a false state that terrorizes people into submission.

Suggestions and Conclusions

Children are still at war, and those who have been removed from conflict still live with PTSD and other issues into adulthood. Efforts must be continuously made to protect and save children from exposure to raw violence and hostilities. UNODC has suggested a focus on preventing violence and strengthening protective factors at the community level (rather than seeking to identify and target at-risk youth)\textsuperscript{206}. By targeting families and communities, the Islamic State can be met with the same strategies that they implement – a potential to create an equal but opposing force to combat the Islamic State. UNODC also suggests to identify and facilitate opportunities for youth to achieve status without engaging as a member of the Islamic State; they additionally express that effective child protection


and welfare systems, as well as policies and programs designed to address child labor, could potentially be effective in tackling and preventing ‘push-factors’ that drive children into the IS\textsuperscript{207}.

As far as reintegration into peaceful society, Quilliam suggests the creation of a “Commission to Protect Future Generations from Radical Violence” to “oversee effective monitoring and re-integration of children within the EU. The body would house an intelligence system of at-risk children... and ensure proceedings [of re-integration] uphold standards of international human rights”\textsuperscript{208}. This may entail judicial proceedings and placement, as well as the establishment of support networks of other adults and peers that share their spiritual, intellectual, ideological, social, and emotional values; all so that the child may continue to feel safe while they learn a new way of living and are ‘deradicalized’\textsuperscript{209}.

As for the United States, suggestions are less extreme, and include allocating funds to spend on conducting joint operations in the media, working to de-militarize our society and encourage future generations to find peaceful solutions to conflict – including the War on Terror. Admittedly, the search for peace is a difficult task for the U.S. Military; putting an end to senseless violence and acts of terrorism perpetuated by radicals is often difficult without the use of force, and the DoD does already allocate funds for researchers and military members to find more routes to peace. However, the ‘War Machine’ still functions as an integral part of modern-day military operations, so perhaps more funding can be given to find not only peaceful resolutions to conflict, but also a way to reach the children of the Islamic State before they meet U.S. Military men and women in battle. In addition, expressing the seriousness of the mission of the military and warning American adolescents of the stress and violence they may be exposed to could be key to ensuring there are less unsuspecting recruits; increasing retention levels while decreasing soldier suicide rates. Although, considering how dedicated the U.S. Military

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
already is to preserving and caring for soldiers’ physical and mental resiliency and health after they begin their service, perhaps a better recommendation could be to invest in more in-depth mental health screenings prior to enlistment, in order prevent a high enlistment rate of those with prior mental health issues²¹⁰.

Ultimately, children will continue to be targeted by militaries of all-volunteer forces in order to maintain numbers and protect state interests; and violent extremists will continue to manipulate children and exploit them in their quest for power. However, efforts must be made by those responsible state actors (those whom abide by international humanitarian law) to enforce the same ethical expectations on the entirety of the globe, if not but to protect the childhood of little boys and girls everywhere. Powerful states must continue to give aid to weaker states that rely on children out of necessity (lack of adult population), and those who purposefully create child martyrs in pursuance of death must be stopped. Life is a human right; the only means to protect that right from malice is an active effort by the whole of the human society.

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²¹⁰ U.S. DoD: Military OneSource, “Mental Health Resources for Military Families”.


The Politics of Security: How Social Constructions are utilized in the Securitization of Migration

Kayla RITCHIE

Abstract: This work explores the relationship between social constructions and the securitization process. The theoretical basis of securitization should be married to the concept of social constructions when exploring the securitizing actor addressal of contact between a target group and a referent object. To illustrate this, this paper discusses the connection between US immigration policies and negative perceptions of unauthorized immigrants in the US. This leads to an analysis of why the phenomena of migration is treated as a major threat to domestic safety. The work demonstrates how and why importance is placed on securitization of a specific targeted group, unauthorized immigrants in the US, and the lengths taken to maintain their marginalization in society. This paper argues that negative conceptions of the worthiness and deservedness of unauthorized immigrants must be instilled and widely accepted to maintain and expand the power of the homeland defense infrastructure.

Keywords: US Immigration policy, Social constructionism, Securitization, Unauthorized immigrants

Introduction

The political landscape is set in borders, and solidification through legal protections is the undisputed norm. Statehood is reliant on parameters within a territory, which when contested, prompt severe repercussions such as war. In the same vein, when individuals’ cross national borders without abiding
by the legal procedures of the receiving country, extreme action can be taken. A state may respond to such an occurrence by solidification and enforcement of the sanctity of its borders. However severe the measures taken are dependent on variables such as the political and social atmosphere.

The case of the United States begs special attention today given the exaggerated response the current government has taken to the delicate circumstances of undocumented people entering the United States from its southern border. Many of this state’s immigration measures for addressing its southern border have been condemned by human rights organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch, for endangering the lives of migrating people. Inhumane conditions at the border did not appear out of nowhere. How did the United States get to a point at which the population is willing to let asylum seekers undergo traumatic and violating conditions?

In seeking to understand the human implications of securitization of migration, this work utilizes the case of the United States and its social and political atmosphere. The purpose of looking at the circumstances, policy, and political response, is to analyze these components for evidence of social constructions that isolate undocumented immigrants from the greater American population. This is looked at as part of the process of the securitization of migration. This work intends to answer the question: how are social constructions of undocumented immigrant facilitated towards the securitization of migration at the United States southern border?

Securitization

Securitization is a broad framework discussed in the emerging political science discipline of security sciences. Credited to the Copenhagen school, securitization is a logic of security built on the constructivist theory of

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international relations. Securitization holds the assumption that security threats are always existential for the survival of a particular referent object, be it the state, population, territory, identity, culture, social order, and so on. The securitization framework characterizes security as:

(...) a distinct modality marked by utmost urgency, priority of action and the breaking free of ‘normal rules’ of politics: with the process of securitization, an issue is dramatized as an issue of supreme priority, so that an agent can legitimately claim a need to raise the issue above the constraints of regular political rules and procedure and open debate to treat it by ‘extraordinary measures’.

Therefore, securitization is the identifying and legitimizing of a threat, and as a constructivist framework, facilitates an understanding of the political mechanism required to create security measures and promote these measures until a threat resides at an acceptable level.

Securitization theory has three principal elements in its interpretations. First, the speech act references the utterances that begin security action. The second and third aspect include the securitizing actor and the audience; these groups hold unequal power to affect security. The securitizing actor participates in the diagnosis of the threat components and the desired route of response. The audience participates in actions to neutralize the threat by accepting that it exists and fearing it. The securitizing actor negotiates with the audience; the pretext of the speech act guides this interaction.

Social Constructionism

Coming from sociological studies, social constructions are fundamentally about knowledge and human conceptions of reality. This concept has been fit into the discussion of policy scientists to describe various phenomena.
including “different populations [being] forced by economic necessity, in-accessibility, or lack of well-being in public spaces... into marginalized use of public space”\textsuperscript{216}. Social constructs as a concept of policy explore the role of ideological intentions and linguistic presentation in social policy\textsuperscript{217}.

First used in policy studies by Schneider and Ingram to describe the interaction between policy makers and target groups, social constructions provide a well-constructed framework by which the political and normative aspects of public policy can be understood\textsuperscript{218}. The merger of such concepts allows for greater depth of understanding social policy formulation and implementation.

A comprehensive definition of social constructions came out of Schneider and Ingram’s work, defined as “widely held portrayals of particular groups of people that have been created through a dynamic and often endog-enous process that involves history, politics, culture, socialization, religion, and the media, conveyed through images, symbols, stories, metaphors, and synecdoche”\textsuperscript{219}.

In these portrayals, human attributes are used to define and construct different social collectives. Different social collectives become associated to values that once ingrained become nearly impossible to deconstruct. Social constructions develop through the processes of policy implementa tion, and target groups internalize the prescribed values and may even incorporate them into their perceptions of self.

Although other mechanisms drive the ability for these representations to permeate society, social policy materializes to enact and fortify the boundaries between social collectives. The result of such conceptions is taking hold


\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 3.


\textsuperscript{219} Travis P Wagner and Lisa A Morris, “Improving Comprehension of Public Policy Design,” 197.
of conditions of community interactions. Racialization is a very prominent process best understood as a perpetuation of the social construction “race”. In all instances of racialization, there is a representational process of defining an “Other”, deemed essential to boundary formation, and accompanied by a key ideological inversion. The racialization process is motivated by political interests and carried out by the implementation of such a policy.

“Race” is a concept rejected by quarters of the scientific community due to there being no biological evidence for racial categorization. The notion is outdated and even disproven, but yet “race” is a persistent concept in the social and political landscape of the United States. One example of race being utilized in American law is the case of segregation being enforced to disenfranchise and destabilize African Americans. A “color line” was struck to create a clear distinction within the population and the treatment government and society treated these groups with.

Comprehending this phenomenon of categorization and treatment based upon race serves as a necessary pretext to understanding the current struggles of immigrants as they seek to establish lives through residence within the United States. Classification by linguistic treatments service the interest of creating distinctions with social, economic, and political implications. These distinctions will be codified in law and perpetuated in society leading to repercussions that cultivate social and economic disparities and convolution of identities that help people understand themselves.

Immigration Policy

Immigration policy across the globe exists within the realm of security. Aspects of securing borders and statehood through security feature a civil code that outline the stipulations associated with taking up space within

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a state. Enforcing these stipulations, the law and justice community retaliate against cases of the undocumented. Further than the walls and fences raised, internment and detention centers filled, and patrolling units watching the physical space demarcated as borders, federal immigration enforcement agencies increasingly enter community spaces to insert their influence.

Immigration policy in the US has long been charged with extracting migrant labor without protecting or providing for the individual laborers. The case of “Operation Wetback” in the early 1950s demonstrates the concerted efforts of Border Patrol to respond to a manufacturer issue of illegal entrance into the US by “reproducing a captive pool of migrant farm workers who were tied to coercive contracts, subject to exploitation in the fields and separated from the costs of family reproduction”.

This policy did not last due to its exclusive character which institutionalized a system that treated Mexican workers as outsiders. It represented a form of blatant racially motivated discrimination which was out of line with the energy the civil rights movement brought to public policy in the 1960s. From this point on, the structure of the immigration law in the US became organized under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA is comprehensive in nature, addressing most of the necessary processes and procedures concerning “aliens and nationality”. Unlawful presence in the US, as codified by this document, decides the difference between someone who is documented and someone who is not. As a result of this law, an order is justified and carried out by the enforcement community.

This legal code stipulates region-based immigration quotas, which disproportionately impacts Mexican immigrants. This policy was instituted shortly before the rise of Mexican and central American immigrants into


urban centers within the US, many of which entered illegally due to the increased difficulty of entering legally due to the imposed quota system\textsuperscript{225}. The Reagan administration then began the process of massively building up border resources as part of its War on Drugs and ideological opposition to communism\textsuperscript{226}.

In later years the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was designed to reduce the number of illegal migrations and promote placement of documented people in jobs by penalizing employers for under the table contracts and increased funding for border security\textsuperscript{227}.

Faucets of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and local law enforcement interact to carry out the INA as well as executive orders that address border security. The expansion of security at the southern border in the post-9/11 restructuring of the US security apparatus, is maintained and progressed further by increasing the level of pressure to combat unauthorized migrations.

This policy, in conjunction with the quota system, has generally been considered a failure in promoting the legal entrance or preventing undocumented people from making and maintaining residence within the confines of US borders. Throughout the 1990s till present, policies that situate immigrant workers from Mexico and Central America as “illegal”, seek to enhance the difficulty of their everyday lives as a means of penalizing them.

Many issues arise out of this broken system. Immigration enforcement targets the most vulnerable people for deportation, using racial profiling as a means of identifying undocumented migrants, penalizing and deporting in some cases legal migrants, and contributing to the segregation of communities and labor\textsuperscript{228}. The drastic and militaristic vigor in which im-

\textsuperscript{225} Marcel Paret. “Legality and Exploitation: Immigration Enforcement and the US Migrant Labor System” 514.

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 515.

\textsuperscript{228} Marcel Paret. “Legality and Exploitation: Immigration Enforcement and the US Migrant Labor System,” 516.
migration is controlled has been built up significantly since 9/11 with the inclusion of many immigration control agencies under The Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Existing at the federal level, DHS is the central entity for processing and treating immigrants. The DHS states its mission is to “safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.” Its function since its foundation in 2002, has been to carry out security policy through its twenty-two departments. Formed out of the post-9/11 restructuring of US homeland defense, it is a unit which prides itself on zero-tolerance addressal of security issues.

Within the broad scope of this zero-tolerance standard, the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP) seeks to expedite the removal of unauthorized immigrants by criminally prosecuting all unauthorized immigrants. Border Security is charged with carrying out this directive, and in order to do so, it receives a significant amount of federal funding. Increased demands for labor, education, and law enforcement, also places pressure on public servants to conform to the security apparatus’ sense of order and plays a role in combatting undocumented people’s ability to participate in American society.

Laws and enforcement procedures that do not directly target undocumented immigrants contribute to the institutionalization of their illegality. Many states have petty laws that ensnare migrants into breaking the law. For example, driving without a valid driver’s license is illegal. In most states it is illegal for unauthorized people to obtain a valid driver’s license; therefore, an undocumented persons process of deportation could begin at a routine traffic stop when they are unable to present a driver’s license. Stipulations such as this contribute to the ability of local law enforcement to apprehend


231 Ibid., 2259.

Unauthorized people at which point the federal government can take their case and submit them for deportation or detention\textsuperscript{233}. These punitive justice measures make even more delicate the already precarious legal standing of unauthorized immigrants. This strict order of prohibiting the unauthorized people is built upon a system that traps immigrants into committing petty offenses, and then utilizes this to remove them from society\textsuperscript{234}.

These policies culminate into a marginalized place in society with very little, if any, opportunity for migrants to rise out of. The individuals who make up the US’s undocumented immigrants exist within a system that would rather see them disappear than work with them to process their authorization and settle them. This is a process that intentionally isolates and demonizes migrants, and in the process it mobilizes enhanced federal policing in the workplace, schools, and streets.

Should someone navigate around all the barriers to their illicit entry, the threat of being caught still looms overhead with instances of employment offices and residences raided, traffic stops utilized to identify the unauthorized, and other aspects of defense security that enter the scope and practice of everyday law enforcement procedure. It is the right of the state to ensure the sanctity of its boundaries, but the mechanisms by which these borders are protected increasingly blurs the lines between community safety and domestic security.

\section*{Immigrants}

An estimated population of 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants live inside the US\textsuperscript{235}. These are individuals who, either by choice or necessity, do not hold citizenship, asylum, or a related status that would qualify them

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 87.
\end{itemize}
for residence in the US. They exist as outsiders of an “official” national community. The main, tangible difference between an American national and an undocumented person is their civil status, a condition with implications in many aspects of daily life. Despite this, depictions of immigrants as threatening American society have long been presented and negative conceptions perpetuated.

To look for justice in states’ immigration systems is not just to catalog the legitimacy of its practices. It is also a discussion of the philosophy upon which the state is built. The concept of “citizen” is integral to the modern constitutional democracy. Rights, representation, and resources are reserved for citizens. These are highly sought after privileges associated with living in a stable state. It is through citizen engagement with democracy that maintains and expands these privileges.

American national identity and nationalism are bound to ethnic understandings of the composition of the state. Although the US is a multiracial state, its immigration policy is consequential in shaping the ethnic and “racial” composition\textsuperscript{236}. Immigration policy is made to benefit the national community, and the sanctity of this entity to be understood as more than just the physical security of persons. The protection of national identity is carried out through an immigration system that has nationality-based quotas. This monitoring of demographics directly shapes the ethnic makeup of the state. Immigrants that enter without authorization disrupt this system, posing a threat to American law and order. Disruptions of the national cohesion and demographic makeup can be legitimized as threats.

Unauthorized immigrants knowingly forgo citizen privileges. They realize that illegality is constructed to meet them, and that this fluid status of “illegal” does not have a neutral perception by the state or its citizens\textsuperscript{237}. The


Immigrants is a diverse group comprised of close to 50 percent of Mexican origin with migrants from Central America, Asia, South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Canada making up virtually all other unauthorized immigrants\textsuperscript{238}. While the majority of unauthorized immigrants are Latino, they are overrepresented in American perceptions of who unauthorized migrants are\textsuperscript{239}.

Depictions of immigrants are often founded on intense fear or pity of the uncertainty of undocumented immigrants. The most extreme cases depict undocumented migrants, particularly those from Mexico, as rapists or gang members. This has been the case in campaign rallies and President Trump’s tweets\textsuperscript{240}. These dangerous conceptions drive the notion that undocumented people should be met with greater security, both at the borders, and in communities. They also provoke state violence against unauthorized immigrants.

Depictions of the human existence of immigrants is based on their civil status. By not obtaining permission to enter or maintain residence in the US, this group is labeled with umbrella terms such as “illegal immigrants,” “illegal aliens,” “illegals,” “criminal aliens,” and other unsavory crafted group signifiers. Elements of truth in these labels make them harmful to those represented by them. Those with an undocumented status require addressal based on their civil condition, however some of these labels carry connotations that service the system of laws, institutional policies, and bureaucratic practices that erase identities and associates them with crime.

Addressing the existence of undocumented migrants could scarcely be done without painting a picture describing who these people are. Unfortunately, this imagery simplifies the reality which is much more complex.


\textsuperscript{239} Karina Moreno and Byron E. Price, “The social and political impact of new (private) National Security: private actors in the securitization of immigration in the U.S. post 9/11”, 372.

\textsuperscript{240} Marc Hooghe and Ruth Dassonneville, “Explaining the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments,” American Political Science Association (July 2018), 529.
Undocumented immigrants represent many different people and living under diverse conditions. Categorizing the entire groups in such a manner erases their individual narratives and simplifies them to a label conducive to their being conceived as a threat.

The term “alien” is used in legal code “to describe any person not a citizen or national of the United States”\textsuperscript{241}. Alienating undocumented immigrants casts them out of the general society and engenders a norm of their marginalization\textsuperscript{242}. Terminology carries intention, and the weight of allowing words like “alien” and “illegal” have repercussions in the daily lives of those represented as outsiders. Labels of “Otherness” is undeserved of unauthorized immigrants. Lacking rights and resources, few undocumented immigrants voice concerns associated with their civil status or representation. Depictions of undocumented immigrants by politicians, policy actors, or the public scarcely discuss the substantial benefits from their contributions.

The label of laboring immigrants has been politicized to depict undocumented labor as “immigrants steal jobs” from those hardworking Americans that deserve them. Although untrue, without evidence, the narrative has persisted from the 1800s to date\textsuperscript{243}.

Additionally, undocumented immigrants are portrayed as not paying taxes and yet receiving social benefits. This is false and in fact undocumented immigrants do have taxes withheld from their paychecks and receive few social benefits\textsuperscript{244}. In the same vein, undocumented immigrants are often described of as violent criminals. And yet there is unsubstantiated evidence to prove this, rather studies have shown immigrants exhibit lower rates of criminal activity\textsuperscript{245}.

\textsuperscript{241} U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Immigration and Nationality Act”.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{245} Xia Wang, “UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS AS PERCEIVED CRIMINAL THREAT: A TEST OF THE MINORITY THREAT PERSPECTIVE*”. Criminology 50, no. 3 (August 2012): 763.
Immigration policy addresses human lives under socially constructed conditions. The public perception of undocumented immigrants is impacted profoundly by those with an interest to affect them, collectively through policy. The portrayal of unauthorized immigrants as purposefully tearing down a correct and just order allows for their securitization. Unauthorized immigrants as a collective are perceived as a threat to American values, status quo, and physical safety.

Conclusion

The author is concerned with the social dynamic that exists to command public perception and skew it in favor of perceiving a threat. While immigration policy is a beneficial idea to uphold the sanctity of national borders, it perpetuates harmful barriers between humans in society. Although a system of law and order stabilizes the nation and creates coherence, the frivolous extension of the violent arms of the realm of immigration enforcement should continue to be questioned.

A system that facilitates, perpetuates, and normalizes such abuses must also be put on trial. The US is geographically as well as economically large. It creates many barriers to entry that service the creation of a national identity which it can take extraordinary measures to control and maintain. The prioritization of securitizing over settling can be understood through social constructions of migrants that fit the needs of political decision makers.

The author is concerned with social constructions of migrants as the target group, contributing to the permissibility of inhumane treatment being utilized at the southern border. Should this be proven by the evidence presented throughout the text, it would imply that citizens are not only complicit, but play a major role, in the security acts of their nation. The broader picture here is that violence is being used against a US community to destabilize and dismantle it. When depictions of immigrants are built in order to attribute their existence as unlawful, it extends the space in which defense structures can occupy everyday life. It enables the violent removal of individuals from their jobs, homes, and families.
Bibliography


The Return of European Foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria

Albert James CONTRERAS

Abstract: This paper examines the history of foreign fighters in the Soviet Afghan War, Bosnia, and both Chechen conflicts. It then looks at the lasting impact of foreign fighters who fought in those regions. The paper concludes with a discussion on the future implications for Europe whose citizens have fought as foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria and who now may possibly decide to return home as the wars subside and whether it is possible to draw out any lessons learned from previous experiences from the Soviet Afghan, Bosnian, and both Chechnian Wars.

Keywords: Terrorism, Foreign terrorist fighters, FTF, Hybrid warfare

Introduction

There are many security issues which Europe must account for in this modern age. Some of these issues consist of Russian hybrid warfare, the migration crisis from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as terrorism. Terrorism has posed a significant threat, and the situation could potentially deteriorate with recent events. “The most impending threat that all intelligence agencies in Europe view as troublesome” Tigner argues, “is the return of foreign fighters from combat in Syria and Iraq”246. This is

a legitimate threat given how many Europeans traveled abroad to fight for the Islamic State (ISIS).

There has been a staggering number of foreigners who decided to go and fight for ISIS in the Middle East. These foreigners have come from all over the world to fight for the caliphate. Tigner estimates, “30,000 foreign fighters went to go fight for ISIS, and about 5,000 of these fighters were from Europe”247. ISIS successfully recruited many foreign fighters via social media platforms. According to one study, “Sophisticated propaganda portrayed a glamorous life in the caliphate, depicted a heroic fight against the enemy, and captured the imaginations of vulnerable individuals worldwide”248. Not only was ISIS’ method of recruitment appealing, but the use of social media platforms helped them in other ways too. Some of the methods included, “Encrypted communications, the ease of connectivity, and instant global reach provided a large base of support”249. Compared to past conflicts, the Islamic State’s utilization of social media platforms to recruit globally was unprecedented.

Some European countries have been more heavily affected by the advanced recruiting style that ISIS had implemented. The countries that contributed the most foreign fighters to the Islamic State’s cause include Kosovo, Bosnia, and Belgium. The Kosovo Center for Security Studies reports “at 125 recruits per one million people, Kosovo’s rate was higher than second-placed Bosnia (85) and third-placed Belgium (42)”250. The demographic of those recruited by ISIS are young men, who practice Islam and are typically of Middle Eastern descent. However, women between the ages of 16 and 24 are also being recruited. Women are primarily recruited for supporting roles, professional positions, enforcing Sharia law, and serving as recruiters

247 Ibid.
within the Caliphate, whereas males generally serve in combat roles. One review notes, “Once these people are recruited, they must make their way to Syria”\textsuperscript{251}.

There is one common theme among Europeans traveling to fight for ISIS, the vast majority go through Turkey. Pantucci adds, “In most cases, individuals travel to Turkey and from there cross the porous border into Syria, where they connect with Islamist groups on the ground”\textsuperscript{252}. There are two forms of transportation that most European foreign fighters use to enter Syria: vehicle, plane, or both. “Sometimes foreign fighters used aid convoys from Europe in order to enter Syria”\textsuperscript{253}. As for traveling by airplane, they travel under false pretenses to Turkey and, from there, head to their final destinations in Syria or Iraq. This experience is similar to those observed during the Soviet-Afghan war, Bosnia, and Chechnya.

### History of foreign fighters in past conflicts

#### Soviet-Afghan War

The Soviet-Afghan War, the Bosnian, and Chechen conflicts share common characteristics of foreigners coming to fight for an insurgency. The Soviet-Afghan war was waged from 1979–1989; it was fought between the Soviet Union and the tribal Mujahideen. Donnelly, Sanderson, and Fellman discuss how the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan “to defend its communist proxy government in Kabul from a growing insurgency”\textsuperscript{254}. The Mujahideen were able to defeat the USSR with the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. They also relied heavily on the influx of foreign fighters who came to help the Mujahideen against the Red Army. However, Donnelly,

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.

Sanderson, and Fellman acknowledge, “There is no consensus as to how many people traveled to Afghanistan, but estimates range from 10,000 to 35,000”\(^{255}\). Foreign fighters came from all over the world to help the Mujahideen with its struggle. Osama Bin Laden was one of the foreign fighters who answered the Mujahideen’s call. As Donnelly, Sanderson, and Fellman note, “He gained experience and developed connections during his time in Afghanistan, which helped him form and lead a new organization: Al-Qaeda”\(^{256}\). This conflict marked the first time that an insurgency used the media to garner support and attract foreign fighters to its cause. It also paved the way for other conflicts which foreign fighters participated in.

**Bosnian Conflict**

The conflict in Bosnia serves as another example of foreigners coming to fight for an insurgency. The Bosnian war lasted from 1992–1995, initially triggered after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in March 1992. However, Bosnian Serbs rejected separation from Serbia, and with the backing and support of the Serbian military, they fought against the Bosnian Muslims. In this conflict, Bosnian Muslims were persecuted and atrocities were committed against them. “The overt religious nature of the war, atrocities committed against civilians, and the timing of hostilities” argues Donnelly, Sanderson, and Fellman, “made the conflict attractive for the former mujahedeen coming from Afghanistan”\(^{257}\). Just like in the Soviet-Afghan war, foreign fighters felt compelled to defend Muslims against persecution. One report estimates, “1,000 to 2,000 foreign fighters contributed to the fight in Bosnia”\(^{258}\). The foreign fighters consisted of veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war and recruits with no prior experience. The conflict concluded when the United States intervened and with a ceasefire in 1995. For a third example, this paper now turns to the First Chechen War, which shared a lot of similarities with the Soviet-Afghan War and the war in Bosnia.

\(^{255}\) Ibid.

\(^{256}\) Ibid.

\(^{257}\) Ibid.

\(^{258}\) Ibid.
Chechen Conflicts

The First Chechen war lasted from 1994–1996; the conflict was between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Donnelley, Sanderson, and Fellman recount how, “Chechnya refused to sign an understanding regarding its relationship with Russia, the head of the All-National Congress of the Chechen people, Dzhokhar Dudayev, unilaterally declared the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”259. The Russian Federation was unhappy with the declaration that Dzhokhar Dudayev had made. In response, Russia attempted, but failed, to overthrow Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev260. Dudayev eventually won the presidential elections of Chechnya in 1991. As an effort to restore order in the breakaway republic, former Russian President Yeltsin in 1994, sent in the Russian military261. The Chechens were unable to fight the Russians using conventional warfare, so they resorted to guerilla tactics. Chechnya ultimately achieved a Pyrrhic victory, and Russia was embarrassed by this loss. In Chechnya, “jihad through the media” was created and used as an effective recruitment tool. The man credited with the creation of this was Samir Salih Abdallah al Suwaylim, also known as Emir Khattab. In Donnelly, Sanderson and Fellman’s analysis, they share how, “Khattab required all operations to be filmed and distributed, pioneering a critical form of jihadi media and propaganda”262. Even though the propaganda influenced terrorist organizations, and inspired many to answer the call of jihad, many foreign fighters were unable to enter Chechnya. Due to the challenges of traveling to Chechnya, there were only between 200–300 foreign fighters that participated in the First Chechen War”263. Less than five years later, another war broke out between the Russian Federation and the Chechen republic of Ichkeria.


260 Ibid.


262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.
The Second Chechen War happened under very suspicious circumstances. At the time, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was running for president while Chechnya was still suffering from the devastating effects from the First Chechen War. Russia promised Chechnya aid, but never fulfilled its promise. The government under President Boris Yeltsin was losing popularity while tensions within the region were starting to flare once more. The turmoil that Chechnya was experiencing was used to Russia’s advantage. It is widely believed, although there is no conclusive evidence, that the Federal Security Service, under Putin’s command, began a campaign of bombing Russian apartment complexes to justify returning to hostilities within Chechnya. The Second Chechen War waged from 1999–2009. Like the first conflict, there were a few foreign fighters present, although they were less effective. At the onset of the Second Chechen war, it is estimated that there were roughly 700 foreign fighters, but later diminished Russia made advances. The active combat phase between the Russian military and insurgent Chechen forces lasted for only a matter of months. The National government delegated responsibility for resolving the insurgency to Chechen officials. Ultimate victory was achieved by the Russian Federation, as a pro-Russian government rose to power in Chechnya and major instances of terrorism ceased by 2009. Although these conflicts ended more or less the same, each conflict affected and intensified the next.

The effects of foreign fighters from past conflicts

Afghanistan

Once the Soviet-Afghan War concluded, the foreign fighters took different paths – some returned to their country of origins to demobilize or join local causes, while others chose to follow the key facilitator of foreign


266 Ibid.
fighters Abdullah Azzam in the Soviet-Afghan War\textsuperscript{267}. One key foreign fighter who joined the Soviet-Afghan War was Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden and Azzam created a new terrorist organization post conflict, Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda would be responsible for attacks against the United States: The World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the East African Embassy Bombings, and the USS Cole bombing. The attack which proved the most effective and gained them notoriety was the coordinated attacks on September 11, 2001. In the opinion of this author, the only way Al-Qaeda was able to execute such an attack like 9/11, was due to the experience they received in the Soviet-Afghan War.

Bosnia

The Bosnian conflict also experienced the same influx of foreign fighters coming from all over the world, many of which came from international terrorist organizations. Some of them were veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, while others were fresh recruits. According to one report, “Terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda used the ethnically-motivated violence in the 1990s as pretext to establish terrorist roots in the country, train its Afghan-based fighters, and lure new recruits”\textsuperscript{268}. Although they attempted to defend the Muslims in Bosnia from genocide, the negative impact of the foreign fighters in the conflict has outweighed the positive. The most serious consequence observed has been a lasting impact on Bosnia itself, radicalizing Muslims and offering their narrow perception of Sharia Law to educate the youth. Until now, this has only been the case in northern Bosnia, but it may threaten to spread as a large portion of these Bosnian Muslims are leaving to join ISIS. The radicalization of Muslims in Bosnia can be ascribed to the foreign fighter’s presence. As one report notes, “Many foreign fighters stayed after the conflict in Bosnia, they established roots and radicalized some local Bosnians to extremism”\textsuperscript{269}. Not only did local

\textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
Bosnians become radicalized, but many organizations were established in Bosnia to finance terrorism. For example, “Several Al-Qaeda fronts opened in Bosnia, posing as humanitarian NGOs and charities”\textsuperscript{270}. Years after the war in Bosnia, Al-Qaeda continues to garner support, while other Bosnians go to Iraq and Syria to fight for the Islamic State.

**Chechnya**

The Chechen conflicts were not really affected by the foreign fighters’ combat capabilities. First, there were few foreign fighters who traveled to Chechnya to make any difference. Nevertheless, they transformed the use of media in terrorist organizations and successfully promoted extremism in Chechnya. As one report found, “Emir Khattab revolutionized media and modern insurgency, laying the ground for what is now the norm in Iraq and Afghanistan”\textsuperscript{271}. Khattab used propaganda films in order to gain support and for recruitment. Chechnya is also one of the countries which currently enforces Sharia law and has issues of human rights violations. Another problem Chechnya faces, is exporting Chechen citizens to conflicts where radical Islamic elements are involved; these citizens usually end up fighting for terrorist organizations, as demonstrated with the Second Chechen War.

One terrorist attack which would be the equivalent of 9/11 for the Russian Federation was the Beslan Massacre. The Beslan Massacre is the most devastating terrorist attack in the history of the Russian Federation. As Britannica states:

>A hostage situation happened at a school in Beslan, Russia and 1,200 hostages were taken. An explosion occurred when the terrorists believed they were being attacked by Russian forces. This incident resulted in the deaths of 334 hostages, Russia was forced to revamp their counterterrorism measures\textsuperscript{272}.

\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.


After reviewing these past conflicts, maybe there is something Europe can expect from foreign fighters returning to Europe, after having fought in Iraq and Syria.

**Analysis of European Foreign fighters Return**

There are three main actions which will more than likely transpire once combat comes to a conclusion in Iraq and Syria. European Foreign fighters will either stay in Iraq or Syria, return back to their home country, or move on to the next conflict in which Muslims are being victimized. When it comes to European foreign fighters who chose to stay in the Middle East; they will either stay because of their own free will or due the fear of facing prosecution back in their home country. The worst-case scenario is that some will continue their extremist ways and end up joining another terrorist organization in the Middle East, furthering the trend of international terrorism. However, as Tigner warns, “The second outcome, which European Security services dread the most, are those European Foreign fighters returning back to Europe”\(^{273}\).

There remain various possibilities if the European Foreign fighters return to their country of origin. Comparable to the foreign fighters of the Soviet-Afghan war, many will go back to Europe and demobilize. A Brookings Institution report on foreign fighters in 2014 found that most foreign fighters returning from the Iraq conflict posed less of a threat than originally anticipated. Many who joined the Islamic State were motivated by a host of specific reasons and were unlikely to pose a domestic threat; and many were initially humanitarians opposing Assad\(^{274}\). If there is any positive indicator from all these past conflicts, it is that the majority of foreign fighters will return to Europe without the intention of carrying out a terrorist attack. However, the ones the European Security Services are cautious of, are the ones with the intent to carry on their jihad against Western society within the boundaries of Europe.

\(^{273}\) Tigner, “Islamic State Returnees Pose Threat to Europe.” 2017.

\(^{274}\) Ibid.
European Security Services should expect at least two threats from those foreign fighters returning with the intention of carrying on their jihad. The first threat will be fighters returning with the aim of radicalizing or recruiting other people in their home country. The next threat will be individuals returning back to Europe who intend on carrying out terrorist attacks on European soil. The biggest threat which European officials might foresee as a problem is the radicalization and/or recruitment of prisoners. David Ibsen, executive director of the Counter Extremism Project, stated this, “If all the returning foreign fighters face a prison sentence, we are likely to see an increase in radicalization in prisons and the cycle will continue.”

Experiences have shown not all people who returned have been arrested, but this may change in the future. The European Union plans on enacting directive 2017/541, that will criminalize travel within or beyond the EU for the purposes of joining or supporting a terrorist organization. The possibility of prisoners becoming radicalized is a potential security issue which may arise in the future. Not only does Europe have to worry about prisoners becoming radicalized, but also regular civilians as well. The main threat which returning foreign fighters present is the likelihood of an attack.

Europe should expect attacks from the returning foreign fighters, with and without combat experience. However, there is a certain kind of foreign fighter returning which European Security Services should be most concerned about. These are the fighters who will be dispatched back to Europe, by terrorist organizations, with the orders and intent on carrying out attacks within Europe. These foreign fighters are at the greatest risk of conducting terrorist attacks on European soil. While Europe should be greatly concerned about those returning with combat experience, a majority of them will not come back. Most were either be killed in combat in

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277 Ibid.

Iraq and/or Syria, possibly choose to live in the Middle East, or will chose to fight in the next conflict involving Muslims. While the numbers do not seem to require an over emphasis on defeating this threat, the risk still remains. The final threat is that these experienced fighters will move on to another part of the world and carry out violent jihad there. As for those European Foreign fighters looking to join the next conflict, the regions that seem the ripest are the Middle East and Southeast Asia. European officials should maintain vigilance to ensure that Islamic terrorism in the Middle East does not return to Europe.

European Security services maybe overanalyzing the fact that European Foreign fighters are returning back to Europe. There is a legitimate threat of possible attacks being carried out by those who return, but the threat is minimal. If past experiences have indicated anything, it is that most European Foreign fighters will come back and demobilize. And if anything were to happen, Europe has made the necessary preparations to effectively contest this kind of threat. If there are threats which Europe needs to continue to improve on, it is the threat of hybrid warfare and international terrorism.

Bibliography


The Growing Threat of the Alt-Right: Who Are They, How They Recruit, and How to Prevent Further Growth

Meghan LOVETT

Abstract: This paper attempts to analyze the new international threat of the Alt-Right. It describes the difficulties surrounding defining the Alt-Right, the spread of ideology to European countries, the rhetoric and recruitment methods used by the Alt-Right and provides potential solutions to prevent recruitment in the future. This paper attempts to define the Alt-Right and provide clarity about what it entails within the ideology. It also describes the current problems associated with the lack of a formal definition. The paper then analyzes the spread of the ideology in Europe and describes the differences and similarities between the ideologies within the U.S. and Europe. Additionally, the paper provides insight into the recruitment methods, targets, and rhetoric of the Alt-Right as well gives possible strategies to help deter young people from being recruited.

Keywords: Extremism, Alt-Right, Neo-Nazi, Terrorism

Introduction

The Alternative Right (Alt-Right) is an extremist political ideology that is growing worldwide. The name for the ideology originated from a journalist in the United States, however the extreme white-supremacy rhetoric has gained popularity worldwide, especially in Europe. The Alt-Right mainly recruits from the internet and has adopted many elements of popular culture to attract young men into their ranks. This article seeks to analyze what the movement is and offers solutions in combatting the further
Defining the Alt-Right is Difficult

The term “Alt-Right” is difficult to define because it has never been given a firm and formal definition. In addition, the term is used in a derogatory manner by those who view themselves in stark contrast and in opposition to those who fall under the ideology. For the purpose of this article, the working definition that will be used is the one provided by the Conservative American news outlet: The Daily Wire. According to The Daily Wire, “The Alt-Right is a fringe far-right ideological movement that espouses ethnonationalism, particularly European nationalism, viewing countries and cultures as being inherently a matter of “blood and soil” — a concept embraced by Nazi Germany tied to the notion of ethnic purity and anti-Semitism.”279 The Daily Wire continues its definition of the term by providing characteristics of the ideology, specifically stating, “The Alt-Right has heavily used social media to promote its ideology, with Alt-Right activists and trolls often waging online campaigns against enemies and spreading memes via Twitter, 4chan, and Reddit, among other platforms.”280

The first use of the term “Alt-Right” was coined by Richard Spencer, a notorious political extremist. Spencer began working for The American Conservative, a political publication, but was later fired due to his extremist beliefs. “In 2010, Spencer founded AlternativeRight, a supremacy-themed webzine aimed at the ‘intellectual right wing’, ” where he continued to promote his ideology until he joined the National Policy Institute.281

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280 Ibid.
according to leading Civil Rights group the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), Richard Spencer supports the idea of white-supremacy and the bulk of his rhetoric focuses on white-nationalism\textsuperscript{282}. It is entirely possible that Spencer realized that white-supremacy is not a minority belief in the U.S. Though, it is also quite possible that Spencer realized the negative connotations of the term “white-supremacist” and opted to change the label, as prescribed by sociologists George Mead, Frank Tannenbaum, and Howard Becker\textsuperscript{283}. As Hawley explains, “white supremacist is not usually the preferred term within the radical right. It instead relies on terms like ‘white nationalist’, ‘white separatist’, and ‘identarian’”\textsuperscript{284}. With this in mind, Richard Spencer most likely rebranded the ideology as “Alternative Right” in order to appeal to a larger population.

The \textit{Home Office Counter-Extremism Strategy Plan of 2015} definition of extremism is “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. [The calling] for the death of members of our armed forces [is also regarded] as extremist”\textsuperscript{285}. These groups justify and advocate for violence, promote hate and division, encourage isolation, and reject the democratic system\textsuperscript{6} These groups strive to disassemble the societies in which they live and cause harm, or in some cases kill, citizens. Within this framework, the “Alt-Right” completely fits, which likens Alt-Right groups with terrorists and should be addressed and combatted as such.

Another issue is when there is a blurring of lines and terminology becomes confused. The Alt-Right is not Far-Right, nor should it be considered to be attached in any way to Conservatism but should rather be perceived as, “not conservative; its leaders vociferously reject prominent


Defining the Alt-Right is Difficult

conservative thinkers, ideas of human equality, core Judeo-Christian values, and the concept of America as a nation built on ideas, rather than racial or ethnic identity.”

Current attempts to combat the growing threat of the Alt-Right are hindered by the obstacle of confusion regarding the terminology and actual groups that fit within this framework. For instance, the SPLC published a guide to combating the Alt-Right on college campuses. They recommended a variety of options, such as an aversion to violence and speaking with groups hosting Alt-Right speakers. After listing names of several well-known Alt-Right men, the guide ends. The problem with such a guide is that this open-endedness leaves much to be interpreted. Who else is considered as Alt-Right? This open-endedness and lack of a cohesive and comprehensive definition of the “Alt-Right” may lead to many on college campuses labeling every Conservative or Right-Wing Speaker as Alt-Right, and inadvertently lead to the censorship of opposing views and create a toxic culture of censorship. For instance, Ben Shapiro, a Jewish Conservative Political Commentator, has been labeled Alt-Right, even though he has spoken out against the ideology. Like Shapiro, many other conservative political commentators are regularly labeled as Alt-Right as well, without any evidence to substantiate the claim. The only crime of the speakers has simply to be on the opposing side of the political spectrum.

While many conservatives are labeled Alt-Right, the Alt-Right movement rejects conservatism. They disagree with much of what conservatives stand for. However, there are elements of Alt-Right ideology that have roots in conservatism. It should be noted that the conservative moment and those involved are not necessarily subscribers to Alt-Right ideology. Neither of the major political parties in the United States are radical in

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The Alt-Right differs in their views of how the government should work, which is different from the ideas of the modern conservatives\textsuperscript{289}. A prominent example of the American Left distorting the definition of Alt-Right ideology is the discourse surrounding President Donald Trump’s campaign slogan: “Make America Great Again”. This is regarded by some on the Left to be Alt-Right sentiment\textsuperscript{290}. The misunderstanding of the term has driven a further divide between the Right and the Left, who have been growing increasingly further apart since the days of the Clinton administration. Clarity must be given attention to this issue, or else the political divides between the major political parties in the United States will only further partisanship and nothing of national importance will be accomplished within the confines of the U.S. federal government.

The Alt-Right in Europe and in the United States of America

The Alt-Right is not an ideology restricted to the United States but is growing worldwide. The 2019 E.U. Terrorism and Situation Trend Report has noted that “The number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism remained relatively low but increased for the third year in a row”\textsuperscript{291}. In Europe the Alt-Right has the same aims of the Alt-Right groups in the United States. However, there are differences in the types of ideologies that are common in the United States versus in Europe. For instance, Neo-Nazi parties are less common in Europe, most likely because of the deeply personal and horrific history many Europeans have with the actions committed by the


Nazis in World War II. In Europe, there is a growth in Ethno-Nationalist
groups but likening themselves with Nazis is less frequently observed.

In the United States the majority of groups that can be labeled Alt-Right
are independent groups, as in not typically associated with mainstream
political parties. The Alt-Right “can scarcely be called an organized move-
ment. It has no formal institutions or a leadership caste issuing orders to
loyal followers”\textsuperscript{292}. The two largest political parties are not considered,
as a whole, to be extremist parties. There may be smaller parties whose
opinions are more on the extreme side, but they are certainly a political
minority. Some of these groups include the Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazis, the
Neo-Confederates, among others\textsuperscript{293}. However, in Europe Alt-Right extrem-
ists or Right-Wing Nationalists finds themselves represented more by par-
ties than by independent groups. Such parties include: the Italian League,
Alternative for Germany, Spain’s Vox, France’s National Front, and more\textsuperscript{294}.

One of the reasons such parties in Europe have seen growth, can possi-
ably be attributed to the 2015 Immigration Crisis. Some political parties in
Europe “have been able to generate substantial popular support by prom-
ising to defend their respective countries against the cultural attacks of
immigrants and foreign influences and have consequently made gains in
domestic parliamentary elections”\textsuperscript{295}.

Recruitment

The recruitment processes for all extremists is similar. The majority of
groups use the internet as their main tool, they recruit new members


fighting-hate/extremist-files/groups.


ropean Ethno-Nationalist and White Supremacy Groups,” Counter Extremism Project, April 04, 2019.
through chat forums and distribution of propaganda on social media sites. The Alt-Right’s main target are young white men that feel isolated by society. They manipulate them by provoking typically right leaning arguments that are commonly accepted and then move on to more extreme views. Once such individuals subscribe to the views of the group, they are encouraged to do activities in the group’s name.

There are certain characteristics that make some men more vulnerable than others. Edelstein explains, “[R]ight-wing extremism represents moral waywardness in thinking and in action. The concept of moral deprivation or waywardness points to the psychosocial and moral implications of a syndrome that combines economic, familial, educational, and cultural factors in variable ways.” In many instances it was also found that those who subscribe to right-wing extremist ideology also grew up in financially unstable homes. Men whose lives are scarred by insecurity and changing social environments are also more prone to be partial to extreme right ideologies.

This can be illustrated in the case of post-Versailles Germany, where many men left the war angry, unemployed and distraught, raising their children in grief. As Edelstein discuses:

“These children ... develop[ed] corresponding mechanisms of compensation, character traits, and motives of spite and revenge that take them, first, into the ranks of the storm trooper thugs, later into the SS, and finally, during the war in Eastern Europe, to their well-known involvements in concentration camps, firing squads, and mass murder in Polish and Russian villages and ghettos.”

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299 Ibid.
These children became targets for right-wing extremist thought because the youth camps and military gave them a sense of belonging and cohesiveness they did not have in their lives at home.

When Germany was reunited in 1990, there was a resurgence of Alt-Right groups. This stemmed from the shock of change in life in East Germany (where the right extremism had the strongest presence). Research has shown:

“The traditional society had been organized through intergenerationally stable rules of “mechanical solidarity”, with little room for individual variation and for individual influence on the social order. Whereas traditional loyalties and duties had once persisted against the onslaught of individual needs, goals, and desires, the latter came to be decisive influences in the market-dominated world of competitive capitalism that succeeded the traditional world of personal bonds, inherited skills, and natural exchange.”

This change inspired a new generation of young men to feel isolated from the new society being pressed upon them. It is possible that they felt inferior to West Germans, who had been living in a modern world and felt unable to adjust. And rather than face their problems, they used the outgroup (foreigners) as a scapegoat, beginning anew the cycle of their parents and grandparents under National Socialism.

When applied to the current political climate, this may also explain the recent growth in Alt-Right participation. Today’s young men have experienced the hardships associated with the United States financial recession in 2008 and witnessed a change in society as dictated to them by their parents and grandparents. There also appears to be a renewed focus on social justice in the traditional media as well as social media. Men who disagree with the rhetoric emanating from mainstream thought are also often cast out or censored by the public. The feeling of being an outcast is what establishes these individuals as targets for radical and extremist thought. Instead of adjusting to the new societal norms, they opt to rebel and blame others for perverting their society, which means changing

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300 Ibid.
their society from one where they fit in and are accustomed to into one that has no place for them.

The target populations for extreme ideology has remained the same: young men who have never felt as if they belonged. Alt-Right group members provide a supportive environment that bolsters the men’s self-esteem and also allows recruiters to progress the extreme political ideology. Once these men have become closed off into the group, dismissing the outgroup becomes easy and often supported by their peers. One explanation that may address this is change, or the fear of change to the status quo, as demonstrated with the end of communism and the reunification of Germany.

Language is a key factor into being socialized into groups, and analyzing the rhetoric surrounding Alt-Right ideology is key in understanding it. The internet is the most popular recruitment tool for extremists worldwide, because social media is a main place of socialization among the younger populations. According to Julia Decook, “these platforms and the subcultures they support are pieces in the construction of ideological sensemaking and as larger learning spaces for civic engagement”\(^\text{301}\).

The way in which the Alt-Right is able to spread their message is by “normalizing and mainstreaming extremist views”\(^\text{302}\). This can be done through the use of programs that create “digitally enhanced image of the far right that coopts and mobilizes historical meanings, forges ideological connections across geographical boundaries, and reinvigorates a narrative about a threatened national identity inflected with a persecution complex”. Other techniques that are unique to the Alt-Right is the use of “meme-culture”, comedy, and satire into their recruitment techniques. For the new far-right movement, “irony has a strategic function. It allows people to disclaim a real commitment to far-right ideas while still

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espousing them” 303. Using irony, humor and satire also allows these people to hide their true opinions, if they were to be charged with a crime whose cause could be linked to the online presence of the individual, they could hide under the false pretense of comedy. “Fascism is more or less a social taboo. It’s unacceptable in modern society, ... humour or irony is one of the ways that they can put forward their affective positions without having to fall back on any affirmative ideological positions” 304. While the Internet has proven useful in spreading these ideologies, it is important to note that these forms of propaganda are no different than earlier Alt-Right movements with similar messages.

The Alt-Right also profits from attacking the social psyche by creating panic to spread fear. For example, in Germany, Alt-Right groups are using the 2015 refugee crisis and the news stories surrounding it to bolster xenophobia and Islamophobia. Once fear has reached the masses, they then will look for ways to solve the artificial threat, by looking toward Alt-Right groups or political parties. One instance would be the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (Pegida), a German political group that started in 2014 and who, despite problems within the organization, “has spawned a series of transnational and translocal identitarian and nativist movements that rely on global discourses equating Islam with terrorism while sounding the alarm for local activism to address imminent threats” 305.

The Pegida had many localized groups in different cities around Germany. The creation of localized chapters “underscores the importance of “branding” an ideology and both virtual and face-to-face networking.” 20 Groups like these have given people opportunities to meet up with other believers of the ideology, in a safe space that they might not have been otherwise able to speak and express their opinions. It is quite probable that these


304 Ibid.

groups contributed to the “us versus them” mentality, which is found in many extremist groups.

The result of this rhetoric is the ability to create a collective identity. The Collective Identity Formation, is a phase in the recruitment process “marked by the reciprocal aggravation of internal conflict and of social disorganization”\textsuperscript{306}. In order to create a collective identity, there has to be something to separate one group from the other. Creating a target group and an outgroup is an effective way to do that\textsuperscript{307}.

**Solutions**

The number of violent attacks attributed to Alt-Right groups is steadily increasing in both the United States and in Europe. For this reason, it is imperative that steps are taken to deter the addition of new members. There are three areas of improvement that may assist this objective. The first is the creation of new programs that could substantially decrease the amount of people recruited to Alt-Right groups and extremist groups in general. This could be in a variety of different sectors but may be used as an outlet to create a sense of community for those who are being attracted by the communities normally associated with the target group of recruits for Alt-Right groups. This idea of programs and/or clubs would not be limited to children, but also open to the community at large so that adults may take advantage of them, as it is most frequently adults who are joining the Alt-Right groups. The second area of improvement would be mental health reform. Eleanor Boatman states:

“These groups are growing by targeting individuals, primarily young-adult white males, with psychosocial issues that leave them vulnerable to exploitation and control. White supremacists are actively searching online, baiting individuals suffering from emotional and social issues, including


difficulties in finding a relationship, having friends, and low self-confidence. The alt-right then manipulates these individuals’ weaknesses by contributing and reinforcing their externalization of feelings (i.e. it is everyone else’s fault for feeling rejected, emasculated, angry, and lonely)”\(^{308}\).

One study showed that “depression, dysthymia and symptoms of anxiety and post-traumatic stress are associated with extremist sympathies”\(^{309}\). However, there is still a cultural stigma with going and seeking treatment for mental health issues that seems to deter individuals from receiving the treatment they need. The final area of improvement would be the encouragement of monitoring children’s use of internet chat forums through a public outreach or public awareness campaign, similar to those used to deter adolescents from smoking.

The largest issue to tackle would be that pertaining to mental health. According to a study done by The British Journal of Psychiatry, it was shown that young adults are the most vulnerable to sympathize with extremist ideology\(^{310}\). The aforementioned mental illnesses also have an average onset ages ranging from 13 to 21\(^{311}, 312\) Therefore, efforts should be focused to provide mental health support in order to minimize the chances of extremist influence on young adults.

Creating greater ease of access to mental health resources could also prove beneficial in minimizing the chances of extremist influence on young adults, particularly if efforts were made on college campuses. Increased access to low-cost psychological and psychiatric appointments, the creation of free


\(^{310}\) Ibid.


group therapy, and offering low cost alternatives for psychiatric medication could assist those afflicted with mental illness. This may also assist in the control of these illnesses before they can worsen. Such resources should be provided to young adults. Perhaps the best implementation of such ideas would be at a local level, through local governments or offered through charity services, where the guidance and assistance could help prevent these individuals from falling prey to online extremist recruiting. However, further research would be needed to ascertain as to the cost and how to publicly fund such efforts.

The 2014 Isla Vista Massacre shooter experience demonstrates that those on the Autism Spectrum are likely to be targets as well. This is likely due to their mental illness creating difficulty in interacting with other people. However, there is more time to observe those afflicted as the average diagnosis age for Autism Spectrum Disorder is two years and the symptoms are typically visible. The issue here is not identification or treatment but increasing social interactions to prevent the social isolation that extremist groups prey on.

People who have not learned to thoroughly analyze new stories to locate bias and propaganda tactics may be likely to fall victim to extremist recruitment strategies. The creation of nonpartisan political education courses could help prevent this. The creation of a program that instructs adults in analytical thinking skills and research would also be very beneficial. This is because it teaches the public to analyze events deeper and to find factual data regarding hot news topics, which could help them better discern propaganda online and on news shows. The largest obstacle is finding ways of encouraging attendance in these programs. However, further research needs to be done before an effective method can be created.

Children may also benefit from the creation of new educational programs targeted towards decreasing social isolation. There is a fear that technology is detrimental to children developing social skills and emotional maturity. One psychotherapist has noted that technology dependencies

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undermine self-awareness, weaken self-regulation, diminish social skills, undermines empathy, and stunts motivation\textsuperscript{314}. These qualities can lead to a higher frequency of isolation in children, and this isolation in turn makes children and young adults more susceptible to targeting by extremists. While there has been very little scientific research to reinforce these claims, one study found in “Five Days at Outdoor Education Camp without Screens Improves Preteen Skills with Nonverbal Emotion Cues”, and it was suggested that “skills in reading human emotion may be diminished when children’s face-to-face interaction is displaced by technologically mediated communication”\textsuperscript{315}. Perhaps the creation of a program or a class that promotes face-to-face interaction and limits technology access could prove helpful in preventing social isolation among students.

Many technology professionals in California choose to send their children to technology free schools, such as the Waldorf Method School, because of the fear of social isolation\textsuperscript{316}. Schools that use the Waldorf Method are dedicated to creating well-rounded students, which is exactly what should be emulated. With this in mind, perhaps encouraging more schools to have tech-free policies could prove beneficial.

Encouraging parents to become more active in their children’s online presence could assist the children as well. Encouraging parents to be engaged in their children’s online usage possibly would prevent the recruitment of children into political extremist groups or being targeted for others malicious reasons. Some advisable ideas include: monitoring their social media platforms, discouragement or banning of chat room participation if under 13 years of age, or even promoting more extreme measures such as restriction to applications and programs for mobile phones and computers.


Another idea is to implement education for children regarding political extremism. For instance, the inclusion in history courses of lectures dedicated to teaching about the reasons of hate surrounding acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing: such as the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide. In government classes, instructors may also show videos informing students about the dangers of political extremism, such as lesson plans regarding terrorism and radical related violence (for older students). As recommended by “Teaching Tolerance”, education in digital literacy has proven helpful in combatting recruitment and sympathy with Alt-Right ideology. One source argues:

“Fostering digital literacy could, …, help students understand how the alt-right takes advantage of a 24-hour thirst for headlines and garner mainstream media coverage for memes, conspiracy theories and misinformation campaigns. It could also inform students of how online and media climates can be so influential in shaping consumers’ worldviews”.

The creation and establishment of better access to mental health resources, the creation of educational programs for adults and children, and the encouragement of parental responsibility regarding the online presence and activities of children should all be implemented to prevent the proliferation of Alt-Right sentiment. This would also possibly decrease the number of young people who are already members of Alt-Right groups or political parties as well.

**Conclusion**

The Alt-Right ideology is a steadily growing movement around the world, with high concentrations in the United States and within Europe. The ideology is a rebranding of well-known extremist ideas such as racial and gender superiority. The Alt-Right’s main recruitment methods are the internet and propaganda inspired by popular culture. Such means are used to recruit young, white men who are isolated by society and those who suffer

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from mental illness. Initiatives such as increasing mental health resources, the creation of educational programs for children and adults, and the encouragement of better parental supervision of children’s online activities could prove helpful in preventing more young people from being recruited by extremists.

**Bibliography**


Democracy and Social Stability in the Age of Post-Truth, Fake News, and Social Media

Alex THOMPSON

Abstract: The following research paper intends to highlight how Democracy and social stability are being affected by the changing factors in our political and technological discourse. The research includes the usage of post-truth, fake news, and misinformation and disinformation in political discourse as well as recent examples that have brought these actions into the public spotlight. The paper will also look at methods that the aggressors are using to spread their message such as troll factories, propaganda, and social media. Lastly, the paper will look at different cases of attacks on Democracy and destabilization of social stability in those countries. These cases include the terrorist attacks on Sri Lanka and their response to control public violence and panic, the 2018 US Intelligence Community response and proposals to stop meddling in US elections such as the midterm election, and proposals on how private sector companies that are in charge of social media platforms need to take measures to delete fake news and de-weaponize their platform for terrorists.

Keywords: Post-truth, Fake news, Social media, Misinformation, Disinformation, Filter bubble

Increasing Use of Post-Truth and Fake News in Political Discourse

Post-truth is a growing phenomenon that has become more powerful and influential with technological advances and the acceptance of the public. It is
the process of appealing to the emotions of the audience and making facts and expert opinions secondary to its appeal. Recently, post-truth has become more prevalent and talked about in the past couple of years. Technological advances such as social media has allowed anyone with access to the internet to quickly and efficiently receive information, even if it is illegible\textsuperscript{318}.

Before the internet and social media, channels of information and news were confined to traditional forms of media including newspapers, television, and radio. However, these traditional forms have regulations placed on them. Newspapers, although less regulated, are still subject to make changes if accused of inappropriately slandering someone or making claims that are unsubstantiated. Radio and television receive more government regulation\textsuperscript{319}.

However new media, with the internet, is regulated less and impacts the political views of people much more. Traditional media has to compete with new media in terms of the availability, costs, and interests. Unlike traditional media such as newspapers, social media faces lower costs and are able to report in real time about new developments in the news much faster. With the decline of popularity in traditional media, new media such as social media platforms, hold a much stronger hold on the views and interests of the public.

Citizens and voters increasingly use social media to seek out information concerning political parties’ stances on a range of issues that appeases their own personal interests. However, social media distributes information faster than political parties can adequately respond and maintain interaction with\textsuperscript{320}. To appease the public’s opinion and maintain control over their political party they more recently have begun resorting to calling things that they don’t agree with ‘fake news’ and working on changing how citizens view their party.


\textsuperscript{320} Peters, Rider, Hyvonen, and Besley, \textit{Post-Truth}, 6.
In addition to post-truth, fake news has also been a major part in the age of misinformation, disinformation, and deception. Fake news has been present in social media and news for a long time even before social media became popular. According to Hendricks, fake news is defined as “invented material that has been cleverly manipulated so as to come across as reliable, journalistic reporting that may easily be spread online to a large audience that is willing to believe the stories and spread the message”\(^\text{321}\). Combining false and undocumented claims, distortions and misrepresentations, fake news persuades the audience to take a wanted opinion or behavior. Fake news aims to be seen as real news and supports itself with manipulated pictures and video footage.

The real goal of fake news is anchored in political or monetary gain and spreading out to a bigger audience. However, the definition has expanded with the focus and debate on President Trump. Rhetoric criticizing and supporting the president has journalists, supporters, and dissenters alike labeling the opposition and things they do not agree with as fake news. This has been seen as a shift from the traditional definition of ‘fake news’, which has now become a label for discrediting and slandering sources and information without much research or evidence.

While the official definition of fake news still holds, the changes in its usage is important to highlight, as it has become harder to define and determine who is qualified to deem something as fake news. Restricting and making sure that fake news is not spread by citizens and readers is important to the integrity of information spread and keeping people correctly informed on current events. Making the official definition of fake news clear to citizens and helping them understand how to detect it is one of the most important factors in creating a solution to stop fake news from spreading on social media platforms and impacting Democratic processes.

Misinformation and disinformation also contribute to the deception and corruption of truth. Misinformation refers to incorrect facts that a person holds to be true. Often misinformation comes from ignorance, not

intentionally made to deceive citizens, journalists, and politicians. Whereas disinformation intentionally seeks to spread incorrect facts, to deceive and to misinform people\textsuperscript{322}. Those who claimed Barak Obama was not a US citizen illustrates this distinction. Misinformation represents the people who truly believe that Barack Obama is not a US citizen, while disinformation represents Obama’s opponents in the opposing party who intentionally spread deceiving information about Obama with the hope that others will believe it. To be effective, misinformation and disinformation need to incorporate some truth into the fake information that is spread. It may include a mix of allegedly true information, some doubtful or undocumented information, and completely false information.

The goal of a well-crafted piece of misinformation or disinformation is to have impact and believability while taking time to reveal the information as false information. Tools such as social media create more confusion on misinformation and disinformation than compared to traditional forms of media like television, radio, and newspapers. Social media gives anonymity and power to anyone to start up their own blog or post. Anonymity makes it more difficult to understand the motives behind posts that are false as there is no evidence to point to whether the user is trying to intentionally slander someone with false information. However, by tracking a user’s post history, the frequency false information is posted, and when an account was opened, it is possibly to determine whether an account was made for the purpose of posting false information. Even with these criteria, it is still impossible to know the motives behind the trolls.

Methods and Platforms Used by Aggressors

Troll factories and propaganda are two of the biggest factors in disinformation in the age of social media. Propaganda has two main foci when being spread on social media: creating dissent and polarization within countries and spreading the ideas of the aggressing country. Russia is one of the best countries to utilize propaganda for their own gain and in spreading it to

\textsuperscript{322} Hendrick, 2019,
other countries. According to the Research and Development Corporation (RAND) the techniques that Russia employs include operating Kremlin-supporting news websites, state-funded television, and working with Russia-backed civil society organizations. Russia also has a very powerful and effective social media campaign that combines news tweets, comments, troll and bot accounts on social media, and fake hashtag/Twitter campaigns.

Russian social media uses a combination of bots and trolls to spread the idea of pro-Russian rhetoric and to attack their targets. To be able to recognize the accounts of these Russian bots and trolls, RAND created a fingerprint. The goal of this propaganda is to create polarization within their target country and to create distrust between the citizens of the country and the government. One of their largest targets are the countries that were former Soviet states. Their target is to create hostility and distrust between the citizens that either speak Russian or are ethnic Russian and the government of those countries.

Technological advances and social media created new venues for troll factories and propaganda to flourish. Now there are a variety of platforms that were not highly regulated like traditional media, designed to get users to stay on their platforms. The algorithm of social media websites will cater and cut content that is similar to what the user has been searching for and is interested in, making it more likely to show up in the search results and in their feed. This enables social media to narrow the users point of view and to continue to receive sources that are all similar and/or agree with what the user believes in. This allows users, whose views are not as popular in the public eye, to feel as if the whole world agrees with them and that they must be right.


The algorithms create a bubble around the user which is an excellent place for conspiracy theorists and propaganda to flourish. Algorithms that are designed to keep the user on their website is good for the company that owns the site but can cause negative developments in the user’s ability to critically judge pieces of content. The bubble causes users to become more focused on information that supports their viewpoint regardless of who was behind spreading the information and making sure that the content is credible. This is how propaganda can gain influence and for fake news to spread. It also harms the discussion and debate of important issues regarding democracy and society. If more and more citizens are getting their news from social media websites, and they are being influenced by algorithms that only give them one side of events, it creates greater polarization amongst citizens when engaging in discussions about politics and current events.

Dealing with Attacks on Democracy on a Country by Country Basis

Social media has become a double-edged sword for both the aggressors and the defenders. From the positive perspective, information can now spread more quickly, enabling first responders to go to the scene of a crime and deal with attacks and security risks much faster than they ever could before. At the same time, it can also create panic and chaos and give information to attackers.

On Easter, Sri Lanka was attacked with bombings that killed around 200 people. Sri Lanka made the decision to shut down social media owned by Facebook (Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram) to reduce the amount of fake news and misinformation from spreading and creating violence and panic. Other social media platforms like YouTube were allowed because they were not as widely used as other social media apps e.g. Facebook and WhatsApp. While Facebook has been an effective tool to spread information, validating information in a time of panic and grief can become problematic. Having a platform that has failed in the past to filter and censor
fake news and misinformation can also be extremely dangerous\textsuperscript{326}. Fake news and misinformation are especially dangerous in Sri Lanka because the misuse of social media has caused witch hunts and mob violence.

This situation brings up an important debate concerning the impact of social media and social stability. The debate centers around the question of whether fake news and misinformation should be able to have a presence in social media and in the sphere of society. In the case in Sri Lanka, it exemplifies how there is a problem of not having enough expertise to deal with outcomes of attacks around the globe. Additionally, Facebook can run into problems when something happens in a country that has a language which none (or very few) of their employees speak and are unfamiliar with\textsuperscript{327}. There needs to be a better program that deals with news and events around the globe for social media companies to be able to deal with fake news, misinformation, and weaponizing of their platform.

Another important event was Russia’s interference in the 2016 US election, representing a foreign attack on American Democracy. According to a joint statement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence, there was no change in how and when voters voted or how many votes were counted\textsuperscript{328}. Rather they discussed the interference of Russia in the election through propaganda on social media, fake news on politicians and their policies, and spreading Russian sentiments through English speaking news sources like the Russian Times and Sputnik. In response, the Director of National Intelligence mentioned that they will focus on two parts in protecting the integrity of the Democratic system in future elections: First the DNI will work on foreign influencers in national


Dealing with Attacks on Democracy on a Country by Country Basis

Elections by working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, and other Intelligence Communities to get a better picture of the threat and proactively stopping information loss and cyber threats. Second, they will also work on establishing cyber security guidelines and information about responsible information sharing sites such as social media. The United States approach to dealing with the attack on Democracy is becoming proactive in identify threats before they occur in future elections. Proactivity in a fast-changing field like social media is key to thwarting attacks on Democracy.

With the rising use of social media as a tool for misinformation, fake news, and use as a platform for terrorists, private companies must hold greater responsibility over what happens on their platform. Currently social media acts as a global community for people to connect and spread information. However, since social media is used around the world, there is greater responsibility in the global community. Fake news, misinformation, videos by attackers and terrorists need to be monitored and taken down especially in more extreme circumstances. The responsibilities of private companies now include monitoring, creating clear guidelines on what is defined as fake news, and restricting fake news and propaganda. Companies need to create clear guidelines on what constitutes as fake news to help misunderstandings and conflicts that may arise from content creators and journalists that want to create satirical content. It would also help citizens report fake news to moderators for the content to be reviewed and either restricted or deleted.

A team of computer science and engineering majors have also come up with additional ways to detect and monitor fake news. They propose using a data-driven approach to analyze posts and articles to detect early on whether a post is qualified as fake news. One of their suggestions was to create a database of fake news benchmarks that could be shared and

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expanded upon so that future researchers and moderators would be able to recognize fake news early on and stop if from having an effect on the citizens of the public\textsuperscript{330}. For future research they also suggest finding ways to detect visual fake news, such as manipulating video footage of public figures, synthesizing high quality videos, and deepfakes\textsuperscript{331}.

To illustrate a recent example in the United States, a video of Democratic Senator Nancy Pelosi that had previously been taken, was slowed down to make the viewers believe that she was drunk\textsuperscript{332}. Replications of this video stayed up for quite a while on social media sites and is just one example of one of the many ways that visual content can be used to spread fake news on social media sites. Apart from detecting and monitoring fake news, there is the question on how fake news needs to be dealt with. In the same way fake news is spread and gets a reaction, there needs to be a method of taking it down and fixing incorrect messages. If for example, the source was from a company, then there should be an edit and a reupload with the edit. If the source came from a non-official source, then the best way to resolve the issue is by taking it down and sending a message to the creator explaining why it was taken down, what they can do to fix the post, and who they can contact to dispute the validity of their takedown.

Conclusion and Takeaways

In the new technological age of information people are able to access a much wider variety of information now than ever before. However, as


\textsuperscript{331} Deepfake: a doctored image, video, or audio using artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques; see also Frue, Kiesha, “What is a Deepfake and Why Should You Care?”, Accessed September 22, 2019, https://towardsdatascience.com/what-is-a-deepfake-and-why-should-you-care-763f667321d0.

\textsuperscript{332} “No, This Is Not a Real Video of US House Speaker Pelosi Slurring Her Words Onstage – the Footage Has Been Doctored to Slow Down Her Speech,” AFP Fact Check, May 24, 2019, Accessed July 29, 2019, https://factcheck.afp.com/no-not-real-video-us-house-speaker-pelosi-slurring-her-words-onstage-footage-has-been-doctored-slow.
shown in the cases of Sri Lanka and the United States, social media websites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube can be misused and cause harm to the integrity of Democracy and manipulate the social stability of citizens. One of the biggest hindrances in working toward the deletion of fake news and reinstating the integrity of Democracy is working with private sector companies to de-weaponize their platforms for terrorists and aggressive nations.

Social media has been created to give a voice to the opinions of those that cannot be heard and to share information with others. But the misuse of these tools requires solutions to be provided by the companies that are behind social media. It cannot be stated enough how much of an impact social media sites have on political discourse and rhetoric and their implications on how future elections and discussions regarding politics will continue.

Private companies need to be held responsible and accountable for what is posted on their platform as well as who posts the content. One possible solution might be to remove anonymity amongst its users, so that people will no longer be able to hide behind their user name, and would have to face consequences for posting fake news and disinformation. With social media’s popularity it is the duty of social media to promote media literacy and promote a strong way to find what sources are credible and define what fake news is.

Another proposed solution, would be for social media sites to band together and create a campaign to define fake news, to educate its users about what it is, how to detect it and determine whether the sources are credible. Ad posts created by social media companies would be beneficial in mending the issues that have arisen through social media. More jobs to counter fake news posts and terrorist propaganda would reduce the amount of traffic that these posts would receive and limit the amount of impact they would have on the users.

Finally, it is imperative to work on creating clear guidelines and definitions of the terms and type of content that is not allowed on social media websites. Some gray areas of content include educational content on fake
news and terrorism on sites like YouTube and parody content that take a satirical point of view such as the Onion. Creating clear guidelines will stop conflict from arising amongst users that want to be educational or do not want their free speech impeded by the companies of the social media sites. These represent just a few ideas on how to fix the issues that social media is now facing and hopefully with the insight gained through this paper, it will create a discussion on improving media literacy and creating a discourse on social medias impact on society.

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Abstract: The Dark Web and its widely abused platforms are a major security concern for many governments today. The following paper will explore the evolving landscape and emerging threats found on the Dark Web. This article aims to provide context, and appropriate tactics that governments can employ in countering this new age of global terrorism and crime. As well as a comprehensive review of the tools and services associated with the Dark Web.

Keywords: Dark Web, Tor, Bitcoin, Hidden Wiki

Layers of the Internet

The misinterpretation of terms such as the surface web, Deep Web, and Dark Web has always been prevalent. The websites we browse for our day to day activities only make up a small percentage of the actual internet, this is called the surface web. It is visible and accessible to common search engines such as Google and Yahoo. While estimates vary, many experts agree that the surface web comprises roughly only 4% of all online content. This is known as the Iceberg theory, with the part below the surface being much greater than above. The Deep Web, the part of the internet which is not directly available, makes up about 96% of the World Wide Web. It consists of the parts which are not indexed or accessible.

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by any standard search engine. These are benign private databases such as online banking, medical records, government resources, subscription information etc. These databases are not available to the general public, they can only be accessed by a direct URL or IP address and require authentication.

The Dark Web on the other hand, also known as the Dark Net, is a subset of the Deep Web. It is the anonymous part of the Deep Web only accessible by special software and specific cyber connections. One cannot access the Dark Web without specialized encryption and obfuscation software known as Tor, or I2P\textsuperscript{335}. The Dark Web is a collection of thousands of websites that use these anonymity tools. Sites that exist on the Dark Web exist on encrypted networks and cannot be found using traditional search engines\textsuperscript{336}. The user must know where to find the site through directories such as the “Hidden Wiki” in order to type in the URL and visit. To visit a Dark Web site or “hidden service” that runs Tor encryption, the web user needs to be using Tor. This principle applies to I2P as well, the visitor must use the same encryption tool as the site. Although many people have never seen or used this software, it is freely available for download and can be installed in just a few minutes. This is your passport to the digital underworld. The identity and activity of Dark Web users stay anonymous and cannot be traced due to the multi layered encryption system. The Dark Web’s encryption technology routes users’ data through a large number of proxy servers operated by thousands of volunteers around the globe. This provides a secure channel where the client and server can communicate without being concerned of their identities. These anonymity tools, Tor being the most widely used and I2P a distant second, prevent network surveillance and traffic analysis. Due to the Dark Web’s anonymous nature it has enabled a variety of illegal activities to take place. It provides a safe haven for terrorist communications as well as a vector for recruitment. It allows for terrorist networks and crime syndicates to utilize bitcoin and


various crypto currencies for money laundering. It has become a delivery service for any crime imaginable, drugs, stolen goods, identity theft, child porn, human trafficking, hit men, weapons, explosives, uranium, hackers for hire, malware distribution, rootkits, botnets, and zero-day exploits. The Dark Web has become a proverbial Amazon for crime. It is a major concern for governments and security agencies around the world, one whose impact on society and public policy will be explored in this paper.

History of the Dark Web

As stated earlier, the Dark Web is a collection of sites and resources that are deliberately hidden. Most sites on the Dark Web makes use of Tor, short for “The Onion Router”, that acts as an overlay network providing online protection. Tor’s powerful encryption and network of volunteers make it virtually impossible to find anyone’s real identity when they access a site using it. Tor was originally created by the NRL the Naval Research Laboratory in the 90s as a means for military personnel to communicate abroad anonymously. However, its original purpose was negated because only the US government at that time used the network. Runa Sandvik, a security researcher who worked on the Tor Project, explained that Tor was released to the public in 2002 because, “if you have this anonymity system and all traffic going into the system is the US Navy and everything popping out is the U.S. Navy then you’re not that anonymous. By opening up this system to everyone, different groups of people can hide in a big crowd of anonymous Tor users.” Tor makes all of its users look the same which confuses the observer and makes you anonymous. The more people who use the Tor network, the stronger it gets. Since the security of a single user is a direct function of the number of overall users, a large user base is vital. Smaller darknets are easier to hack and easier to de-anonymize. Very quickly due to its anonymous nature, TOR attracted


thousands who wanted to use it for a variety of purposes – ranging from legitimate to highly illegal.

With regard to the legitimate reasons to use Tor or other similar services, it is important to keep in mind that the ability for users to email, surf the web, share content without giving away their IP address is critical if you reside in China, Russia, Iran, or other countries that control and surveil the internet. One could rely on Tor to mask their identity when visiting sites such as Facebook, YouTube, or the New York Times. Tor also protects users’ data against corporate and government targeted mass surveillance. The Tor Project has already won several awards for the spread of freedom and democracy around the world. For example, in 2009 during the “Green revolution” protests in Iran and the 2011 “Arab Spring” in Syria, Tor was used as a means for dissident movements to collaborate but remain hidden in plain view or is also increasingly being used by journalists to securely communicate with sources and whistleblowers such as those within the WikiLeaks community.

Even if Tor might have been originally developed for good, ironically within the US government, it should come as no surprise that given its powerful ability to facilitate clandestine communication, criminals, terrorists, and black hat hackers have adopted the tool in droves, enabling the creation of illegal marketplace services such as the Silk Road.

### Illegal Marketplace

The Dark Web facilitates a wide variety of criminal transactions where a range of malicious actors – from drug and arms dealers to terrorists to hackers for hire leverage the secrecy and anonymity afforded by tools like Tor and I2P to facilitate conversation, coordination, and action. A user on the Dark Web can buy drugs, guns, credit card numbers, various exploits, and just about

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anything you can imagine. Anonymizing services like Tor enable these Dark Web sites that host illegal content to exist. A paper published in 2016 by researchers at Kings College attempted to quantify how much of Tor’s hidden services were used for illegal activity. Researchers used the two most popular search engines on the Dark Web, Ahmia and Onion City. The scans returned a total of 5,205 live websites over a 5-week period within the Tor network. Out of which 1547, 28%, hosted illicit material (see table below)\(^\text{342}\).

Table 8.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Websites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other illicit</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inknown</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate pornography</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nexus</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacking</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total active</td>
<td>2,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total illicit</td>
<td>1,547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A 2019 study, *Into the Web of Profit*, conducted by Dr. Michael McGuires at the University of Surrey, shows that things have become even worse. The number

of dark web listings that host illicit content has risen by 20% since 2016\(^{343}\). The definitions used by these researchers for illegal activities were as follows:

### Table 8.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>Trading of firearms and weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Trade or manufacture of illegal drugs, including illegally obtained prescription medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>Content espousing extremist ideologies, including ideological texts, expressions of support for terrorist violence, militant how-to guides and extremist community forums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Money laundering, counterfeit bills, trade in stolen credit cards or accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacking</td>
<td>Hackers for hire, trade or distribution of malware or DDoS capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate pornography</td>
<td>Pornographic material involving children, violence, animals or materials obtained without participants’ consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nexus</td>
<td>Websites primarily focused on linking to other illicit websites and resources within the darknet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other illicit</td>
<td>Materials that did not easily fit into the other categories but remain problematic, such as trade of other illegal goods and fake passports or IDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Online communities for sharing illicit material in the form of forums, social networks and other message boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Hitmen for hire, and instructional material on conducting violent attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Non-illicit content, such as ideological or political content, secure drop sites, information repositories, legitimate services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Websites which were either completely inaccessible or otherwise had no visible content, including websites which hosted only placeholder text, indicating that their operator had yet to generate indicative content</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some security and law enforcement experts privately estimate the vast majority of Tor’s hidden services are unlawful. As you can see in Table 8.1,

\(^{343}\) Moore & Rid, “Cyberpolitik and Darknet” 2016.
the rate of criminal adoption is far outpacing that of privacy activists\textsuperscript{344}. As of 2017, Tor software had been downloaded over 200 million times, and currently in 2019, it is being used by 3 million people daily. That means over 400,000 criminals are getting up and going to work on the Dark Web using Tor’s hidden services. Silk Road was just one of dozens of online criminal super marketplaces. If you want to purchase drugs today on the Dark Web you can go to Empire Market. Or if you want to commit identity theft and buy credit cards, bank account numbers, from virtually every bank and country in the world, one would only need to go to Genesis Market\textsuperscript{345}. If criminals and terrorists, for example, need to travel across international borders and establish new identities, they could buy a fake passport, or immigration documents from the BlackBooth Market. If someone wants to purchase weapons and explosives, such as handguns with silencers, Ak-47s, Bushmaster M4’s, C4 explosives, NIJ level IV body armor, they would only need to access AlphaGuns or the EuroGuns market. Additionally, as we saw on Silk Road, assassinations are also just a click away on the Dark Web. Service providers such as Quick Kill and C’thulu have all advertised “permanent solutions to common problems”\textsuperscript{346}.

There have also been numerous sites on the Dark Web providing a sanctuary for merchants of child pornography\textsuperscript{347}. Sites like Jailbait, and Lolita City have thrived. For example, one Dark Web site alone had over 27,000 registered pedophile members in its forums. All these illicit goods and services are offered for sale on the Dark Web. With the transactions on the Dark Web taking place using crypto currencies like Bitcoin, it makes it difficult for law enforcement to trace these transactions, identify suspects and gather evidence of criminality. Today, these marketplaces – driven by a “fully networked and anonymous criminal workforce”\textsuperscript{348}, drive tremendous profits, a trend that is only increasing.


The Silk Road, “also known as the Amazon of drugs and vice,” is one of the best-known examples of a successful and lucrative online criminal marketplace. Known as the first modern Darknet market\(^\text{349}\), it was launched in 2011 and offered every possible illicit product imaginable, neatly presented by category with customer reviews, high resolution photos, and descriptions. It offered, “stolen bank accounts, counterfeit currency, Ak-47s, armor piercing rounds, stolen credit cards, computer viruses, key-stroke loggers, compromised Facebook accounts, tutorials with step by step instructions on hacking ATMs and other point of sale machines, child pornography, and even hit men for hire”\(^\text{350}\). Between 2011 and 2013, Silk Road processed more than 1.2 billion dollars’ worth of transactions. Users on marketplaces like Silk Road use Bitcoin and other crypto currencies that are rooted in anonymity, making it extremely difficult for Law Enforcement to track. According to *Addiction* nearly 20% of drug users in the United States purchased narcotics on Silk Road. Even though Silk Road was eventually shut down and its owner arrested, ironically “the Silk Road bust was


the best advertising the Darknet markets could have hoped for\textsuperscript{351}. In 2013 the number of listings offering illegal content for sale on the Dark Web appeared to have more than doubled in less than a year.

Silk Road Website

Tor’s most controversial property is its capability of creating hidden services such as Silk Road on its network\textsuperscript{352}. This allows anybody running Tor the ability to create and host a hidden web service, “a virtually untraceable server hosted within the Tor network, simply by adding two short lines of code to a short configuration file”\textsuperscript{353}. This allows circumvention of all known forms of content restrictions or surveillance. Neither the Internet Service Provider (ISPs) that route the traffic, nor law enforcement agencies, nor even the developers of the Tor project itself, have visibility into the


hosted servers’ location or the identity of its operator\textsuperscript{354}. Unlike the human readable domain names that we are used to seeing on the surface web, .com,.org,.net, these hidden services or Dark Web sites deal with domains that do not participate in the public DNS (Domain Name System) and are not recognized by ICANN (The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) they are always 16-character values prepended to the .onion top-level domain\textsuperscript{355}. For example Silk Road’s hidden domain name was silkroadvb5piz3r.onion. Users can navigate to these sites through directories, as stated prior, such as the “Hidden Wiki” which organizes Dark Web sites by category similar to Wikipedia. In addition, users can also browse the Dark Web with search engines such as Ahmia, Onion City or Grams which were patterned after Google where users can find illicit drugs, guns, counterfeit money and other contraband\textsuperscript{356}.

\textbf{Terrorism}

Crime is not the only reason to use Tor hidden services. A number of reports indicate that Al Qaeda, ISIS, Ansar al Sharia in Libya (ASL), Jabhat al-Nsura (JN), as well as other terrorist groups, use the secrecy and anonymity afforded by Tor and I2P encryption protocols. They use the Dark Web, “to communicate, recruit new members, raise funds, purchase arms, spread propaganda, and even plan operations”\textsuperscript{357}. 25 Terrorists have started to recognize the advantages of the Dark Web and have begun to use its secret platforms. Many of the terrorists’ websites or social media are shut down. With the decision by many governments to filter extremist content, it has resulted in jihadists looking for new online safe havens\textsuperscript{358}. The conventional surface web is much too risky, for terrorists can be monitored, 

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
traced, and found, in contrast to the Dark Web, where the decentralized and anonymous networks keep their identity and activity hidden\textsuperscript{359}.

Solid evidence of terrorist use of the Dark Web platforms was found in 2013. The NSA intercepted encrypted communications between Al-Qaeda leader Ayman-Al Zawahiri and Nasir Al-Wuhayasi, the head of AQAP. It was revealed that for about a decade the communication between leaders of the worldwide Al-Qaeda network was at least partially leveraged on the Dark Net\textsuperscript{360}. Following the Paris attacks in November 2015, ISIS had completely turned to the Dark Web to spread news and propaganda in an apparent attempt to protect the identities of the group’s supporters and safeguard its content from hacktivists\textsuperscript{361}. The move came after hundreds of websites associated with ISIS were taken down as part of the Operation Paris (OpParis) campaign launched by the amorphous hacker collective Anonymous. ISIS’s media outlet, Al-Hayat Media Center even posted a link and explanations on how to get to their new Dark Net site on a forum\textsuperscript{362}.

Terrorists also use the Dark Web to obtain weapons. In the Paris attacks four of the assault rifles used had been originally purchased off the Dark Web from a vendor in Germany. Additionally, the weapon used in the 2015 Munich shooting rampage was also bought off the Dark Web. This illustrates the pervasiveness of arms dealing on the Dark Web\textsuperscript{363}. With the sheer availability of weapons on these marketplaces, it is likely to facilitate a nexus between criminal arms dealers and terrorists, as it removes the need for a physical connection between vendor and buyer\textsuperscript{364}. This is par-
particularly concerning given the fact that ISIS has called for simplistic attacks in the past such as vehicular attacks, and knives. This growing nexus raises the stakes quite a bit. It is possible now for self-starter terrorists, savvy enough to access Dark Net marketplaces, to obtain weapons and carry out significant attacks.

The Dark Web can also be used by terrorists for the clandestine transfer of funds, using virtual currencies like Bitcoin and Monero. This recent trend is one of the most alarming combinations of terrorism and the Dark Net capabilities365.

In 2015 a Singapore based cyber intelligence company S2T uncovered concrete evidence that a terror cell, related to ISIS operating in the Americas solicited Bitcoin in its fundraising efforts366. One hacker group “Ghost Security” even went so far as to track the digital footprints of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks. They successfully uncovered a number of Bitcoin addresses belonging to ISIS. One of the accounts analyzed, contained over 3 million US dollars’ worth of Bitcoin. The growing sophistication of terrorists’ use of the Dark Web and crypto currencies presents a tough challenge for governments, counter terrorism agencies and security services367.

Hackers for Hire

The Dark Web is also a sort of hackers’ paradise. It is a black market of exploits. Hackers distribute malware, exchange attack methods, share known vulnerabilities in networks or software, and collaborate to breach tough cyber defenses368. Quite often the worst cyber-attacks are launched from the Dark Web. Take for example the Target breach of 2013. The malware BlackPOS, which was responsible for the massive invasion of Target’s point of sale systems, was purchased off the Dark Web. This was one of the

368 Cole, Online Danger, 2018.
largest data breaches in history, with over 40 million credit and debit card numbers, along with 70 million records of personal information stolen\textsuperscript{369}.

Some of the most popular cyber exploits can be found on the Dark Web – fully packaged cyber-crime toolkits like SpyEye, Zeus, and Bugat\textsuperscript{370}. These kits can be used for phishing campaigns, spam, fraud, DDoS attacks, and data theft. Network compromises and large-scale data breaches used to be spearheaded by highly skilled hackers. Now a days it does not take a sophisticated and carefully planned operation to break into IT systems. Hacking tools and malware that are available on the Dark Web, make it possible for amateur hackers to cause enormous damage\textsuperscript{371}.

Frighteningly enough, in the digital underworld, users can shop for zero-day exploits. As reported, “Zero-day bugs ... have not yet been discovered by software and antivirus companies thus defeating common security measures without raising alarm”\textsuperscript{372}. Zero-day exploits enable particularly stealthy and sophisticated attacks against specific targets, giving rise to what security researchers term APTs, advanced persistent threats. The likelihood of being detected in one of these attacks is effectively nil. Society today is faced with serious challenges emanating from this proliferation of open source cyber weapons. Marc Goodman, former member of the FBI cybercrime division warns, “The panoply of malware toolkits and millions of botnet zombies on the Dark Web are providing criminals and terrorists powerful tools of domination that can be used as offensive weapons, cash making machines or both”\textsuperscript{373}. There are tools on the Dark Web available for download developed to attack industrial control systems and take power grids off-line. Goodman states that there are zombie botnets, like Storm Bot 2.0 for sale capable of generating 300 gigs per second of attack.

\textsuperscript{370} Goodman, Future Crime, 2016.
\textsuperscript{373} Goodman, Future Crime, 2016.
traffic, enough to “knock small countries offline.” How long will it be before someone uses one of these “digital Molotov cocktails” and lobbs it back at us with the intent of attacking our own critical infrastructure systems?374.

The Role of Cryptocurrencies

One of the main enabling mechanisms of the Dark Web is cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Bitcoin is pseudonymous and difficult to trace. It is the standard currency of the Dark Web. Bitcoins are an uninsured and variable currency that was created in 2009375. They are stored in encrypted digital wallets. Bitcoins are designed to be very difficult to track back to the person who spent them. Each transaction is recorded in a public log, but only the wallet IDs are recorded, not the names of the buyer or seller.

Bitcoin can then easily be laundered through unregulated exchanges, such as those without KYC/AML procedures (Know-Your-Customer and Anti-Money Laundering) which avoids identity checks. In a report from 2016, researchers at the University of Technology in Sydney found that approximately 25% of bitcoin users and 41% of bitcoin transactions were associated with illegal activity376. The same report estimated that roughly $72 billion worth of bitcoin changes hands for illegal goods and services each year, with a majority of these transactions taking place on the Dark Web. The Center on Sanctions & Illicit Finance even published a memo that roughly 95% of bitcoin laundered from 2013 to 2016 originated from transactions made on Dark Web marketplaces such as Silk Road, AlphaBay and Agora.37745 In 2017 another research group CipherTrace reported that the amount of cryptocurrency laundered had tripled from 2016. One can assume by 2019 it is significantly larger. The level of anonymity is unrivaled by any other payment mechanism. Bitcoin’s use of a wallet as the

374 Ibid.
375 Chertoff, “A Public Policy Perspective of the Dark Web.” 2017
sole identifier of an entity in a transaction makes analysis harder than with traditional financial institutions and instruments\textsuperscript{378}.

However, all is not lost, law enforcement agencies and data analysis firms are quickly adapting. Police forces around the world are getting faster, and more competent at flagging Bitcoin transactions linked to illegal activity. Bitcoin’s underlying digital ledger technology the blockchain can also work against criminals and terrorists. It records which address sends and receive transactions including time and amount. Analytic firms and law enforcement agencies have developed databases and powerful sophisticated engines capable of blockchain analysis.

However just as law enforcement has adapted, so too has the adversary. Criminals are now turning in droves to bitcoin mixers known as tumblers. This refers to online third-party services which break down your coins into many different parts and mix those parts with other broken parts from other clients\textsuperscript{379}. A tumblers purpose is to mix one’s funds with other users’ money, obscuring the trail back to the fund’s original source\textsuperscript{380}. Even more concerning for law enforcement, is the shift criminals have taken, moving towards crypto currencies such as Monero, Zcash, and Dash that provide massive advantages over Bitcoin. Virtual currencies like Monero, have an increased focus on privacy. It encrypts the recipients blockchain address and generates fake addresses to obscure the real senders, it also obscures the amount of the transaction\textsuperscript{381}. High privacy cryptos like Monero, eliminate law enforcements ability to trace transactions and identity suspects.


Policing the Dark Web

Due to the threats lurking within, the Dark Web is fair game for the most aggressive intelligence and law enforcement techniques. Law enforcement agencies for years have been developing technology to infiltrate and deanonymize services such as Tor.

All the way back in 2002 the FBI put resources into developing malware that can compromise servers in attempt to identify users of Tor\textsuperscript{382}. The FBI reportedly used a “computer and Internet protocol address verifier (CIPAV) to identify suspects who were disguising their location using proxy servers or anonymity services like Tor\textsuperscript{383}. This technology allows Tor traffic to be flagged separately from regular internet traffic. This helps law enforcement agencies narrow down their search parameters during an investigation.

Police forces have been expending considerable resources in trying to unmask the uses of Tor. In 2014, it was revealed the FBI paid the SEI of CMU (Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Melon) $1 million to hack Tor. This led to the arrest and prosecution of Silk Road 2.0 operators. Tor eventually patched this protocol vulnerability in mid-2014, but it demonstrated the law enforcement’s reach. That same year DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) began conducting a research project called Memex. This was the development of a software that allowed for better cataloguing of Dark Web sites. Zetter shares, “It aimed to shine a light on the Dark Web and uncover patterns and relationships in online data to help law enforcement and others track illegal activity”\textsuperscript{384}.

Additionally, after the Snowden leaks, it was revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) reportedly had a program called Xkeyscore. This showed that any user simply attempting to download Tor, was automatically

\textsuperscript{382} Finklea, “Dark Web,” 2017.


fingerprinted, essentially enabling the NSA to know the identity of millions of Tor users. Tor is a high priority target for the NSA. The work of attacking Tor is executed by the NSA’s application vulnerabilities branch, which is a part of the SID (systems intelligence directory).

Furthermore in 2015 the FBI employed the most extensive use of malware a US law enforcement agency had ever employed before. Targeting the world’s most notorious darknet child pornography site. The FBI used a hacking tool, NIST (network investigative security technique), which exploited the Tor Browser. 95% of the code in Tor browser comes from Firefox with some modifications and some additions. Court documents show that likely a piece of Flash or JavaScript that exploits a vulnerability in the Firefox based Tor browser was employed. Once law enforcement found the IP address to the physical server that hosted this illegal site and arrested its operator, instead of shutting it down, they ran the site for another 2 weeks on a FBI server as a watering hole. Any visitor to the site had the malware planted on their machine, making it an easy way for law enforcement to identify and prosecute them. Over 1500 Playpen users were arrested. Tor quickly applied a patch to the critical zero-day vulnerability. The operation however was legally controversial, it generated serious concerns about security research ethics, not to mention the right of not being unreasonably searched guaranteed by the US fourth amendment. The debate surrounding the Dark Web had just begun. Online anonymity is a double-edged sword that must be handled delicately.

**Going Forward**

This paper has shown clear evidence that the Dark Web is a major platform for global terrorism and criminal activities. The growing sophistication of terrorists’ and criminal use of the Dark Web presents a tough

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challenge for governments, counter terrorism agencies and security services in the future. While countries like China and Russia have taken efforts to completely block access to Tor, these agendas compromise the ideals of a free and open society. Specific tactics for intervening on the Dark Web must be carefully considered. Dark Web policy, like all good policy, “must be nuanced and thoughtful in order to strike the balance between the needs of innocent privacy minded users and the government’s responsibility to stop illegal activity.”

Governments have to employ appropriate tactics that stop illegal activity while also protecting innocent privacy minded users like those who live under repressive regimes. However, there is an obvious demand for illegal online marketplaces, so it is not an issue that will dissipate on its own. Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors around the world must undertake coordinated actions in targeting high value black marketplaces. This will overcome jurisdictional obstacles. The international community must promote cross-border information sharing, investigation and enforcement operations such as those during Operation ONYMOUS by Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre, the FBI, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s, Homeland Security Investigations and Eurojust. The operation resulted in 17 arrests of vendors and administrators running online dark marketplaces and more than 410 hidden services being taken down. Bitcoins worth approximately USD 1 million, EUR 180 000 euro in cash, drugs, gold and silver were seized. The dark market Silk Road 2.0 was taken down by the FBI and the U.S. ICE HIS, and the operator was arrested.

Government agencies need to solidify their policies on how to regulate the Dark Web within a legal framework. Consensus is important and coordinating regulations is vital. The combined capabilities of different government

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agencies can be effectively utilized towards regulating the Dark Web. The most appropriate tactics to employ are those that are narrowly focused like the FBI and Europol’s take down of Playpen and Silk Road 2.0. This allows for long term deterrence by looking for illegal sites instead of illegal users; government hackers can place deanonymizing tools onto the computers of users accessing the site, and future users who are considering accessing illegal sites will be more hesitant to do so in the future. Tools and techniques must be continually developed in order to monitor and track the illegal activity. Cybercrime budgets must be increased. Law enforcement has to be able to recognize and deal with the various crimes on the Dark Web, whether it is enhancing security agencies ability to trace cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin through blockchain analysis with certain training and collaboration in both the private and public sector, or mapping Tor’s hidden service directories through software like Memex. There is a need to develop NITs, hacking tools which maintain the privacy of the average Tor user, while unmasking the criminal on specific sites. These methods and measures must be put in place in all security agencies. The cyber skills gap between authorities and the adversary must be closed.

Like Michael Chertoff the former head of DHS said, “US policy makers moving forward must monitor vigilantly the evolution of the Dark Web and ensure that enforcement agencies have the resources and legal support to successfully police the Dark Web.” These widely abused platforms have to be fair game for the most aggressive intelligence and law enforcement techniques as well as for invasive academic research. The line between utopia and dystopia is growing increasingly thin.

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395 Moore & Rid, “Cyberpolitik and Darknet” 2016
Bibliography


Abstract: Russian aggression in Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet space have increased tensions and reinforced questions of the state of security. In response, the citizenry of these countries has flocked to volunteer in self-defense forces that are being adopted by respective Ministries of Defense as reserve personnel in the case of invasion. These countries, and the Russian Federation, have opted to adopt asymmetrical means of warfare. While Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine have been reliant on American military support to supplement their own efforts, the Russian Federation has also been dependent on American military literature and using it to reshape their own military methodologies. Through a country case method, this article seeks to review and analyze the experiences of Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine in reaction to perceived Russian aggression.

Keywords: Hybrid warfare, Self-defense forces, Asymmetrical conflict, Russian aggression

Introduction

With the presence of a Russian invasion in the eastern part of the country, Ukrainian civilian volunteer battalions quickly emerged and doubled the size of the military within a matter of months. In 2017, Polish Minister

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of Defense Antoni Macierewicz swore civilian volunteers into the new Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) and reminded them that countless others in Polish history had done the same in times of grave danger\(^\text{397}\). In Estonia, the Estonian Defense League is also composed of civilian volunteers, from ages 7–18 (junior members) and 18 plus, waiting to be called on to defend the sovereignty of Estonia\(^\text{398}\). The success of these volunteer self-defense forces has even been recognized by the United States military in an annual report. U.S. European Command stated in its 2019 Force Posture Statement that, “Continued senior-level engagement and support for Ukrainian self-defense capabilities and institutional reform will help enhance regional security and demonstrate our continued commitment to Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity, and a rules-based international order in Europe”\(^\text{399}\). The current state of security with allied nations in the former Soviet space seems to be increasingly dependent upon these non-professional military units. Discounting the use of nuclear weapons, as only a handful of nations have them, this article seeks to use a country case approach to analyze the recent experiences of Ukraine, Estonia, and Poland in regard to a return to militarism in reaction to a revanchist Russia and Russian aggression.

Russian aggression in the Twenty-First Century has been primarily focused on neighboring Ukraine. The 2014 ‘Maidan Revolution’, essentially a second ‘color revolution’ 10 years following the first, created a chain reaction on the borders of Russia. This resistance to Viktor Yanukovych, the national leader loyal to Moscow, led to his eventual ousting and formation of a new government intent on joining the Liberal Democracies of the West. In the eyes of the Russian Federation, this was unacceptable. This may best be represented with President Putin’s declaration to his security council that

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the government must do whatever it could to ensure that these ‘color revolutions’ never hit Russia. Their response was the seizing of territory in Ukraine, known as Crimea, that was strategically, culturally, and symbolically important to both Russians and Ukrainians. This seizure of territory allowed Russia permanent access to a warm water port, its Black Sea fleet, and hold on one of its holiest sites. It was taken so quickly that Ukraine had no ability to properly respond to the loss of territory. The next step for the Russian Federation was the fomentation of war in other parts of Ukraine that border Russia.

The “oblasts” (regions) of Donetsk and Lughansk in Southeastern Ukraine form the area collectively known as the Donbass. This area is important to both Ukrainians and Russians as it is transnational and also rich in resources, such as coal. That said, not long after the timely annexation of Crimea, a “civil war” broke out in the area between “Ukrainian separatists” and Ukrainian government forces. The use of вежливые люди (polite people), also known as зелёные человечки (little green men), has been the trademark of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This conflict is now in its fifth year, claiming the lives of over 13,000 people, and displacing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians. Yet this experience is not entirely unique to Ukraine as the Russian Federation experimented with hybrid warfare in previous years in the other former Soviet nations of Estonia and Georgia. Before beginning with the country case approach, it is necessary to provide contextual information on the experience of these countries and their dealings with the Russian Federation in the Twenty First Century and decades following their independence from Moscow’s geopolitical influence.

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Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare in the Twenty-First Century

Frank Hoffman defines ‘hybrid warfare’ as “threats incorporate[ing] a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors”\(^{403}\). Hoffman continues by adding that hybrid warfare tends to blend regular and irregular components and units to blur the lines of how a unit operates, which also works to further increase what Carl Von Clausewitz dubbed “the Fog of War”, or confusion and disruption of the battle space due to uncertainty\(^{404}\). For the purpose of this section, the methods of cyber warfare, kinetic warfare, unconventional warfare, terrorism, and influence operations will be used under the umbrella of hybrid warfare.

The first method, cyber warfare, was introduced by the Russian Federation against its former Soviet Union compatriots of the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively\(^{405}\). The 2007 case with Estonia witnessed a massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which flooded network traffic so that the information system infrastructure of the country could not operate\(^{406}\). The case of Georgia took this a step forward by combining both cyberwarfare and kinetic warfare\(^{407}\). This, as in the case with Estonia, was done by flooding network traffic, but also by controlling the access points of Georgia’s network information infrastructure, which only flowed into the country through Russia and Turkey. This


allowed Russian forces to cut off communications between Georgian troops and their commanders in the field while kinetically engaging. As successful as the Georgian War may seem to have been for the Russians at first glance, it did alert them to the fact that they needed to modernize their military. Russia proved that it was ready in 2014, when it responded to Ukraine’s second ‘colour revolution’ with an invasion. Russia’s introduction of the little green men in Crimea allowed for a quick and successful invasion, without the need of spilling blood or wasting ammunition408. These little green men were also able to go to the Donbass and conduct ‘unconventional warfare’ (publicly be declaring that they were assisting the separatists) as well as through the use of terrorism, ultimately leading to, the question that Rod Thornton and Frank Hoffman pose: “are we at war, and if so, with who?”409. Rod Thornton’s discussion on Russia’s use of hybrid warfare originates with his article “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare” whereby he promptly implies that the Russian use is more akin to the full integration of all aspects of the DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic), or instruments of national power. This should not be a new concept by any stretch of the imagination. Yet what we are witnessing with Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, at least theoretically, can be linked to Dr. Mark Galeotti’s coining of the term ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’410, formerly stated in a speech/article by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia Gerasimov. General Gerasimov’s speech/article, in a comparative manner to Carl Von Clausewitz’ work “On War,” represented a list of observations as opposed to any authentic ingenious new strategy. In his speech, General Gerasimov discusses the Arab Spring and the implementations of soft power to destabilize the ruling orders within the countries, where each of these ‘colour revolutions’ were happening. Gerasimov also states, “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the


409 Ibid.

power of force of weapons in their effectiveness”\textsuperscript{411}. Galeotti, in an article written in 2018 in Foreign Policy, redacted the idea of a specific Russian military doctrine circulating\textsuperscript{412}. However, it appears Galeotti was incorrect, as a year following the original article, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was renewed and published. Article 15 of this document outlined the same observations and sentiments that General Gerasimov had previously stated in his speech/article\textsuperscript{413}. Whether Dr. Galeotti appreciates it or not, the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ illustrating hybrid warfare and the full integration of the instruments of power, had become a part of the official military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

Country Case

Ukraine

The natural reaction of Ukraine to this loss of land and fomentation of war was to quickly mobilize and militarize. In early 2015 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe noted that the government in Kiev had officially established the separatist region as an “Anti-Terrorist Zone”\textsuperscript{414}. This took place almost a year after the illegal annexation of Crimea and fomentation of war in the eastern part of the country. When this all began, the Ukrainian government quickly realized that it was no match for the larger and superior Russian forces that were moving in\textsuperscript{415}. In hindsight,


it was an intelligent move to leave the peninsula as Ukraine’s 3,500 troops would be no match for the nearly 100,000 Russian soldiers that President Putin later admitted to having moved into Crimea\textsuperscript{416}. To further complicate things, ousted President Viktor Yanukovych had done his best to destroy the structures and stability of the Ukrainian military, leaving the country with no more than perhaps 5,000 troops nationwide\textsuperscript{417}. However, volunteer militias and self-defense forces quickly organized themselves into small battalions and were adopted by formal Ukrainian government institutions for legitimacy in order to fight the increasing Russian presence in the Donbass\textsuperscript{418}.

These militias and self-defense forces have been successful on the battlefield, but have found themselves at the center of controversy as some of these groups are far-right in nature and have been accused of both war crimes and espousing Neo-Nazi and White Nationalist ideologies, particularly the “Azov Battalion”\textsuperscript{419}. The allegations have been so far reaching that the United States, which has been funding both the Ukrainian military and militias in this conflict, included the stipulation that, “‘none of the funds made available by this act may be used to provide arms, training or other assistance to the Azov Battalion’”\textsuperscript{420}. While at first glance this may seem unprecedented, funding of foreign security forces is prohibited under the stipulations of the “Leahy Act”, which bans the funding of foreign militaries or security forces with credible evidence of their violation of human rights\textsuperscript{421}. Nonetheless, the reports of these self-defense forces committing

\textsuperscript{416} Erlanger and Kramer, “Ukraine Forces Ill Equipped,” 2014.


\textsuperscript{418} Cohen, “Ukraine’s Battle at Ilovaisk,” 2016.


war crimes and violating human rights has not stopped their popularity in the public perception, and some are even using it as political ammunition to push their own agendas for the national politics of Ukraine.

Estonia

Like Ukraine, the Republic of Estonia is a former Soviet republic. Estonia, since a 2004, became a NATO member state. It has since then experienced instances of Russian aggression and intervention on its territory, physically and psychologically. On the physical dimension, Estonia has not been shelled or bombarded with artillery, but saw one of its intelligence officers kidnapped on Estonian soil, taken to the Russian Federation, and tried for espionage. On the psychological dimension, Estonia was the infamous first case of cyber aggression between nation states, falling victim to Russian DDoS attacks in 2007, although Russia never formally claimed responsibility. Being a nation of only 1.3 million people, Estonia understood that it needed to quickly appeal to its Western allies to shore up its defenses. This was a main reason for Estonia’s support of NATO’s push to reinforce the Baltic states, especially as the Estonian professional military, the Estonian Defense Forces, only numbers 6,000 during peace time. Also, like Ukraine, Estonia has looked towards its civilian population for volunteers to join the Estonian Defense League, similar to the National Guard in the United States. This force numbers 26,000 when including other volunteer forces, or just over four times that of the professional military force. The National Defense Strategy of Estonia also stipulates that these volunteers will act as guerrillas and resistance fighters in the case of an invasion and/or

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occupation. This same document also stresses the importance of Estonia’s allies and its commitment to NATO.

In Estonia, there are nearly 1,200 allied troops as of the 2016 Warsaw Summit of NATO\(^\text{426}\). The majority of this contingent are British troops, but there are also French, Danish, and Belgian forces present as well\(^\text{427}\). In addition to the 1,200 troops directly stationed in Estonia, the country is part of the rotation for the U.S. Army’s unilateral Operation Atlantic Resolve, which rotates 6,300 personnel between Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania\(^\text{428}\). These specific personnel are responsible for armor, combat aviation, infantry, and logistics. Within Estonia, they make use of Ämari Air Base and Tapa Army Base, both east of the capital Tallinn.

### Poland

In reaction to Russian aggression in former Soviet Republics, the Republic of Poland has also set a main objective of improving its defensive posture. In the latest Defense Concept of the Republic of Poland, the government has set a minimal objective of reaching 2.5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product to national defense by 2030\(^\text{429}\). The same year that this defense strategy came out, a budget report for the Ministry of National Defense indicated that the professional Polish military numbered 129,000 troops (105,000 active duty, 20,000 reserve forces, and 4,000 cadets in the officer corps)\(^\text{430}\). To Poland’s east, the Russian Federation has one million active duty and demonstrated the ability to mobilize over 300,000 at one

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time for official military exercises. While Poland’s military is the largest in NATO’s eastern flank, it is still 10 times smaller than Russia’s and three times smaller than what Russia has demonstrated that it can successfully coordinate at one time. What was Poland’s answer to this numerical disadvantage? The answer is actually two pronged: volunteer militias and pushing for a permanent American military presence in the country.

In 2016, Deutsche Welle reported that thousands of Poles were lining up to volunteer in paramilitary militias to assist in Poland’s national defense in case of Russian aggression similar to that observed in Ukraine. The idea of these paramilitary units spurred then Minister of Defense, Antoni Macierewicz, to establish the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) to act in a similar fashion to the National Guard, similar to the Estonian Defense League and other forces in the Baltic states. The Polish government is looking at boosting the total number of the WOT to 50,000 people, which would act as guerilla forces across Poland to supplement the professional military. Besides supplementing the military with paramilitary and militia forces, the Polish government has set a security objective of establishing permanent American military bases on Polish soil, similar to that of the American military bases in Germany. When Polish President Andrzej Duda visited Washington D.C., he displayed Poland’s eagerness of achieving this objective by offering to name the permanent U.S. military installations “Fort Trump.” The Trump administration has taken the Polish interest in a permanent U.S. military installation seriously enough that then Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Kathryn

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434 Gao, “Poland Plans to Fight Russia,” 2018.

Wheelbarger, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the Department of Defense was actively looking at options for this presence, but would not go into detail in an unclassified setting. Months later, when President Duda returned to Washington, President Trump would not go into specifics about the topic, but did state the plan would be to pull 2,000 troops from bases in Germany and post them at the Polish installation, which would put the number of U.S. troops in Poland at 6,000 at any given time.

Analysis and Recommendations

Russian hybrid warfare has been the main instrument of President Putin’s war on Liberal Democracy and the Liberal World Order as envisioned by American President Woodrow Wilson and later American international relations experts during the Cold War. In order to legitimize his campaign of fomenting anarchy within this Liberal World Order, President Putin has used the American unilateral invasion of Iraq, under President George W. Bush, as legal justification for Russian unilateral military action to achieve its own objectives. Having seemed to study American literature and the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan since the attacks on 9/11, the Putin’s Russia has adopted asymmetrical warfare to attack adversaries and destabilize their institutions. Using 2001 to 2013 as a time frame, one can assume that the Russian military was studying U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal, the pioneer of the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) war machine in the war on terror.


McChrystal’s understanding of the situation in Iraq and use of SOF in Iraq turned 2004’s record of 18 specialized night raids against insurgents into 300 per month by August 2006\(^\text{439}\). McChrystal also acknowledges that part of what he and his subordinates did was learn from the situation, increase communications across a wider geographic network, and utilize intelligence to begin eliminating countless insurgent targets each and every night. Alexander Salt writes that McChrystal’s approach was network-centric and allowed for retention of traditional capabilities with professionalism, technology, and overwhelming force when needed in order to successfully conduct swift and precise operations. Salt also writes that McChrystal’s reforms were able, “to create a quasi-flattened command hierarchy for JSOC, which would allow for maximum organizational efficiency by attempting to streamline information gathering, analysis, and distribution”\(^\text{440}\).

McChrystal’s revolution in the way that SOF were able to swiftly and asymmetrically overpower targets was an example for other major conventional militaries to admire and adopt. The operation to swiftly take over the Crimean Peninsula is an example of other militaries following this lead. Following the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Operations doctrine definition of the capabilities of SOF, these capabilities can be attributed to this operation. Specifically, the capabilities listed are:

1. Conduct operations with CF, multinational partners, and IGOs.
2. Work closely with foreign military and civilian authorities and populations, when directed.
3. Deploy rapidly and provide tailored responses.
4. Gain access to hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas to prepare the operational environment for future operations and develop options for addressing potential national concerns.
5. Conduct operations in austere environments with limited support and a low-profile.
7. Assess local situations and report rapidly.
8. Execute special operations missions using nonstandard equipment\(^\text{441}\).

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In Crimea, the Russian SOF were able to deploy rapidly, gain access to the territory and prepare it for a future military operation, conduct their operation without any support, and execute their mission without any standard equipment. The speed was demonstrated when President Putin admitted that these SOF were able to take over the parliament of Crimea four days following his decision to retake the peninsula\(^\text{442}\). This also paved the way for the Russian military to deploy 100,000 personnel so that the territory could not be retaken\(^\text{443}\). They demonstrated the ability to conduct the operation without any support or standard equipment as they were in unmarked uniforms and lightly armed\(^\text{444}\). The application of McChrystal’s revolution in SOF was also being used by the Russians elsewhere around the world, such as in Syria and Venezuela.

The Special Operations doctrine also discusses the SOF role in conducting irregular warfare and unconventional warfare. The doctrine specifically defines irregular warfare as, “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” It also states that the goal is to, “create instability and disrupt and negate state legitimacy and governance to gain and maintain control or influence over and the support of a relevant population”\(^\text{445}\). According to the doctrine, this is paired with unconventional warfare to, “support an insurgency, or resistance movement against a nation state,” in a hostile nation (Ukraine) and “support a nation state against an insurgency, resistance, or terrorists” (Syria and Venezuela). The Russian SOF have been supporting the nation states of Syria and Venezuela against resistance movements and an insurgency\(^\text{446}\). The Russians have also accomplished this by the use of military


contractors\textsuperscript{447}. The specific military contracting company, the Wagner Group, emerged when they were engaged by U.S. SOF in Syria and suffered 200 casualties\textsuperscript{448}. It was this same group that deployed to Venezuela in January of 2019 to shore up the security of President Nicolas Maduro as it seemed that his rule was in danger and a civil war would break out\textsuperscript{449}.

The relevancy of the Russian SOF and their adoptions of American military doctrine would have wide implications for the security of Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine. These three countries have shown a dependence on the United States and NATO allies for their protection, but they have also shown a keen interest on the idea of guerilla forces and fighting an invasion via asymmetric means. The Russian experience has shown that, even having adopted the American doctrine, they cannot fully employ the tactics to an American level when fighting American forces. The 200 casualties in Syria display that. The casualties in Syria did something else, it showed that if you are willing to contact and destroy these Russian SOF conducting hybrid warfare operations, then you can stop the further progression and advance of their campaign\textsuperscript{450}. In this regard, these three countries have the advantage, as the United States has military personnel, and SOF in each of these countries, preparing local forces in the event of such an invasion\textsuperscript{451}. Yet all of the training in the world won’t help these people unless they are prepared to use it and repel a foreign invasion, which their very


presence in the volunteer and professional military organizations of their
countries would indicate. One recommendation that the governments of
these countries could consider, is something similar to Uniformed Servic-
es Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which
guarantees American citizens who sign up for military service (professional
or reserve) protections against termination of employment452. Adopting
similar statutes in these countries would boost the morale of those seek-
ing to volunteer for their respective uniformed services, whether it be the
professional militaries or these self-defense forces being adopted by re-
spective defense ministries, by ensuring that their participation does not
threaten their “day jobs” and civilian occupations. It would also justify all
of the various training opportunities and schedules that the respective de-
Fense ministries are putting in place, as there is job security for those will-
ing to make the ultimate sacrifice in the name of patriotism.

Conclusion

The Russian use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine has spread fears across the
former Soviet space that Moscow will take away the sovereignty of the citi-
zens it once controlled. In the region, the specific attacks that have been
observed have been focused on former Soviet republics but have ranged
from cyberwarfare to kinetic warfare. The new Russian military school of
thought appears built on American military doctrine and has adopted the
tactics and methods written and used by American military leadership and
thinkers. Although successful in a limited scale, the Russian adoption has
not been a match against the U.S. employment of the same methods and
tactics when directly engaged. A large portion of the kinetic warfare be-
ing used in this new strategy is reliant on asymmetric warfare. Defend-
ing NATO’s eastern flank, Estonia and Poland are working with the United
States to prepare in the case of a Russian invasion on their soil just as
Ukraine, outside of NATO, is doing the same to the south to prevent further

progression of this invasion. This security effort is also heavily dependent upon civilian volunteers who will act as guerillas if the need ever arises. What is clear is that if there is an invasion of Estonia or Poland, the professional and volunteer militaries will be dependent upon American military help, which has already proven successful when engaging Russian forces in the type of warfare that it was instrumental in developing.

Bibliography


Abstract: Since the Second World War, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols were developed to protect civilians from the consequences of armed conflicts by distinguishing them from combatants. With the advent of non-State armed groups and foreign participation in non-international conflicts, this distinction required clarification of the rules pertaining to the protection of civilians participating in armed conflicts. In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) released the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, providing recommendations for such situations. However, the emergence of cyber warfare now requires that this guidance be further expanded. The abuses resulting from the United States’ War on Terror illustrate the consequences of vague consensus on terrorism and gaps in international law. Independent interpretations, such as the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013) and Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2017), provide the groundwork for the ICRC, but the continued existence of numerous interpretations surrounding cyber operations allow for the undermining of civilian protections. Thus, it is necessary for the ICRC to establish official protections of civilians for cyber participation in hostilities.

Keywords: International Committee of the Red Cross, International humanitarian law, IHL, Armed conflict, Direct participation in hostilities, Targeting civilians, Cyber operations.
Introduction

The Second World War proved that there needed to be laws applicable to all nations to protect civilians during times of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) Geneva Conventions of 1949, which will be discussed further in this paper, provided such protection and further extended them to the international and non-international conflicts of the Cold War era through amendments. Since then, civilians have become more involved as private entities in close proximity with armed conflicts. Without a recognized definition of “direct participation in hostilities,” the concept can be manipulated to undermine civilian protections. In 2009, the ICRC provided guidance that declares the situations to which international humanitarian laws apply for civilian involvement during armed conflicts. However, the criteria and interpretations provided do not apply to the cyber dimension of warfare. Situations of cyber operations being met with lethal force in 2015 and 2019 have introduced a new dilemma regarding civilian participation and the limits of protection concerning the distinction between cyber participation in hostilities as opposed to cyber-crime and terrorism.

Targeting Civilians in Warfare

Initial humanitarian laws in the 19th century focused on protecting combatants, as they were suffering from widespread injury and sickness without means of medical help on the battlefield. During the peak of conventional warfare in the Second World War, both the Allies and Axis powers employed various methods of violence against each other, including the use of bombing campaigns. The German Luftwaffe’s raids over Warsaw and the Blitz of London indiscriminately bombed both military and civilian targets, killing thousands. Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF), in conjunction with the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), retaliated by area bombing the German cities of Hamburg and Dresden. Alongside the difficulties of using precision bombing at the time, Britain opted for area bombing as a means to break the morale of the enemy’s population in hopes they
would pressure their governments to surrender. The justification for the indiscriminate targeting of civilians surrounded the role of factory workers who were constructing arms and ammunition for the military. The logic for such was that if factories could be legitimate targets, so should the people operating within them. This came to be a negligible goal, as it ultimately served to strengthen their morale instead. German citizens remained efficient in rebuilding damaged infrastructure for the majority of the war, and the Nazi Party used the bombings as propaganda against the Allies. It was not until the USAAF were able to accurately target resource supply lines that a greater impact on Germany’s fighting capabilities was achieved. On the Pacific Front, USAAF employed a similar strategy to the RAF through the firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Existing international humanitarian laws prohibited the bombardment of undefended structures and required that “all necessary steps” be taken to avoid attacking buildings of art, charity, religion, science, historic monuments, and hospitals. However, such laws had to be reemphasized and reevaluated concerning the more complex role of civilians in armed conflicts.

Protection of Civilians

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules created by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that intends to “limit the effects of armed conflict” through the protection of those who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities. It is primarily composed of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its amendments. The first and second conventions protect wounded and sick soldiers as well as religious

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454 A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified? (Bloomsbury, 2007).
455 Ibid., 251.
456 Ibid., 251–252.
457 Ibid., 195.
and medical units during warfare on land and sea. The third protects prisoners of war, while the fourth protects civilians from the consequences of war. Two amendments to the conventions were created in 1977, known as Additional Protocols, to address issues that arose during the conflicts of the Cold War era. Protocol I strengthens the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, where two States are involved. Protocol II further protects victims of non-international conflicts, which are restricted to the territory of a single State, and was the first international treaty to be directed at such conflicts explicitly. Article 3, common to all four conventions, applies to non-international conflicts through implementation of key concepts such as: humane, unbiased treatment for those within custody of opposing forces; prohibiting murder, mutilation, torture, cruel and humiliating treatment, hostage taking, and unfair trial; requires that the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked be collected and cared for; and grants the ICRC the right to offer its services to the parties involved in the conflict. This is an important clause, as most conflicts today are non-international. It is vital that these protections be applied correctly and clearly to the appropriate populations. To guarantee that IHL encompassed all situations, the ICRC established customary rules that apply globally. The first six rules clarify the distinction between civilians and combatants:

1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

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(2) Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited\textsuperscript{465}.

(3) All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious personnel\textsuperscript{466}.

(4) The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates\textsuperscript{467}.

(5) Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians\textsuperscript{468}.

(6) Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities\textsuperscript{469}.

**Direct Participation in Hostilities**

The concept of “direct participation in hostilities” in rule 6 was vague and required clarification. In 2009, the ICRC released the *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law*. Within the *Interpretive Guidance*, “hostilities” is the collective employment of methods used to injure an enemy by the parties of a conflict, and “participation” is the involvement of individuals in such hostilities. Thus, “direct participation in hostilities” is considered “specific acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict”\textsuperscript{470}. The *Interpretive Guidance* lays out clear criteria that must be met for a civilian action to be considered direct participation in hostilities:

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\textsuperscript{470} Nils Melzer, *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law* (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009), 43.
Direct Participation in Hostilities

(1) Threshold of harm: The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack\textsuperscript{471}.

(2) Direct causation: There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part\textsuperscript{472}.

(3) Belligerent nexus: The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another\textsuperscript{473}.

Having met the above criteria, the next concern is the beginning and end of the perpetrator’s loss of protection. It would be difficult to determine whether a civilian has previously participated in a conflict or plans to in the future, so the loss of protection is restricted to the specific acts committed, as to prevent unjust targeting\textsuperscript{474}. The \textit{Interpretive Guidance} considers the act of direct participation to include any preparations made beforehand for the purpose of the act, and their deployment to and from the act’s location\textsuperscript{475}. While civilians lose protection during the duration of these acts, so do members of non-State organized armed groups that participate in an armed conflict, for as long as they assume a combat function\textsuperscript{476}. Before engaging in hostilities, there must be undoubted determination of whether a person is a civilian, and, if so, whether they are directly participating in hostilities\textsuperscript{477}. This is a difficult, but necessary proposition; for example, if a non-state organized armed group were employed as protection of a party’s armed forces during a time of armed conflict, their status depends on who they protect against:

\textsuperscript{471} Ibid., 47.
\textsuperscript{472} Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{474} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{475} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{476} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{477} Ibid., 74.
The line between the defense of military personnel and other military objectives against enemy attacks (direct participation in hostilities) and the protection of those same persons and objects against crime or violence unrelated to the hostilities (law enforcement/defense of self or others) may be thin\textsuperscript{478}.

Thus, engaging with hostile combatants or criminals can determine the legal standing of participating civilians. Even so, the Interprettive Guidance urges that the force used against those unprotected from direct attack be kept to the temporary minimum of what is necessary for a strategic goal\textsuperscript{479}. When the civilians or members of non-state organized armed groups cease participation in a combat function, they regain protection from direct attack. However, this does not protect them from prosecution for violations of domestic or international law committed during their participation\textsuperscript{480}.

Implications

The Interprettive Guidance provided by the ICRC is critical to preventing the exploitation of civilian protections by parties to an armed conflict. Without such, what is considered “direct participation in hostilities” can be determined independently, with some opting for strict criteria while others may choose a looser interpretation. The consequences could potentially allow for a government persecution of its people to appear legal under IHL, claiming that the victims were involved in armed conflict and that it was legitimate warfare. This hypothetical can be compared with other subjects, such as the situation regarding terrorism. In response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States declared a “War on Terror” through a Joint Resolution of Public Law 107–40, authorizing the use of military force:

> The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on

\textsuperscript{478} Ibid., 38.

\textsuperscript{479} Ibid., 77.

\textsuperscript{480} Ibid., 83.
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons\textsuperscript{481}.

This exploits the lack of internationally agreed upon definitions for terrorism, allowing for the ongoing interventions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria. The authorization was also used to justify the targeting of U.S. citizens operating within terrorist cells. In 2011, 16-year-old Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi was killed with six others by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen, without an accusation of any crime\textsuperscript{482}. The act quickly met a backlash in U.S. court, with accusations toward the Central Intelligence Agency for killing Al-Aulaqi without due process and not as a last resort, claiming he was not an imminent threat; however, the case was dismissed\textsuperscript{483}. This is just one of many examples within the War on Terror that exploits vulnerabilities in international policy that can be used to undermine civilian protections. The next era of disputed hostilities is occurring in the realm of cyber warfare.

In 2009, private contractors and civilian employees in proximity to armed conflicts were primary concerns for the Interpretive Guidance, in terms of the legality of targeting such participants and protections allotted to them. Ten years later, armed conflicts have become evermore complex in the cyber realm. The definition of cyber participation in hostilities is now obscure enough to require official interpretation. A landmark case occurred in May of 2019, when Israel countered a cyber operation with lethal force. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) successfully intercepted a cyber-attack perpetrated by Hamas, and retaliated with an air strike on the suspected headquarters of the perpetrators in Gaza\textsuperscript{484}. The justification for striking the building was that Hamas “attempted to establish offensive cyber capabilities within the

\textsuperscript{481} United States of America, 107th Congress (September 18, 2001), \textit{Public Law 107–40} (Vol. 147 ed.), Congressional Record.


Gaza Strip and to try and harm the Israeli cyber realm”\textsuperscript{485}. Many militaries consider the cyber dimension as a “domain of military operations,” though the scope of this domain is contested\textsuperscript{486}. Regardless, if the perpetrators were undoubtedly members or under command of Hamas, the airstrike was legal for IHL, as per customary rules 3 and 4\textsuperscript{487}. A precursor to this situation occurred in 2015, when the U.S. targeted Junaid Hussain\textsuperscript{488}. Hussain was a recruiter for the Islamic State and responsible for two attacks committed by his recruits as well as the hack of the accounts for many U.S. personnel in 2015\textsuperscript{489}. According to former FBI Chief of Staff, John P. Carlin, Hussain was an “imminent threat to the American homeland, and since we couldn’t reach him with handcuffs, he was a top priority for the military”\textsuperscript{490}. Thus it prompted the drone strike killing of Hussain in Syria later that same year. It is not disputed that these two instances were legal under IHL, but the hypothetical implications surrounding them pose ethical dilemmas. If instead, Hussain had been acting alone to hack U.S. personnel data, would he still lose protections from direct attack? How does IHL apply to cyberattacks committed in times of no armed conflict with the perpetrator? What constitutes lethal retaliation? These questions will eventually require an answer by an international authority.

Some have already recognized these issues of civilian protection in the cyber realm. Published in 2017 by international experts participating in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, the \textit{Tallin Manual and Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations} recommends how IHL be applied to cyber warfare. However, it does not apply as IHL, because it is only an independent interpretation and so

\begin{footnotesize}
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\textsuperscript{486} Groll, “The Future Is Here, and It Features Hackers Getting Bombed.” \\
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{488} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.
\end{tabular}
\end{footnotesize}
necessitates a higher officiality to gain compliance. Thus, if a comprehensive guidance were to be created, it would need to be set forth by the ICRC.

**Conclusion**

The strategic bombings in Poland, Britain, Germany, and Japan during the Second World War necessitated protections for civilians from direct attacks during armed conflicts. The ICRC succeeded in prohibiting such actions by distinguishing civilians from combatants and declaring that civilian participation does not permit the targeting of them. However, as the civilian’s role in armed conflicts became evermore intertwined with the combatants’, a further distinction was required for what would be considered “direct participation in hostilities.” The *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law* succeeded in determining such for private contractors and civilians employed in armed conflicts but failed to resolve the issue of participation through cyber means.

U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, in retaliation for cyber-attacks, now necessitate clarification of such participation and the limits of protection. As shown in the U.S. War on Terror, non-consensus for terrorism allows for manipulations to the jurisdiction of countering it, such as circumventing due process for U.S. citizens by means of drone strikes. Thus, I think it is of critical importance that ICRC expand their *Interpretive Guidance* to clarify protections of civilian participation in the cyber dimension of modern conflicts. This should be done in consideration of the recommendations made by the *Tallin Manual and Tallinn Manual 2.0* and other independent studies that carefully interpret the customary rules of IHL and its application for cyber operations. These studies on their own are only legal frameworks for those in agreement with it, so official guidance should be provided by the ICRC to clarify and distinguish cyber participation in hostilities globally.
Bibliography


The Scope of Cryptocurrency in the Information Age

Eric NESBITT

Abstract: In this information age we are living in, we are on the cusp of a major technological paradigm shift that will have reverberating effects through every aspect of society; cryptocurrency implementation into major security threats has the potential of altering the security world as we know it. The purpose of paper is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of what cryptocurrency is, blockchain technology, the use of cryptocurrency by illicit actors, terrorist organization’s use of cryptocurrency, and ways in which law enforcement/security agencies can prevent the nefarious use of cryptocurrency. Additionally, this paper aims to provide resources to further expand on discussed topics; ultimately helping academics, decision makers, and policy setters with advancing the understanding of cryptocurrency in our modern world.

Keywords: Cryptocurrency, Security Threats, Blockchain, Peer-To-Peer (P2P) Network, Bitcoin, Public Ledger, Cryptography, Hash, Proof-of-work Mechanism, Fiat Currencies, Ransomware, Encryption, Mining, Bitcoin ATM, Altcoins, Terrorist Financing

Introduction

Right now, the largest theft of currency in history could be occurring. A single person, in a country across the world, could be draining the accounts of thousands without anyone being witness. By the time the theft would be noticed, authorities alerted, and the case transferred to the proper agency; all of that currency would be laundered and stored away. If that single person is strategic, they would hide their tracks exceptionally well
and may never get caught. This type of theft is a very real occurrence that is happening in the world today. The massive growth of cryptocurrency in our everyday global society has opened up entirely new categories of illicit activities that current legal precedent is being decided on this very day. What needs to be discussed is to what extent is cryptocurrency used to aid in illicit activities? This question, and subsequently related questions to cryptocurrency will be answered further on.

What is Cryptocurrency?

Before diving into the intricacies of cryptocurrencies use for nefarious purposes, the question of what cryptocurrency is must be addressed. It is very important to note that there is not a clearly defined single definition for cryptocurrency. Depending on which financial instructions, organizations, or government is defining it, there are slight differences. The best definition is put forth from a report requested by the European Parliament on combating cryptocurrency and crime. The definition used pulls from those issued by the World Bank and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on the topic of cryptocurrency. The definition of cryptocurrency is as follows: “a digital representation of value that (i) is intended to constitute a peer-to-peer ("P2P") alternative to government-issued legal tender, (ii) is used as a general-purpose medium of exchange (independent of any central bank), (iii) is secured by a mechanism known as cryptography and (iv) can be converted into legal tender and vice versa”\(^{491}\). In the remainder of this paper, the term cryptocurrency will be referring to this definition.

Cryptocurrency started to gain popularity in 2008 with a paper titled *Bitcoin – A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System* which was written by a Satoshi Nakamoto\(^{492}\). In this paper, the critical peer to peer exchange system of currency, including the all-important blockchain, was introduced. It was


not until 2009 that Bitcoin could be used by the public, at which point it quickly gained traction. It should be noted that there were other cryptocurrencies prior to Bitcoin, but none were nearly as successful, even up to today\textsuperscript{493}. After 2010, Bitcoin saw steady growth, but also began its pathway towards illicit activity. The Silk Road, a black-market store located on the dark web sold anything from illicit drugs to firearms; its currency used, Bitcoin. This played a big factor in building the value of Bitcoin and sparked the creation of other forms of cryptocurrency. Today, there are around 1600 different types of cryptocurrency, but the ‘big five’ control most of the market —\textsuperscript{494} Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Bitcoin Cash, and Litecoin\textsuperscript{495}. The reasons for the development and growth of these other kinds of cryptocurrency all revolved around the changing market and privacy.

There are some key terms and functions that must be discussed in order to explain the growth of other cryptocurrencies, and how they factor into modern day illicit activities. The first is the \textit{blockchain} this is essentially a public ledger of every single peer-to-peer cryptocurrency transaction that occurs. It is open to anyone with a connection to the internet and all transactions can be viewed. Another key term is a \textit{wallet}, this is a digital application that allows cryptocurrency users to store and retrieve their digital assets. For every single exchange that happens in the blockchain, a new wallet is formed; this happens every time, with every transaction. For each wallet the user needs a key to be able to access it. This is a sophisticated string of letters and numbers that can be entered for a specific address that then unlocks the wallet. Keys are quite important, and often cryptocurrency users will have them on secure flash drives that will self-encrypt if tampered with. The final significant term is called \textit{mining} or \textit{cryptomining}; this is the process of verifying a transaction and adding it to the blockchain. This can serve two purposes, first is legitimizing the exchange of cryptocurrency and the other is hiding a transaction\textsuperscript{496}.

\textsuperscript{493} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{494} Matthew Frankel, \textit{How Many Cryptocurrencies Are There?}, (The Motley Fool, 2018).
\textsuperscript{495} Houben, Snyers, \textit{Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain}, 30.
\textsuperscript{496} Rosemary Bigmore, \textit{Decoding crypto-speak: the ultimate cryptocurrency jargon-buster}, (The Telegraph, 2018).
In Depth Analysis of Blockchain Technology

Simply put, a blockchain is a distributed digital ledger that is completely open and accessible to everyone via the internet. Simply Explain describes a blockchain a string of blocks, each of which contains key information that once recorded, is almost impossible to change. In the case of Bitcoin currency, the information in each block relates to each separate transaction. When a transaction is completed using Bitcoin the information of who sent it, who received it, and how much is all stored permanently on the blockchain public ledger. What makes the blockchain a congruent string of information comes from the hash that is placed on the front and back of each block. The hash ties the information to the previous block and to the next one, thus creating a chain of information that can be traced back all the way to the genesis block, or the beginning of the ledger⁴⁹⁷.

With the blockchain ledger being completely open and accessible by anyone with an internet connection, what makes it so secure and trusted? There are three measures in place in a blockchain to ensure it is secured and to prevent nefarious tampering actions. The first is the hash system. This is crucial because it creates the connection between each block and makes it possible to trace each transaction. The next is the mechanism called proof-of-work, and this is put in place to purposely slow down the creation of new blocks in the chain. Proof-of-work gives all important time for the final step of security, verification from the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network that the blockchain is stored on. A blockchain ledger is not stored on a single computer but on multiple public servers across the globe⁴⁹⁸. In fact, each new person who joins the blockchain gets a copy of the complete ledger, and after each transaction it is updated.

If, for example there was a string of five blocks in a small blockchain, and in the second block a large quantity of cryptocurrency was sold that an illicit actor wanted to hide. The actor would go into the blockchain and try

to create an alternate chain from the transaction to hide the large quantity of cryptocurrency moved. By doing this they change the end hash of the second block, which does not match the next block and therefore must be changed. This process continues down the entire chain, and each hash must be changed. Modern computers are extremely fast, and this process would be easy if not for the Proof-of-work slowing mechanism and then verification from all members of the P2P network\(^{499}\). This is what makes blockchain technology so secure and has solidified it as a digital technology that will be developed and implemented into multiple modern-day industries.

With a secure blockchain in place in major cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, the obvious question can be asked, what is drawing illicit actors to using cryptocurrency? One would assume that illicit actors would seek alternatives means of acquiring and distributing capital given that every cryptocurrency transaction can be traced, and that tampering is made nearly impossibly with the blockchain technology. The major drawing factor to illicit actors to use the cryptocurrency and blockchain technology, is its infancy\(^{500}\). Legislation is still being determined about the adaptation of cryptocurrency, law enforcement/security agencies are just beginning to understand and educate on illicit cryptocurrency activities, and crafty methodology transactions on the blockchain that can be well hidden. It should also be noted that each day new cryptocurrencies are being formed and gaining popularity, and each cryptocurrency is not created equally. Bitcoin has a well implemented blockchain at its disposal, but other cryptocurrencies do not follow such a strict standard. There are even new cryptocurrencies that do not utilize blockchain technology, and it is these that illicit actors to seek to exploit them for nefarious purposes.


Analysis of Current Cryptocurrency Use

In 2017 there was a massive boom in Bitcoin, causing investors to turn into overnight millionaires with only owning a small amount of Bitcoin. Jackson reports, “It took Bitcoin less than a year to 20x its value through 2017”\textsuperscript{501}. This boom caused the individual price of a Bitcoin to skyrocket, reaching nearly $1000 overnight. By October of 2017 Bitcoin saw an increase of nearly 300%, reaching its peak price of $4,900 for one individual coin\textsuperscript{502}. This drew a large general public interest to Bitcoin, with hopes of new investors becoming overnight millionaires through buying and trading Bitcoin.

This explosion in Bitcoin caused a wave of creation of new types of Altcoins; these are alternative cryptocurrencies to Bitcoin that either imitate the same system of Bitcoin (publicly accessible ledger), or use alternative methods of operation\textsuperscript{503}. Some employ a completely anonymous and untraceable system that has no public ledger, while others are fully accountable and require personal identifying information. The creation of these new cryptocurrencies had one goal in mind: develop a large enough group of investors to create a boom in the market, similar to the one that Bitcoin had gone through\textsuperscript{504}. Several of these cryptocurrencies gained large popularity which shifted the market of cryptocurrency as a whole, and propelled cryptocurrency as a viable option for the general public.

As of the third quarter of 2019, the number of blockchain wallet users is 42,290,501\textsuperscript{505}. This is nearly seven times larger than the number of wallet users in the Blockchain in 2016, and massively larger than when cryptocurrencies became mainstream in 2010. Below are the current standings of the top ten cryptocurrencies:

\textsuperscript{501} Reuben Jackson, *Understanding the Last Three-year Cryptocurrency Rollercoaster*, (Bigthink, 2019).
\textsuperscript{502} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{504} Reuben Jackson, *Understanding the Last Three-year Cryptocurrency Rollercoaster*, (Bigthink, 2019).
\textsuperscript{505} Szmigiera, *Number of Blockchain Wallet Users Globally 2016–2019*, (Statista, 2019).
**Table 11.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Market Cap (USD)</th>
<th>Supply Limit</th>
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<td>BTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethereum</td>
<td>ETH</td>
<td>$57,462,517,858.00</td>
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<td>Ripple</td>
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<td>$23,790,387,789.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bitcoin Cash</td>
<td>BCH</td>
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<td>21 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litecoin</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>$6,704,709,572.00</td>
<td>84 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stellar</td>
<td>XLM</td>
<td>$5,128,373,973.00</td>
<td>100 billion</td>
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<td>Dash</td>
<td>DASH</td>
<td>$2,592,894,544.00</td>
<td>17.74–18.92 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Houben, Snyers, *Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain*, 30.

Number of Blockchain wallet users worldwide from 3rd quarter 2016 to 3rd quarter 2019.

**Figure 11.1.** Szungera, *Number of Blockchain Wallet Users Globally 2016–2019*, 2019
What Illicit Actors are Using Cryptocurrency?

The use of cryptocurrency in illicit activities has grown exponentially since it started to become mainstream in 2010. As a federal criminal analyst put it, “cryptocurrency is used in a variety of ways by criminals”\(^5^{06}\). Some illicit actors engage in illegal fraud schemes that require them to be paid in cryptocurrency. A very common one is a user downloading ransomware onto their computer, and the hacker demanding payment of Bitcoin. Another way that is becoming popular is targeting individuals who hold large volumes of cryptocurrency. These individuals, also known as ‘whales’ often brag or flaunt their wealth on social media sites, drawing attention from hackers\(^5^{07}\). Those hackers then use SIM swapping and identity theft techniques to drain the whales’ crypto accounts. Some actors who usually run and operate organized crime have moved to cryptocurrency as a layering and laundering method to wash, store, and secure their criminal bounties too. Then there are the illicit purchases using cryptocurrency. While the darknet website Silk Road has been shut down, many other illicit sites that sell the same materials and services exist. A final way in which cryptocurrency is used in an illicit way is within the community itself. With new cryptocurrencies popping up frequently, illicit actors will develop a new currency that will get others to invest in. In reality they are just handing over their legitimate crypto assets to a fake one that then gets transferred to the creator’s wallet and is gone.

The next group that uses cryptocurrency in their criminal endeavors are various types of organized crime groups. While there is no supporting evidence for street gangs using cryptocurrency in their operations, national mafias and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) have been known to exploit cryptocurrency\(^5^{08}\). National mafias, such as the Chaldean mafia, have a large presence in and around Detroit, Michigan, USA, often using

\(^5^{06}\) Federal criminal analyst, interview by Eric Nesbitt, (United States of America, 2019).


\(^5^{08}\) Federal criminal analyst, interview by Eric Nesbitt, (United States of America, 2019).
cryptocurrency gambling sites to try to gain value and wash proceeds. They have been known to commit fraud schemes on businesses in the area and take their proceeds and hide them as cryptocurrency\textsuperscript{509}. OMGs have adopted a much more physical and ludicrous approach to exploiting cryptocurrency. Like one off hackers, they scour social media in search of crypto whales who are flaunting purchases and leaving behind a trail of personal information. When the OMG has identified the individual, they then kidnap them and hold them hostage, demanding access to their crypto assets. Once given access, they drain the wallets into their own and are off. The first major instance of this was in 2017 and was conducted by a Bronx biker group\textsuperscript{510}. While this was the first newsworthy attack, the potential for similar attacks is extremely high.

**Terrorism and Cryptocurrency**

Currently, terrorist organizations along with the rest of the world, are living on the edge of a paradigm shift in technology. One that will fundamentally change the global society as we know it in the near future. Every aspect of how we as humans operate will change – from daily interactions, to complex problem solving. In this wave of change falls cryptocurrency, specifically its potential use by terrorist organizations. It must be noted that, “there is little indication that terrorist organizations are using cryptocurrency in any sort of extensive or systematic way”\textsuperscript{511}. The primary reason for this is the lack of use/acceptance from the global population. It is a small subset of certain individuals who are implementing cryptocurrency into their everyday lives. The technology, for many terrorist organizations is beyond the scope of their capabilities; and the time and resource investment to make cryptocurrency a viable option is not worth it.

\textsuperscript{509} Federal criminal analyst, interview by Eric Nesbitt, (United States of America, 2019).

\textsuperscript{510} Habiba Tahir, *Bronx Biker Gang Members Charged in $2 Million Ether Kidnapping*, (CNN, 2019).

Why then should law enforcement, state security agencies, and the world be concerned about terrorist use of cryptocurrency? The potential for terrorist organizations to gain massive amounts of funding through cryptocurrency is very high. Through further advancement of blockchain technology cryptocurrency will become a more viable option for everyday users, drawing in terrorist organization members. Additionally, new cryptocurrencies are appearing every day, and each have the potential to be used by a terrorist organization to fund their operations. One report warns, “Several recent advances in cryptocurrencies will facilitate their use by the most sophisticated groups that threaten terrorism against Western countries, and the use of cryptocurrencies will be especially enabling for actors that already engage in transnational fundraising and criminal activities”\textsuperscript{512}.

In summary, groups such as Al-qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Narcoterrorist organizations, and lone-wolf attackers all have a potential need/use for cryptocurrency\textsuperscript{513}. In the report by the RAND Corporation titled \textit{Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies}, there are listed five major uses that terrorist groups, such as the one mentioned previously, use cryptocurrency for including: fundraising, illegal drug and arms trafficking, remittance and transfer of funds, attack funding, and operational funding\textsuperscript{514}. Large terrorist organization may seek support through cryptocurrency donations, and often would prefer this method because it leaves the transaction anonymous to those who may try to trace it. Additionally, sourcing illegal weapons through the darknet via the use of cryptocurrency is easier and safer than doing above ground deals. As mentioned earlier from the RAND report, there is no overwhelming evidence suggesting that cryptocurrency is a mainstream part of everyday terrorist operations. The potential for use and major benefits reaped are there and must be monitored by law enforcement, security agencies, and governments.


\textsuperscript{513} Dion-Schwarz, Manheim, Johnston, \textit{Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies}, xii.

\textsuperscript{514} Dion-Schwarz, Manheim, Johnston, \textit{Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies}, xi.
Combating Nefarious Cryptocurrency Use

A common problem exists for all users of cryptocurrency for illicit purposes. Once they have acquired a large sum of cryptocurrency, they generally want to convert it into some form of fiat currency\(^{515}\). In an interview with a federal criminal analyst, they state the ways in which an illicit actor can convert cryptocurrency:

> Even then, most illicit actors still want to liquidate any cryptocurrency back into U.S. dollars, but this can be difficult. There are generally three ways to convert Bitcoin back into cash. First, an actor can utilize an exchange to move large amounts of cryptocurrency, but these exchanges generally follow anti-money laundering regulations and require know-your-customer (KYC) information. Second, an actor can rely on peer-to-peer marketplaces like LocalBitcoins.com or other – typically unlicensed – money remitters. Third, an actor may rely on a Bitcoin ATM, but the amount of money they can receive at a time is limited\(^{516}\).

By using these methods, it allows law enforcement to be able to pick up the trail and begin to trace cryptocurrency transactions; but initially picking up that trail is not an easy task.

With Bitcoin being the most popular cryptocurrency, law enforcement has poured a large amount of manpower and time into understanding its complexity\(^{517}\). Often from an onlooker perspective, who has a basic understanding of Bitcoin and the blockchain; the question commonly asked is if every transaction is accounted for on the blockchain, why not just trace it back? The answer is it is not that simple. A Federal Criminal Analyst shared:

> The pseudo-anonymity of cryptocurrencies makes it difficult to effectively target criminals. Since Bitcoin’s blockchain is a public ledger, technically anyone can track it, but it requires the initial identification of a transaction...

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\(^{516}\) Federal criminal analyst, interview by Eric Nesbitt, (United States of America, 2019).

or Bitcoin address of interest. This initial identification is generally more difficult than say tracking wire activity after a cash deposit at a financial institution\(^{518}\).

As it was briefly touched upon earlier, nefarious users of cryptocurrency are very good at hiding their tracks. When a large amount of cryptocurrency is acquired, they run it through several methods that essentially wash and hide the transaction. This makes tracing it extremely difficult if not impossible for law enforcement/security agencies.

With this difficult task in front of law enforcement and security agencies, how can they best combat illicit cryptocurrency activities? The first step is to understand the terminology of cryptocurrency\(^{519}\). This way agencies can identify if and when they are dealing with aspects of a case related to cryptocurrency. Additionally, being able to know what key hardware pieces are valuable in a cryptocurrency case could prove vital. For example, knowing to search for an encrypted USB stick which may contain the key to a wallet, could open a new lead for a case. The next piece of information is knowing the basics of financial crimes, because in reality that is what all cryptocurrency cases are\(^{520}\). The terminology and method of acquiring the currency is different than typical financial crimes, but the end result is still the same. By educating law enforcement and security agencies on the subject, and able to predict an illicit actors next move, it makes solving or stopping the illicit activity that much easier. The final step that is critical for law enforcement is having allies within the cryptocurrency world\(^{521}\). Global state agencies need to work together on cases like these in order to ensure no information is lost in communication. Additionally, hiring experts who regularly participate in cryptocurrency markets will boost the knowledge of the entire team on a case. If law enforcement, security agencies, and

\(^{518}\) Federal criminal analyst, interview by Eric Nesbitt, (United States of America, 2019).


state governments can adopt and implement these steps; they will have a significant advantage in combating illicit cryptocurrency activities.

**Concluding Thoughts: What Does the Future of Cryptocurrency Look Like in the Information Age?**

A common question by the security world is what does the future of cryptocurrency look like? This is also a question that the general public should be considering too; will we eventually establish a global economy of only cryptocurrency? Many feel that cryptocurrency being adopted as a whole, in the state that it currently is in, will not work. The delay in transaction is too long and the processing power to mine a global level of transactions would be impossible; the technology simply does not yet exist. The blockchain technology though, is where we could see leaps and bounds of adaptations into our everyday lives. In an interview with a Federal Criminal Analyst, they stated:

> Blockchain technology can be used for anything that requires unique identifiers, high degrees of security, public trust, and rapid processing, and this could include anything from digital advertising to product purchases. I also think standardization of blockchain protocols could enable the technology to be transformational, but this standardization is almost antithetical to the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies\(^{522}\).

The potential for a far different future using blockchain technology is clearly out there and may be adapted, but it hinges on legislation.

What should security agencies, state actors, and the general public do till then? The simple answer: become familiar with cryptocurrency terminology and technology. Having an understanding of the basics can help prevent illicit actors who use cryptocurrency as their primary means of financial attacks from claiming more victims. Additionally, as security agencies continue to learn and develop strategies for tracking and preventing

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\(^{522}\) Federal criminal analyst, interview by Eric Nesbitt, (United States of America, 2019).
cryptocurrency crimes, the safety on the cryptocurrency market will only grow. As noted, “Cryptocurrencies have gone from nonexistent to an enterprise worth billions in less than 10 years”\textsuperscript{523}. They are becoming mainstream by a society that is embracing and growing with new technology every day; and must be recognized by the world as a key financial staple in the global market economy.

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https://bigthink.com/technology-innovation/review-of-cryptocurrency-history?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1


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It is our pleasure to present this unique publication composed of papers written by talented young American students who participated in Terrorism Research Center internship within the framework of the Program “Security and Society in the Information Age” in 2019 at Collegium Civitas University in Warsaw, Poland.


We hope you will find the book interesting and valuable and we cordially invite you to learn more about “Security and Society in the Information Age” programming at: www.securityandsociety.org.